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THE WORLD IS ROUND

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE Administration about to assume power in Washington will find our foreign relations in stalemate. To break it, they will have to fulfill psychological as well as political requirements both at home and abroad. Our people must be freed—helped, rather, to free themselves—from an oppressive sense of unreality, from the feeling that perhaps their great efforts since the end of the war and the sacrifices of their sons in Korea have not been directed to clear and practicable objectives. Our allies must be convinced that there is nothing rash or sinister about what we are trying to do, that the American goal is freedom and peace, and that our efforts to build up defenses against possible Soviet aggression, far from indicating a wish to acquire satellites or a fatalistic acquiescence in a belief in inevitable war, offer the best and only chance of saving freedom and avoiding war.

Two concepts have become basic in our policy toward the Soviets—the "containment" of Soviet expansion, and the hope that once Western forces have been built up sufficiently we shall be able to "negotiate from strength" with the men in the Kremlin. Both need to be clarified.

Containment is generally interpreted as a negative concept. Its virtue when it was first used was that it announced to the world that the United States was willing if necessary to use force to halt Communist aggression. At that period the rest of the Free World still was more worried that we might not do so than that we would. Yet by the very fact of saying to the Russians "thus far and no further" we seemed tacitly to accept their conquests to date. That certainly is not an adequate interpretation of our national intention.

Containment, nevertheless, carries also a more positive implication—that steady pressure exerted on the over-extended Soviet Empire may, in time, cause a contraction and hence a breakup or "mellowing" of Soviet power and policy. It is proper to note, and to remind our friends abroad, that even in this more positive

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sense the theory of containment never carried any hint of aggression by the United States. It was not a blueprint of military strategy; it never pretended to suggest that infantry troops should man this sector, air power take care of that one, sea power assume this or that responsibility. It said that the use of force anywhere by the Soviets should be met with counterforce, reasoning that a revolutionary movement such as Soviet Communism cannot be quiescent and remain strong, and that when it ceases to expand it is likely to begin to contract—and may crack.

The other formulation of our policy is "negotiation from strength." Analysis of it is difficult, for the phrase has never been defined. Presumably it was offered to supply a sense of objective for the intensified rearmament of a year or two ago, and, perhaps, to set at rest the forebodings of those who reason—from questionable historical analogies—that "armament races" lead always to war. Actually it has had something of an opposite effect. To the extent that it has entered into the Western picture of the future it seems to have alarmed rather than reassured our friends abroad, for it suggests to those who think in simplified terms the specter of an American president stepping forth with a hydrogen bomb in one hand and a paper outlining the terms of a general settlement in the other.

In any event, negotiation is not a policy but a method. If we are to negotiate we naturally prefer to negotiate from strength than from weakness. However, to give meaning to the hope that some future negotiation with the Communists might be productive we would have to indicate what we were going to negotiate about. Limited negotiations about particular and restricted matters might be practicable. But the difficulty of negotiating with the Soviets on the general problem of coexistence can be indicated by imagining what the first question on either side might be.

The first question that Stalin would ask us would be, explicitly or tacitly: "What countries are you willing to surrender to me?" Our answer would have to be, "None." One of our first questions to Stalin, in turn, would be: "Will you lift the Iron Curtain?" Now his mortal fear, as with all dictators, is of knowledge and truth. To take a single example, the fantastic Soviet propaganda about our alleged germ warfare in Korea indicates why ideas and facts cannot be allowed to flow back and forth across the Soviet borders. So Stalin's answer to our question also would be, "No."

If we will not appease, will not wage a preventive war, do not

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feel that containment and negotiation in themselves represent a sufficient policy—what then? How are we in America to get back the sense of initiative and direction that inspired our great endeavors like UNRRA, the Marshall Plan and NATO? How are our allies to be reassured that we are neither fatigued and holding back nor jittery and pushing recklessly forward? How are we all to regain confidence that we have a solid mutuality of interest and purpose and that the problems we face are manageable?

II

Soviet strategy is based on the fact that the world is round. So far, our strategic planning is not. In joining the United Nations we recognized that it should be; but although from time to time necessity has made us act as though it were, few would say that the coördination of planning, East and West, had been fully conscious or successful. We are in process of developing a global air strategy. But our military planners, like the rest of us, are confused by the absence of an over-all political strategy. We have not defined it because we have been preoccupied with meeting the Soviet attack as it switches from one side of the world to the other. While the Soviets are mounting their offensive as a whole we attempt to deal with it by halves.

The Communist attack on Korea was the application of the Soviet over-all concept to a particular situation. Moscow ordered the attack on an exposed and almost forgotten salient of the Western coalition because this seemed the most direct way available of destroying the United Nations and the unity of the defense system being built up in Western Europe under the auspices of NATO. And that would, indeed, have been the immediate result if the United Nations majority had not determined to prevent the Korean aggression from succeeding. Had the challenge in Korea been ignored all the premises of collective security action in the world would have been destroyed. The American public would, in effect, have been told by their leaders that it need not take the United Nations seriously. The world would have drawn the logical conclusion that no reliance was to be placed on the United States in future crises; and we, in turn, would have written off our allies. Every threatened nation thereafter would have hastened to make the best terms it could for itself alone—and the Kremlin would have been quick to suggest that the way to get a good bargain was to betray a neighbor. Thus the Soviets

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would have gained without a struggle the first and greatest victory they seek—the breakup of the Western anti-Communist alliance. The Soviet strategy failed in its first objective because when the moment of decision came our Government, which had not included a challenge in Korea among the calculable risks to be guarded against, did nevertheless recognize the universal implications of the Communist attack and the necessity of responding to it. Under strong American leadership the United Nations took the decision not to let the Communist aggression succeed.

It is too early to say, however, that the Korean aggression is not a Soviet success. Locally it registered a setback for Communist arms. But in terms of global strategy it may yet succeed, for it has placed on the Western coalition a severe strain which will continue so long as the crisis does and which (Moscow is quite entitled to think) may at any time divide the coalition irretrievably. The coalition will survive only if each of the principal partners understands the Soviet strategy and determines not to lose sight of the character which that strategy imposes on the anti-Communist struggle—the interrelationship of all the component theaters.

During the recent Presidential campaign, many speakers called insistently for "a positive foreign policy" and "a dynamic foreign policy." They did not often give those attractive phrases specific content. But the fact that they spoke as they did revealed their belief that we had reached something like a dead-end in our relations not only with our adversaries but with our allies, or at least their feeling that the voters thought this to be the case and wanted the promise of a fresh approach. The fresh approach should be the global approach. Specifically, any proposed initiative in either Europe or the Far East should be examined in the light of its repercussions in the other arena. More generally, there should be agreement on the form of a political offensive which the free nations can and should take, East and West.

In Europe, the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance were political and psychological in purpose, as well as economic and military. They were admirable and courageous and, to a point, have been successful. But they were essentially holding actions, just as the containment policy is essentially a holding policy. The next step is to try to take the political initiative away from the Soviets. Our guiding objective is the restoration of freedom and unity to the whole Continent. This means the return of

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Russian rule to the frontiers of Russia—on the map of Europe as it was before Hitler and Stalin made their pact to divide Poland, before Stalin gobbled up the Baltic States, extinguished the independence of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, and sat himself down in half of Germany and Austria. There is no need today to talk about the details of frontiers, about where this town or that should be, or this or that iron mine or blast furnace. It is enough to emphasize the central problem in its two chief aspects. One is that Europe and the world will never know peace while Russian troops are in the heart of Europe, if only for the fact that so long as they are, we shall not be able to withdraw the American troops which we now hold there to redress the balance of power. The other is that the withdrawal of Russian troops to the western boundaries of the satellite orbit is not enough. While Stalin holds ancient European nationalities in bondage, exploits their resources and manpower, garrisons their frontiers with his troops and puts officers in command of their armies—so long, that is, as half of Europe is kept down by force—talk of peace in terms of "peaceful coexistence" is meaningless.

Though we are not going to war to set Stalin's slave states free, we shall never be reconciled to their not being free. And though we shall not make the mistake of urging local patriots to sacrifice themselves in premature revolts, there are more ways than we have used so far of giving them evidence that they are not forgotten and of aiding their underground resistance. In a country like ours, where "selling" ideas is held to be an art, we ought not to see such vulnerable opponents as the Bolsheviks, with their bloody record of crime, purge, faked trials, forced labor, imperialism and war, out-think us regularly with peace congresses and petitions, with propaganda on race and labor relations, in the indoctrination of scientists and artists, in the mobilization of well-meaning women and youth groups, even in such an elementary field as the preparation and circulation of books and periodicals. Often, too, our official policies might be more consciously directed to taking advantage of difficulties and inconsistencies in the Soviet position. For instance, we can tell the Poles that we expect them to recover the historic Polish lands in East Galicia annexed by Stalin (with Hitler's blessing). When we do so, why not warn the Poles and reassure the Germans that the world will expect Poland to regorge essentially German lands which Stalin awarded her in compensation for her losses in the East? The pres-

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ent rulers in Warsaw and in the East German Communist Republic are alike servants of Stalin. This is too good an opportunity to miss of making trouble among all three. We may suspect, of course, that Stalin will never in fact bring himself to restore lands now in satellite Poland to Germany—a possible ally, but also a possible rival or enemy. He will only manœuvre as though he might some day do so. But we should be on guard to prevent such manœuvres from proving effective with the German people; and at the same time we should impale Stalin more sharply on the horns of his German-Polish dilemma.

France may have reservations about such a policy. But is she more worried by the prospect that future German power might be turned westward against her or by the possibility that Germany, her partner in the West European defense organization, may carry her into a war against Russia to regain the lost German territories in the East? On second thought, will not France feel that a strong Germany as partner in some form of Western grouping, and restrained by that partnership from rash adventure, is a lesser evil than a thwarted Germany pressed tightly against both eastern and western borders and susceptible to Soviet propaganda about the possibility of expansion westward under Communist auspices?

The future strength of NATO—whether it is to reach anything like its goal of 94 divisions in 1954—depends largely on Franco-German agreement as to Germany's rôle in it. Germans have argued that they cannot afford to rearm until they are sure that West European rearmament has already progressed so far that if they join the system they will be safe. To argue thus is to argue in a circle; for West European defense can be efficient only if the terrain of manœuvre includes Western Germany and if the Western manpower includes that of Germany. Germany and France must decide whether they want to face the perils of the next decade separately or together, and the force of our reasoning and the weight of our help must be directed to securing the latter decision. For it to be acceptable to the French, we and the British must make the relationship between the West European defense force and the North Atlantic defense organization more specific. Only if France feels that she will not be left to deal alone with a powerful German partner will she agree to the degree of German rearmament necessary to the defense of Western Germany as well as the rest of Western Europe.

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The same initiative might enable us to strengthen those West German leaders who understand the exposed situation of their country, and want to remedy it, as against those leaders who do not. The German Social Democrats fix their eyes exclusively on German reunification. That naturally is the objective of all German parties, but the Social Democratic leaders believe, or pretend to believe, that the Soviets will accept it if they are promised that united Germany will be neutral and unarmed. Hence the dogma of the Social Democrats that West Germany must not rearm now. This enables them to dwell on the advantages of not having to pay for a military establishment and ultimately being able to trade freely alike with the West (to which they concede they feel akin spiritually) and the Soviet bloc (where lie the best markets for German heavy industry). This attractive vista ignores the fact that unarmed Germany would be impotent either to defend herself alone or to help defend both herself and the Western civilization to which she claims to want to belong (in all respects, that is, save contributing to its defense). Those urging this course suggest in effect that more trust be put in the Soviets than in the Western allies, and they justify this to the German people by stressing that the proposed German contribution to the Western defense system would not be on the basis of full equality. If London, Paris and Washington would first exchange among themselves every assurance of support which each considered necessary to meet any emergency, they then should not find it beyond their diplomatic capacities to devise a way of integrating the European Army and NATO which would cut the ground from under the feet of the German neutralists.

III

A weakness of such policies as those outlined here is that the European peoples show signs at the moment of feeling more reassured than they did a year or so ago about the risk of an early Soviet invasion. This confidence is, of course, a measure of the success of our rearmament policy. But it also brings that policy to a point of crisis. For the diminished sense of urgency in Europe creates a favorable climate for Soviet propaganda which depicts the United States as bent on war and scheming to use European divisions to fight its unnecessary battles. Just as Korea was meant to break the Western coalition in Europe, so the change in tempo and emphasis of the Soviet propaganda assault in

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Europe is meant to place new strains on the Western coalition, not only in Europe itself but in respect to policy in Asia.

At this point, one must remark on the need for a quick reappraisal of realities by European and Asiatic leaders. One reality emphasized in Washington is that the Soviets are today already making war. They are making war in Korea by way of North Korean and Chinese stooges; more, anyone who believes that many of the MIGs are not flown by Soviet pilots is naïve. They are making war everywhere by infiltration and subversive propaganda, by hate campaigns, and through local Communist Parties financed and directed from Moscow. Communists make no distinction in terms of "peace" and "war" between political warfare and dropping bombs; the choice between the two methods is merely that of tactical expediency. A second reality to be faced is that success by the Communists in their objective of dividing the United States from Britain and the continental nations might well prove the last preparatory move which they considered necessary in order to give them a reasonable chance of success in open war. No one can talk sensibly about the chances of war and peace in terms of dates; it has been calculated, however, that Russia will reach her peak of superiority in manpower in relationship to the Western peoples in the late fifties. But manpower is only one factor, and we do not know what criteria the Kremlin will use in estimating its over-all strength. We cannot permit the bonds of the non-Communist world to be loose, even momentarily, at any period.

It may not seem in the best of taste, perhaps, for an American to speak of the willingness with which the American people have taken over responsibilities which peoples of much greater experience have been forced to abdicate, or of the readiness with which they have submitted to paying the astronomical bills for an effort at world reconstruction which has extended into every clime and every field of human endeavor. In the time of testing, when Western Europe hesitated whether to slide passively into chaos and Communism or make the assertion of will necessary for a painful but orderly rebuilding of the fabric of its ancient civilization, American leaders took the initiative in proposing methods of help on a scale never before imagined in the relations of one nation with another, and the American people gave them the support necessary to success. If it is permissible to recall this it is because both the European nations and the United States are

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about to reassess their foreign policies. The process need not overstrain the Western coalition if each side understands the other's difficulties and is determined to help in surmounting them.

Indeed, the time has come for a thorough appraisal on both sides. The review in Washington should not be conducted in any partisan spirit; it should not be undertaken on the theory that all or many foreign policies must be changed simply because the Administration is new, any more than it should be based on the theory that all policies must be maintained simply because they are old. There will be many decisions to test the common sense and foresight of the new leadership, but none that will be more trying in the light of rock-bound Republican tradition than whether or not the burdens of continuing foreign aid can be progressively lightened by encouraging our allies to support their economies by their own efforts—by permitting them, that is, to sell more of their goods on the American market. The persistence of protectionist thinking in a country which has reversed its rôle from debtor to creditor will cause more trouble to enlightened internationalist elements in the new Administration than anything else, probably, except the tendency to cut all spending indiscriminately and relax.

Abroad it may well be salutary for statesmen to realize that they must initiate a new set of American colleagues into their problems and needs. They will have to provide their share of a coherent program of correlated effort and sacrifice, carrying a reasonable expectation of eventual success, if the present scale of American participation is to be accepted as justified and necessary. To say this is not to make a threat, but to state a fact. The statesmen of Europe, supported by informed and approving electorates, must participate in planning and building a new framework to support the American coöperation which they need.

How thoroughly do European electorates, in fact, understand the realities of current international relationships? After the First World War there was a general tendency among Europeans to blame America for having deserted them when the actual fighting was over, leaving them largely to restore their own economies and establish a system of collective security from which the United States Government remained coldly aloof. The opposite happened after 1945, in part because Americans felt that the thirties had justified some of the European reproaches of the twenties and were determined this time to see the job through.

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It is not the average Frenchman, of course, who chalks up "Le Yankee au poteau!" or the average German who scrawls "Amis go home!" Communist scribblings, like those of the Nazis before them, mingle drearily with pornographic imbecilities on all the walls of the world. Yet any recent visitor to Europe will have to testify that Americans are loved, in Damon Runyon's phrase, "less than somewhat," and that now that the American people have taken the plunge and are trying to live up to the responsibilities which Europe implored them to accept in 1920, great segments of the European population have taken over the rôle they formerly stigmatized as that of the ostrich. A formidable task of enlightenment seems imposed on the European governments. How often do European statesmen remind their peoples that without the Marshall Plan and NATO they very probably would be living today under the rule of Moscow? Such a fate for Western Europe would have spelt war and perhaps defeat for us; and this stark fact was present, of course, in the minds of the American authors of the Marshall Plan and NATO. Neither America nor Europe was disinterested. And the moral does not play favorites between America and Europe either—namely, that the two are interdependent and that the lessons of interlocking interests must be emphasized constantly by the leaders of both.

The ill-humor with which many Europeans regard the Americans in their midst is all too understandable for a long list of reasons that need not be gone into here, though they should be examined urgently by the military authorities. Unfortunately, the mood is being nourished by all the dissident leaders in Europe who mistrust and oppose the build-up of non-Communist strength in the world. They are the "international opposition," with arguments that differ in formulation but are so much alike in result that one can almost give them a unifying label—"The Xenoform." They are the professional enemies of collective action and they base their appeals to their electorates on the native antipathy of human beings for foreigners. We are, of course, well acquainted with their fellow-members in the United States also.

All this acquires its immediate importance from the fact that Moscow's propaganda now concentrates mainly on separating the West Europeans from us by spreading among them the fear that we may launch a preventive war. Americans are so fixed in their determination never to fight again except in defense of freedom that they have difficulty in adjusting their minds to cope

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with the Soviet propaganda. They feel that the record shows that they want peace and will make great sacrifices for it. Moreover, they think that their participation in the United Nations shows that they do not assert any monopoly of wisdom as to how the peace is to be kept. Politicians sometimes tell them that the Free World is a closed corporation and that planning its defense is a sole American right. They have not accepted that idea. They think that it is no more a sole American right than it is, fortunately, a sole American obligation. They think of the Free World as a coalition to which everybody who believes in freedom belongs—and cannot escape belonging, even though contributions can and will differ. They do not mean to offer their contribution condescendingly, or imperiously, any more than they offer it imploringly, out of a sense of weakness and impending doom. It is offered because they feel a real mutuality of need in the Free World. If they claim any merit, it is simply for having widened their conceptions of their own self-interest to include the safety of other nations called on to make the same choice between surrender and a fight for survival.

IV

In the Far East, where the fighting started almost three years ago, both theory and experience support the view that only a global strategy can cope with the problem of Soviet aggression. A 1953 concept for the defense of Europe cannot be paired up with an 1853 concept of the rôle of Asia. Winston Churchill was desperately anxious in two wars to secure access to the enemy's flanks; and the creation of strength on the flanks, in Scandinavia and in the Mediterranean and the Near East, is a vital part of the present program for European defense. But those are not Soviet Russia's only flanks. Looking at the world with a seaman's eyes, Mackinder saw Germany, France and Spain as a peninsula of Eurasia, and in the eyes of the modern airman, whether or not armed with the atom bomb, that is unmistakably what it is. On the other side of the Russian heartland is another pair of flanks, Siberia in the north, facing our Alaskan islands, and the Indonesian, Malayan and Indo-Chinese area in the south, which our naval forces skirted while fighting their circuitous way toward Japan in the last war. When mere civilians begin to grasp the significance of a California-Denmark air service across the Polar ice cap we must suppose that military planners have long ago seen

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that the two pairs of Russia's flanks merge, and that talk of a "Europe first" or "Asia first" approach to the Soviet problem is academic. If our planners have not done so, we may be sure that the Russians have, and that they are conscious of the weaknesses as well as the strengths of their geographic position.

Western statesmen may or may not have been overlong in perceiving the true nature and significance of the two Russian Revolutions of 1917. Today, at any rate, there is no justification for misreading the international significance of a Russian-dominated Communist régime anywhere. The present government of China, ruling the single largest body of human beings on the face of the globe, is such a régime. Westerners and Asians alike who have sought to moderate its plans for the conquest of East Asia, evidently in harmony with the development of the Soviet plan for the conquest of the world, have simply won the contempt of Peking for their own weakness. Any hope that appeasement would work—for example, that a trustworthy Communist promise to take only half of Korea would result from a surrender of Formosa, or that a final cessation of expansionist pressure into Southeast Asia would follow a surrender of Hong Kong—seems completely unreal. A distinguished Indian statesman unwittingly disclosed the true nature of the problem when he remarked, in stating his hopes for a negotiated settlement with Soviet power, that India's experience had demonstrated that no conflict of interests is so severe that it cannot be settled by compromise. He failed to add that, unfortunately, the Russians are so un-British.

The clearest evidence that strategy in the West cannot be divorced from strategy in the East is provided by the Communist attack in Indo-China, for the war in progress there is probably the largest single obstacle to the development of the European Army. As Americans watch sadly and bitterly the lengthening lists of American casualties in Korea they should pause long enough at least to read the headlines which disclose that from 1946 through the first ten months of 1952 the French losses in the Indo-China war have been 28,246 killed and missing, plus 21,250 allied Vietnamese killed.[1] France spends over a quarter of her total military budget on her forces in Indo-China, and nearly a third of her officers and non-coms are serving there. We are inclined to criticize the French Government for being disappointed with a prospective allotment of $525,000,000 in American aid, a

[1] "Losses in Indo-China," by Hanson Baldwin. *The New York Times,* November 25, 1952.

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sum which does not seem to us insignificant, instead of the $650,000,000 which it thought it had reason to expect. Do we feel that France, who in proportion to her population has about the same number of men under arms as the United States, should increase her standing army, thereby decreasing her labor force and productivity and increasing her military expenses? Or do we feel that she should cut her military forces and her expenditures?

Let us consider these questions in terms of the conflict in Indo-China and the rearmament of Germany, for the chain reaction from Saigon to the Rhine runs direct and swift. If the French spend so much of their resources and so many lives in Indo-China they can build fewer divisions in Europe. If they can build fewer divisions in Europe they are more reluctant to let the Germans build divisions. We in America want them to have more divisions in Europe and we want the Germans to contribute divisions to the European Army too. But we cannot let France abandon the anti-Communist redoubt which she is manning in Southeast Asia (thereby opening the way for the Communists to turn *our* flank in that area, for, after all, flanks are reversible). So once we are satisfied that the French are doing about all that they can be expected to do with their own resources, we have to help them out by financial aid or by buying more of their goods, or both. When we reach the decision that we must do this, we have stressed once again the indivisibility of the global theater where we have ranged ourselves in opposition to Communist expansion.

There are politicians and publicists in both Britain and France (and though less frank and vocal, there are some in the United States too) who advise their countrymen to write off their interests and responsibilities in the Far East. They apparently estimate that the continued toll taken of men and treasure in the effort to hold the Asiatic front against the advancing wave of Communism constitutes too great a drain on their national resources, and that the continued risk of direct conflict with the Soviet Union arising from the effort is more menacing than the domination of the Pacific by the Communist Powers would be. A decision in that sense by any one of the three leading Western Powers would be, in fact, the signal that the Third World War had become inevitable; for the Western alliance would have been destroyed, in Europe as well as in the Far East.

A classic method of sowing dissension between allies is to inflict on one of them a defeat which the other cannot or will not

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prevent. That is the tactic, of course, which the Kremlin is now using in its effort to destroy the Western alliance. In its current manœuvres, it does not expect that in Britain, for example, the support which Soviet policies receive indirectly from Bevan will result in Britain becoming Communist, or that when it puts out feelers in the French press for an understanding at the expense of Germany these will result in a Franco-Russian alliance. It simply hopes to chill the feelings of confidence necessary for full coöperation between London and Washington on the one hand, and for agreement between Paris and Bonn on the Schuman Plan and the European Army on the other. The aim, in other words, is to divide two Western states. If we reason the same way, we will decide that the concrete objective of American policy in the Far East is to reduce the Communist threat there by destroying the confidence of Red China in Red Russia—by showing the Chinese that Moscow is using them to fight its battles. What we must offer Red China for the achievement of this aim is, however, the opposite of what the Communists offer the Western World with their tongues in cheek. They play on our pacifist feelings. To offer peace to the Communists, however, is to offer what they consider would be a setback to their revolutionary progress. We must hold out to China the eventuality of defeat, or at the least endeavor in every feasible way to make her alliance with Soviet Russia profitless and frustrating, thus demonstrating that if she continues as a Soviet tool she develops into a Soviet satellite. We must continue to oppose her force with force, and we must be ready to oppose increased force with increased force on every front where she is fighting. In proving to China that her alliance with the Soviet Union is unprofitable, we shall have done one of the most effective things possible to make a war in Europe difficult for the Soviet Union.

A Frenchman was the first to point out in these pages[2] that Korea and Indo-China are "one war." As evidence of this grows, can we expect the United Nations to recognize the fact and add Indo-China to its present responsibilities? The question will be answered, perhaps, by the general evolution of events—whether in the long run the coalition of U.N. members which decided to oppose the Communists in Korea holds to its principles. For the moment, the concrete issue remains the admission of Red China to the United Nations. We must not browbeat our fellow mem-

[2] "Indo-China and Korea: One Front," by Jacques Soustelle. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1950.

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bers, but we must be adamant ourselves against recognizing a régime which has defied the United Nations and is killing the soldiers sent there under the U.N. flag. Foreign Minister Vyshinsky admitted on November 24 that Red China is at war with the U.N. We knew it before he said so. We welcome his confirmation, which ought to settle the question of Red China's membership. Perhaps that was Vyshinsky's object; perhaps, as Jugoslavs and others have argued, Moscow is determined to keep China out of world councils where she might reveal traits of independence. But if in truth Red China ever wants to drop Moscow's patronage there are plenty of other ways for her to let it be known.

V

If our interests and strategy as a world power are world-wide, the assumption would seem clear that a principal place for our diplomacy to operate is in the world organization for peace and security to which we belong. Is the United Nations fitted to implement these purposes? Many say no.

In the first place, it is said that a world organization is at best a nuisance, at worst a serious handicap on the nations most clearly responsible for initiative and positive action to save the peace; for when they attempt to act in a world assembly they find their power blurred by the operations of blocs of nations which have negligible military strength but do have equal votes and are able to pool their individual interests, if not for blackmail, at least for dangerously irresponsible purposes. Incidentally, this view that the United Nations is unmanageable is quite different from the one which sees the United Nations as in some way hampering our efforts to win the Korean war; but the American publicists and Senators who argue the latter view reënforce the former. Secondly, it is claimed that many vital problems can be more easily handled on a regional basis and that the Charter tacitly admits as much by making provision for individual or collective action in self-defense within the United Nations organizational framework. Further, it is alleged that the use of the United Nations as an enforcement agency destroys a more important and promising function as an agency for conciliation. Finally, some have begun to speak of it as a relic of the impractical idealism of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who are supposed (though they led the nation to victory in the two greatest wars of history) to have had no sense of the realities of power.

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Those who consider diplomatic operations through the United Nations unmanageable or positively hazardous stress that the vital questions of war and peace will be settled in the last analysis by the willingness or unwillingness of a few nations, chief among them the United States, to spend money and risk lives to prevent or defeat aggression. To thrash these questions out in a crowded public forum, they contend, merely diffuses power and plays into the hands of the Soviets, who encourage this or that nation or bloc to come forward with proposals which (it is hinted) might receive Moscow's blessing; but which, after much publicized discussion, are rejected, leaving the negotiators at loggerheads and in some cases halfway committed to appeasement.

Many generalized arguments have been made, and could be repeated here, to show how a power like the United States, which on the whole eschews imperialism and is responsible for many good works throughout the world, is apt to be supported in the long run by the majority of nations which seek only peace and a better life. Instead, we may recall a recent instance when our negotiators in the U.N. General Assembly found their friends holding opinions which exasperated them considerably. Let us suppose that the United Nations had not been in existence and that there had been no Indian delegate in New York to discuss his particular formula for settling the Korean war with British, Australian, Canadian, Latin American and other delegates who had been discussing other formulas. The Indian was not backed by many divisions or any battleships, but he did represent opinion in an area which is part—a shaky part—of the peripheral ring of defense against a Soviet breakout into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Suppose he had remained in New Delhi. Would Prime Minister Nehru's attitude toward the Korean war have been any different in that case, or would he not have instructed his ambassadors to play the same rôle in London, Washington and other capitals that he assigned to his delegate in the United Nations? And would Foreign Secretary Eden have been any less impressed in London than he was in New York by Mr. Nehru's suggestion, any less aware of the importance of India's rôle in the Commonwealth or any less anxious to be able to assure the House of Commons that the British Government was not following the American Government blindly but was seeking by every means possible to promote an honorable peace? The British force in Korea numbers only one division to seven American divisions.

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But it represents more power than that—power not only in Britain but in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, just as the Turkish brigade in Korea is valuable not merely because it fights well but because it comes from a part of the world where we are glad to know that there are men who fight well and are willing to fight.

In any event, the Nehru Government must be left to discover for itself from well-meant efforts at conciliation that Soviet policy takes account solely of factors of tangible power, and that a nation like India which is marked as an eventual victim and possesses slight inherent elements of resistance interposes itself between the Moscow strategists and their immediate objective at mortal risk—the risk either of being seduced into the Communist camp, or of being abandoned by the West so that the Communists can more easily take it over when they feel like it. Actually this Indian attempt to find a Korean solution showed that the process of discovery proceeds faster in an open forum, where some of the Indian people (to continue using India as an example) hear at least echoes of the debates and come gradually to form a judgment of the issues at stake, than would have happened if Prime Minister Nehru's attempts to play the honest broker had been canalized in secret negotiations of his ambassadors in London, Washington and Peking. For in the end Mr. Vyshinsky's insulting public rejection of the Indian formula awakened Indian officials and journalists to realities in a way that no amount of private reasoning and public pleading by Americans could ever have done.

Since there are Americans who pretend to think, or perhaps even do think, that we would have done better to fight the Korean war alone, let us recall why the United States felt that its national interests would be endangered by a Communist success on that distant frontier—as distant to us even in the day of jet planes and supersonic missiles as the Sudetenland seemed to Neville Chamberlain or Narvik to the Frenchmen of 1940.

There has been much discussion of the Administration memorandum of September 26, 1947, only recently published, which set forth our strategic interest in Korea. This memorandum, adopted while General Eisenhower was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea" because "in the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be

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maintained there without substantial reinforcements prior to the initiation of hostilities."

The point to bear in mind in examining this memorandum today is that it dealt with Korea only in the light of a possible general war in which U. S. forces were already involved elsewhere on the mainland of Asia. When the attack on South Korea occurred, two facts became clear, one military, the other political. The military fact was that a Communist victory would gravely menace the future independence and security of Japan, and, more immediately, the security of the American forces there. The political fact was that if the Communist aggression succeeded, the system of mutual security established to deal with aggression would be written off as a dead letter. At both points the national interest and security of the United States were involved.

The majority of other U.N. members also felt their interests to be so much involved that they were either eager or willing to associate themselves in condemning the Communist attack and to offer support in defeating it. The critics of the United Nations who feel that the strategy and operations of the Korean war, under American command from the start, have on occasion been hampered by the political views of other U.N. members must show that these divisions of counsel outweighed the advantages of collective action and the help of other nations.[8] They must also explain how the United States could have taken up the Communist challenge by itself. For it was the pledge of U.N. members in the Charter to resist aggression that gave us our valid reason for acting and won international approval. And if our action was indispensable to protect our national interests, then the existence of the United Nations was also indispensable.

Along with a growing feeling among some Americans that the United Nations has been less than helpful in Korea has been the development abroad of a belief that military enforcement tasks should be performed by special organizations, regional or other, and that the United Nations should restrict itself to discussing general issues and trying to conciliate disputes. This concept seems dangerous for many reasons, political, military and psychological, both domestic to the United States and international.

[8] Sometimes we might have profited from the political advice of other U.N. members, as when India warned that China would intervene if we advanced to the Yalu; we might have decided to advance regardless, but need not have been so surprised at the Chinese reaction.

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European desires to see European defenses built up ahead of those in other regions, and in particular the desire among members of NATO to build up their defenses ahead of those of nonmembers, are natural enough in themselves and justified to a large extent by the plain requirements of the immediate military situation. Furthermore, the place where military power based on industry can best be mobilized is in Western Europe and North America. It also is the area where parliamentary institutions have chiefly developed, teaching the art of coöperation by democratic methods. Finally, the countries comprised in it have established a common civilization which they discover means much to them when it is threatened. These factors all rightly count in favor of NATO. But the specific tasks which NATO can best perform must not be carried out at the expense of the tasks which only the United Nations can shoulder. Here we are conscious that an escape psychology is at work in Europe. It shows itself in certain circles in all countries in the attempt to flee the world-wide scope of U.N. responsibilities; in others, it shows itself in a desire to escape even the realities of living in Europe.

A year or so ago some French publicists (actively supported backstage by the Communists) propagated the idea that in an eventual war between the two colossi, the United States and Soviet Russia, the continental countries might be able to remain neutral. The argument has become less popular as people thought it over. They found it difficult to believe in all sincerity that it was a matter of indifference for the future of French civilization whether victory would in the end lie with Stalin's dictatorship or the American democracy. Looking at the map, they saw that so long as the United States maintained forces in Germany and held ports and bases to supply them, the Soviets, if war came, would have to undertake not only air operations over Western Europe but must invade and occupy it. The pastime of calling a plague on both houses, with no attention to what the two houses represent, still goes on; but even its chief literary sponsors no longer put any ring of conviction into their writing.

More important today is the note of longing for the little rôle, the smaller task, that runs through many British speeches and writings, not just of the Bevanites who fight rearmament because "peace" is a popular slogan and because preparing against war involves some curtailment of the socialized sector of British life,

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but of Conservatives as well, some of whom feel that Britain has become involved in unnecessary responsibilities as a result of dealing with concrete issues in a world organization. They feel that the rôle of that organization should now be limited so far as possible to consultation and conciliation, and that, meanwhile, regional bodies in which Britain is strongly represented should shoulder the task of protecting British interests and, if need be, fighting Britain's wars. This is implicit rather than spelled out. More clearly stated has been the argument that since the Soviet veto makes it difficult to combine the U.N. function to settle disputes by peaceful means with the U.N. duty to resist aggression, the latter should be minimized in order to concentrate on the former. This attempt will in turn make it necessary to strengthen regional enforcement agencies—which in practice means concentrating responsibility and power in the only substitute organization of the sort which as yet exists. While U.N. talks NATO will act.

This proposal, made in the name of realism, is open to practical objections.

In the first place, it frightens U.N. members who are not included in the regional guarantee; and indeed they are quite right to be frightened, for if the U.N. umbrella is considered insufficient protection for a selected group of member states, the Soviet Union will incline to think that it is not meant as a very real cover for others. Yet some of the U.N. members who do not belong to any regional reinsurance society are precisely those who are in very exposed positions—nations, too, in whose fate we are deeply interested and for whom we might feel called on to fight—including the countries of Southeast Asia, Iran, Jugoslavia, Sweden, Finland and others. It is sometimes urged in this country that it would be shrewd for us of our own accord to hand out guarantees of protection along with threats that if they were not welcomed that would be considered unfriendly. But why set out to avoid getting any return on our investment? Why give a blind guarantee to states which may or may not want it, rather than use the United Nations for one of the two primary purposes for which it was intended, namely to protect every member against aggression? Jugoslavia, for example, is a U.N. member. Should we give her simply a unilateral guarantee of assistance against Soviet attack, or would we do better to have her undertake that

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if the Soviets attack other U.N. members in the West she will join the war against Stalin with all her 30 or more divisions on the basis of a common strategic plan worked out in advance?

Secondly, the proposal tends to overemphasize the possibilities of regional organizations. For instance, the Standing Group of NATO meeting in Paris last October discussed whether it should not begin planning world-wide strategy instead of simply planning for the Atlantic area; when Prime Minister Menzies of Australia was in Washington last summer he raised the question whether his country and New Zealand might not be invited to join NATO, since they had been left in a particularly exposed situation and were conscious of being (as the London *Economist* expressed it) "a long way down in the arms queue;" and some of the most intelligent and experienced supporters of NATO are suggesting that it should spread its responsibilities into the field of economic, commercial, financial and labor planning and cooperation.[4] The needs suggested are real, the instrument suggested unsuitable.

In the third place, and most important, the general acceptance of the idea that the United Nations is simply a "town meeting of the world," with unlimited power to talk but little responsibility for action, soon would result in making even its talk of little account; and if it tries to settle disputes without feeling that it has any duty to enforce its decisions its efforts at conciliation will be very much less effective than they would be if the ultimate sanction of force against an aggressor remained intact.

Emphasis on the duty of U.N. members to be ready to meet force with force is not meant, of course, to minimize the importance of the steps laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter for the pacific settlement of disputes. The United Nations has enormous usefulness as a place where thorny international problems may be debated and where peaceful solutions can often be found or, at the least, warlike solutions postponed. What is being argued here is the equal importance of Chapter VIII outlining action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression—and concluding, significantly, with Article 51 which legitimatizes individual or collective action in self-defense whenever over-all U.N. action fails to materialize. Many obstacles, including the Great Power veto, hamper the efficiency

[4] *Cf.* "NATO's Growing Pains," by Charles M. Spofford. *Foreign Affairs,* October 1952.

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of the procedure. But it was definitely facilitated by the adoption last year of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, based on the need foreseen in Article 51.[5] This Resolution opened the door for U.N. members to free themselves from the tyranny of the Soviet "everlasting No." The parliamentary possibilities of the organization were emphasized and its executive power was strengthened. It showed itself to be a living political organism.

Of course, common sense enters into the degree to which military strategy can be planned by 50 nations, or even by a majority of them. But our planning should move in the direction which the general strategic situation in the world demands, and not toward a compartmentalization of responsibilities into zones of action whose neat boundaries would dissolve immediately in the war which we might have to fight.

And the final danger in playing down the rôle of the United Nations as a security organization and extolling it as a forum for discussion is that in the process it will little by little be turned into an agency of appeasement. The one occasion when the United Nations has come really close to being destroyed was in the winter of 1951, when a group of its members seemed ready to have it offer itself as mediator between victim and aggressor in Korea. If the idea spread that this might be the eventual function of the United Nations in a moment of crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States the days of American participation in it would be numbered, and therewith no doubt the days of the organization itself. Against that result we have to set ourselves to work, developing by every means in our power the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the peaceful procedures which are the first part of the organization's task, but also building up its ability to face the gravest decision of all in case the effort to save the peace fails. To be successful we must hold to our present policy of uniting every available force in the free world coalition—not throwing one nation after another from the sleigh in attempts to lighten the load, but holding the weaker ones to us, and shielding them, thereby gaining a moral strength and

[5] Adopted by the General Assembly, November 3, 1950. It provided: 1, if the Security Council is prevented (by the veto) from acting upon a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the General Assembly shall be called into session within 24 hours; 2, that there shall be a Peace Observation Commission to report on any area where existing international tension is likely to endanger international peace and security; 3, that member states maintain elements of their national forces especially trained, organized and equipped for prompt service in a U.N. unit or units.

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sense of purpose that with all free peoples count as half the race for peace and, if war comes, will be half the battle.

So far as the issue between the Atlantic organization and the world organization goes, as with the issue that has been created between conciliation and enforcement, we need not make the better an enemy of the best, and we must beg any of our friends who seem to desire to do so to cease. Proposals which will disillusion the American people regarding the sincerity of the commitments made jointly by them and other leading Western nations under the Charter diminish support for a strong American foreign policy and play into the hands of American isolationists. Before Europeans go too far in expressing the wish that they could be free from responsibilities outside the Continent or, in the British case, outside the Commonwealth, let them remember that there is always latent in American opinion a parallel strain of wishful thinking, a similar longing that American responsibilities could be restricted to the Western Hemisphere—or, as it is now being more persuasively put, to areas where we are clearly able to exert direct physical strength and where we shall be the sole judges of how and when to exert it. We would like to think that the old slogan against "foreign entanglements" had become antediluvian; it has in reason and fact, but not, even after Pearl Harbor, in the instinctive reflexes of many a headline reader.

These longings, whether European or American, are entirely unreal in the situation of the world today and are to be resisted. Only an agency with global authority can meet the challenge of Soviet aggression; only the United Nations can provide security as well as peace. If the issue were ever put before us in the sophistical terms of conciliation versus force, or if the rôle of NATO were ever put in terms of reducing the United Nations to a glorified UNESCO, then we would have to say: We will not weaken the United Nations' capacity to enforce peace. So many of our interests are not covered by the Atlantic organization that our choice must necessarily be the larger grouping and the strategy which it makes possible. The men in the Kremlin are not making the mistake of thinking that a victory or defeat in one area will not bring them profit or loss in another. Let us emulate their realism.

VI

For the Soviets, the global situation does not seem unmanageable. They are sure they have the system that can reduce it to

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order—beginning with the annihilation of dissidents and ending with a dictatorship centralized in Moscow. And if, eventually, we cannot "manage" a world which *is* one world, geographically and in the realities of modern technology, they certainly will.

The United Nations represents an effort to organize the world on the principles of freedom and self-government—for which the descriptive phrase is the parliamentary system. Its difficulties are known; so are its advantages. One of its great advantages for us is that a large majority of the nations of the world are parliamentary nations. Its great difficulty is that a minority—sometimes a crippling minority—are not. A partial answer to this difficulty was the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, which opened the way for the free nations to take effective security measures (even when the Soviet representative chooses to be present). That did not answer the problem presented by the Soviet veto's exclusion of three major parliamentary nations—Germany, Italy and Japan—as well as several other valued smaller nations. For purposes of collective security, might it be possible to associate them with the work of the Peace Observation Commission established under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution? The Resolution invites the coöperation of all governments with the Commission, and explicitly authorizes the Commission to appoint sub-Commissions without saying whether or not the members of these must be representatives of member states. The Collective Measures Commission, established by the same Resolution, has already moved to draw non-member states into its work. The whole question of U.N. membership will, in any case, be reconsidered by the General Conference to revise the Charter to be held in 1955. Unless we of the Free World think we can enjoy our own parliamentary liberties and at the same time safely ignore the others, or impose our will on them by force, then we cannot avoid continuing the effort to organize all under the democratic legal and moral principles of the Charter.

The last phrase will be taken as a challenge by a school of thought which does not believe that concepts of right and wrong have a place in international politics, but holds that only sacred egoism, with brute force its handmaiden, is realistic, and considers that membership in an international organization which establishes standards of legal and moral conduct imposes fatal handicaps on those who must operate national power to serve national ends. The test of realism is presumably success. Few

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politicians have ended up so quickly in failure and squalor as Cesare Borgia, the prototype of Machiavelli's Prince. The world is not all toughness and treason, and all those who had higher ideals and applied them with success did not win solely by accident.

The Wilsonian plan for a better world was one ruled by law, in which every nation is according to its capacities responsible—and is held responsible—for the peace. The U.N. Charter does not pretend to say that by a mere vote the members of the United Nations can establish the difference between right and wrong. It does say that a member nation which has promised to follow an agreed procedure for the settlement of disputes, and which instead resorts to force to secure its object, has committed a crime which other member nations must restrain and annul. That is about as practical and realistic a method as can be devised for determining aggression and for rallying sufficient force to defeat criminal force.

Let us strengthen the United Nations as an organization to enforce peace. Let us argue with our British and European friends that it is to their advantage to accept wholeheartedly, and to prepare to use if necessary, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution; and even to strengthen it, so that the coalition of the Free World members of the United Nations may be still better able to stand together against aggression despite the Soviet veto. Let us make it one of our diplomatic objectives to secure by patient explanation the support of the Asian and Arab nations for that Resolution—upon the vitality of which, in sober truth, their own existence as nations may some day depend. Thus we shall be continuing along the road on which we set out in 1945. It is the method of unity and strength, of a coalition of all the forces available in the Free World to maintain the peace at the cost of everything except freedom. It gives our people the renewed sense of direction they ask, and since we need the collaboration of our friends if it is to work, it should give their people the sense of participation they ask. It moves from the defensive back onto the offensive without making war more likely and indeed while making war less likely. It undertakes to manage the situation.

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IF NATO HAD TO FIGHT

By Chester Wilmot

THE end of the Cold War still seems to be so far away that there is a tendency to forget what great progress has been made in both the economic stability and the military security of the Western World since 1948 when the Communist coup in Prague and the Russian blockade of Berlin revealed the depth of the cleavage between East and West. To the American taxpayer, still supporting a vast program of foreign aid, it may seem that comparatively little has been accomplished, but to the people of Western Europe it appears that in less than five years the outlook has been transformed.

Economic recovery, so bountifully primed by Marshall Aid, has checked or curtailed the power of the local Communist parties, even in their great Western strongholds, France and Italy. Thus the threat of indirect aggression, on the pattern of Czechoslovakia, has undoubtedly diminished. The danger of direct attack has also declined since the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance made it clear that any aggressive move against any member of NATO would precipitate a world war. Moreover, during the past 18 months the military strength of the Western Powers in Germany has been so greatly increased that the Russians can no longer count on being able to overrun Western Europe in a lightning campaign with the forces at present stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Finally, even though the Soviet Union has developed its own atomic bomb, the deterrent power of American atomic weapons is certainly as great as it was in 1948, and is probably greater now that the United States has proved its mastery of the scientific and industrial problems involved in the production of the far more terrifying hydrogen bomb.

These developments have made the Russians pause, and since 1950 they have been content to consolidate their gains in Europe and have concentrated on extending Communist power in Asia, either by proxy, as in Korea, or by insurrection, as in Indo-China and Malaya. It seems that the present Soviet leaders are most anxious to avoid becoming involved in a major conflict, but this should not be taken to mean that they have abandoned the hope of gaining control of Western Europe. The experience of the last

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15 years indicates that Stalin and his colleagues are both persistent and patient in pursuit of their long-term objectives and that these differ from the traditional aims of the Tsars only in being more ambitious. During the Second World War, whether they were dealing with the Axis Powers or with the Western Allies, the Russians were quite consistent in their aims. They sought to acquire a defensive cushion of territory along their western borders, to gain access to warm water ports in the North Atlantic and the Yellow Sea, to secure a voice in the control of the Black Sea Straits, and to obtain a foothold on the Persian Gulf, which Molotov significantly described—in a telegram to Ribbentrop in November 1940—as the "center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

These aims were so consistently pursued during the war that the NATO Powers must act today on the assumption that the Russian leaders are still determined to achieve them and that the absence of any aggressive move west of the Iron Curtain since 1948 is evidence of a change only in tactics, not in ultimate purpose. The present Soviet policy appears to be to create the maximum tension and trouble short of war in the hope that the burden of rearmament will bring about an economic crisis which will undermine the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance and afford an opportunity for Communist penetration through political channels especially in France and Italy. This is a most dangerous policy, for as the rival camps become more heavily armed there will be a mounting danger that the tension will lead to war without either side deliberately seeking it. It is against this danger that the Western Powers must be constantly prepared, not only because the territory of the European members of NATO is directly threatened, but also because the Communist conquest of Western Europe—and its heavy industry—would turn the balance of world power overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviet Union.

II. EUROPE DECISIVE

As in the Second World War, therefore, Europe is the potentially decisive theater, the one area where defeat would be irrevocable since it would destroy the European foundations of the Atlantic Alliance. The Truman policy of giving priority to the defense of the Atlantic area seems to have been as sound strategically and politically as was President Roosevelt's insistence on "defeating Hitler first." During the last war the "pull to the Paci-

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fic" was very much stronger than was generally appreciated at the time and was due not merely to the natural desire of the United States to be avenged for Pearl Harbor, but also to the genuine doubt in the minds of the American Chiefs of Staff about the sincerity of Britain's support for the Second Front project which they regarded as the best and quickest means of defeating Germany.

Whatever the reasons, however, the diversion of American resources to the campaign against Japan appears now to have seriously impinged upon operations against Germany and to have delayed Hitler's final defeat. To take only one example: the shortage of landing craft was the most important factor in the planning calculations for the invasion of Normandy and it was so acute that the original intention of making simultaneous assaults in northern and southern France could not be carried out. The craft most urgently needed were LSTs (Landing-Ships, Tank). In June 1944, according to its own records, the U. S. Navy had 409 LSTs in service but it provided only 188 for the Normandy invasion. At the same time in the Pacific no fewer than 87 LSTs were employed in the assault upon the small island of Saipan garrisoned by only one Japanese division.

Today there are similar influences at work in the United States supporting a renewed "pull to the Pacific." On the one hand there is the desire to take a stronger line with Communist China and to end the running sore in Korea; on the other there is the belief that America's European allies are not doing all they should or could in their own defense. The result if one may judge from the Republican Party's election campaign and especially from the importance given to the Korean question has been to strengthen the hands of those who would give priority to the struggle against Communism in Asia and would curtail the flow of American aid to Europe. That may be an oversimplification but it is the conclusion which America's transatlantic partners have tended to draw from the campaign and its outcome. Here General Eisenhower is still regarded as Europe's staunch friend but many of his admirers have been dismayed by his apparent readiness to come to a compromise with members of his party who are known to disagree radically with him on issues of principle in foreign policy. On the Continent if not in Britain there is a sincere and widespread fear that he may be persuaded to concentrate on Asia at the expense of Europe and that the new Republican Administra-

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tion will require America's European allies to undertake military burdens which will threaten their economic stability. Even with President Truman in the White House, the United States has been calling for European rearmament on a scale that the British and most other governments consider to be far beyond their means.

Any substantial reduction in American military or economic aid to Europe would have two consequences directly favorable to Russia. It would revive the danger of either internal or external aggression in Europe, according to whether priority were given to economic recovery or military preparedness; and it would prejudice the ability of Britain and France to continue their present considerable contributions to the struggle against Communist aggression outside Europe. The French have the equivalent of six divisions in Indo-China; the British have three divisions in the Far East and another three in the Middle East; but these forces can be maintained only if the Soviet threat to Britain and France in Europe is kept within measurable bounds. It seems, therefore, that an "Asia First" policy on the part of the United States would reduce rather than increase the chances of containing the spread of Communist power in the Far East and would mean, moreover, that almost the entire burden would have to be borne by America alone.

III. DEFENSE AGAINST DIRECT ATTACK

The main threat to Western Europe comes, of course, from the powerful Soviet forces in Eastern Germany. Here the Russians have 22 divisions (ten armored, eight mechanized, and four rifle) so deployed that they could launch an offensive at short notice provided that the units, now presumed to have 70 percent of their war strength, were first brought up to full establishment. At full strength these divisions would have some 5,000 tanks, of which more than 600 would be heavy "Joseph Stalins" to which the NATO armies have as yet no counterpart. These divisions are backed by a strong tactical air force with at least 5,000 aircraft, and as many more readily available as reinforcements. The majority of the fighter squadrons in Eastern Germany are already equipped with jets—including a considerable number of MIG 15s which have proved their worth in Korea—and the bomber squadrons are being reëquipped, though slowly it seems, with the Russians' equivalent of the British Canberra.

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Apart from the conversion of the air force to jets the Russians do not appear to have reënforced their garrison in Eastern Germany to counter the build-up of NATO forces in the West, but they have converted the *Bereitschaften,* the German security forces, into heavily armed military units which now have the strength of a corps of three divisions. At the same time, they have greatly increased the strength and efficiency of the armies in the satellite states. On paper these countries now have 60 to 70 divisions and, though weak in trained officers, they are steadily becoming more battleworthy as they receive modern Russian equipment. In the event of war, it is unlikely that these satellite divisions would be employed offensively, but they would be very useful for the protection of the Red Army's lines of communication and its exposed flanks on the Baltic and in the Balkans. Since there are probably another 60 active divisions in White Russia, and the Ukraine, the Soviet garrison in Eastern Germany could be reinforced more quickly and more heavily than could the NATO armies in the West.

Although the Russians still possess ample power to conquer Western Europe if war should break out, they no longer have the necessary margin of superiority in the balance of forces in Germany to make a successful attack without substantially reënforcing their garrison in the Soviet Zone. In Western Germany there are now the equivalent of 18 NATO divisions (six American, five French, four British, and two Belgian, plus Canadian, Norwegian and Danish brigades amounting to another division). In reserve, though not in Germany, there are a further half-dozen French, Belgian and Dutch divisions available at short notice though these could be employed only in a static rôle. The divisions in Germany are supported by a tactical air force of some 1,800 jet aircraft, not counting the resources of R.A.F. Fighter Command operating from bases in Britain. Few of the NATO squadrons are yet equipped with the most modern jet fighters, but they are likely to have a very considerable advantage over the Russians in the experience of their operational command and the efficiency of their system of control.

These forces, aided as they would be by strong support from American and British strategic bombers, should be sufficient to deny the Soviet leaders the temptation of an easy victory. They could fight a valuable delaying action even though they could not be expected to defeat the armies that Russia could bring to bear

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against them. Their greatest handicap lies not so much in the limitations of their numerical strength as in the lack of a strong natural defensive position east of the Rhine to provide the necessary depth for armored manœuvre and for the deployment of tactical air forces. This lack of depth is NATO's greatest strategic problem in Western Europe, for the experience of the Second World War emphasizes the importance of having adequate room for manœuvre especially in defense against the Red Army.

The European campaigns of 1940–45 provide two significant lessons in this respect. First, a powerful enemy breakthrough on the Rhine cannot be checked short of the Channel if there is no strong mobile force in reserve. This was proved by the Germans in 1940 and was revealed again in reverse by the Allies in 1944 after their break-out from Normandy. Secondly, in dealing with the Soviet preponderance in numbers, the defenders must be free to yield ground in order both to cushion the assault and to canalize the thrusts so that they become vulnerable to counter-attack by armor and air power. One of the main reasons for the failure of the Germans to hold the Russians on the Eastern Front in the last two years of the war was Hitler's insistence that his troops must hold every yard of ground. This rigid strategy allowed the Russians to exploit to the full their advantage in numbers and prevented the Germans exploiting the bounty of space which they had acquired by their conquests. Today, for different reasons, the NATO forces would be obliged to adopt a strategy almost as rigid. Militarily they have not the depth in Western Europe to enable them to yield sufficient ground to absorb the shock of a Russian offensive, and politically they have an obligation to defend the national territory of all members of the alliance. Thus the strategy imposed on NATO by geographical and political factors is not necessarily the best method either of frustrating a Soviet attack, or of ensuring the defense of any one area.

Owing to the difficulty of reconciling the different elements in this strategic problem, the various national commanders in Germany did not find it easy to reach agreement about the way the defensive battle should be fought if Russia were to attack. The French suggestion—no doubt a revulsion from the Maginot Line concept—was that the NATO forces should adopt a policy of mobile defense. Since the Allies were sure to be outnumbered, the French argued, they should fight a series of delaying actions from one river-line to the next, avoiding any decisive battle until the

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Red Army had outrun its administrative resources, and relying on Allied air power to accelerate the process of logistic exhaustion. The Americans, on the other hand, were bent upon holding a continuous front along some major obstacle such as the Rhine. They spoke of defense in depth by a series of mutually supporting localities, and accordingly they called for a faster and greater build-up of ground forces, especially infantry, to hold the line.

The British were reluctant to accept either of these views. They felt that the American policy meant maintaining in Germany more forces than the Allies could afford economically; and that the French plan would mean yielding more territory than the Allies could afford politically, since neither the Dutch nor the Germans could be expected to fight with enthusiasm if their homelands were to be sacrificed. The British proposed, therefore, that the NATO armies must be prepared to stand and fight on ground of their own choosing as far east as possible, but must not try to hold this ground with a continuous belt of defenses. The French attempt to avoid decisive action might result in a retreat to the Pyrenees; the American attempt to hold a line in depth might lead to the Allied forces being destroyed in detail. The British solution was that the NATO Powers must maintain in Germany sufficient armored and mechanized divisions to hold the Russians off long enough for the reserve infantry divisions to be mobilized and established in defensive positions organized as self-supporting strongholds. These bastions, they argued, would serve both as breakwaters to check and channel the Soviet advance, and as bases of manœuvre from which the armored divisions, having pulled back without becoming too deeply involved, might deliver a telling counterstroke.

This British concept was given a practical test during the 1952 manœuvres in north-west Germany. Before this exercise, Marshal Juin, C-in-C, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, had been rather skeptical, but in summing up the results he told a conference of senior officers: "This is a good solution because it enables you to get the best out of both the static and the mobile forces." It seems now that this plan will become the basis of NATO strategy in Western Europe; but, if it is to be successfully applied, there must be certain changes in the character and composition of the Allied forces in Germany. The plan promises to be cheaper in terms of mobilized manpower but more expensive in terms of modern equipment and especially armor, for the first essential is

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to maintain east of the Rhine in peacetime sufficient armored and mechanized divisions to fight the covering action and to gain time for the mobilization of the infantry reserves.

Of the 18 NATO divisions in Germany today, only eight are armored, but at least twice as much armor will be required if the Russians are to be checked without the NATO Powers having to maintain the mass of infantry divisions which would be needed to hold a continuous line. This requirement leads in turn to two more: 1, the earliest mobilization of the 12 divisions which the German Federal Republic is expected to contribute to the European Army; and 2, the continued provision by the United States of the tanks and other items of heavy armament which the European countries cannot produce for themselves. These can be provided only under the Mutual Security Program either directly from American production or indirectly under the offshore procurement scheme, as in the case of the 500 British Centurion tanks recently ordered by the United States for Holland and Denmark.

At the same time it is equally important that a greater effort should be made on the Continent and in Britain to create reserve divisions which can be brought in to hold the infantry bastions. At present there are not sufficient reserves for this task and there is no indication that they can be made available—at an adequate standard of training and equipment—before 1954. The weakness of the reserve forces is chiefly due—so far as the smaller Continental countries are concerned—to the shortage of trained officers and NCOs, and this results partly from their lack of war experience and partly from their reluctance or inability to create a substantial professional cadre. This problem is not easily solved, especially in countries like Holland and Norway which have a strong anti-militarist tradition and a national dislike for giving the professional soldier a fair reward compared with what he could command in civil life. Yet the reserves must be found if the covering forces are to check a Soviet advance while there is still enough depth for effective defense.

It is this need for strategic depth which makes it so important that Western Germany should be incorporated into the defense structure of Western Europe. How this may or should be brought about politically—whether through the European Defense Community or by direct German membership in NATO—lies outside the scope of this article. Militarily, however, the need for sub-

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stantial German contribution is clear, since the Allied Chiefs of Staff insist that the security of Western Europe, including Italy, calls for the maintenance of at least 50 to 60 active divisions, and the greater proportion of these must be stationed east of the Rhine. Since the occupation of Western Germany is virtually ended, a new relationship must be established, and the only basis which provides an effective counter to the Soviet offer of German unity seems to be that of partnership with the West.

This means, of course, the acceptance of the division of Germany as a political fact. The Soviet Union will never agree to German unification on terms which would allow a united Germany to belong to the Atlantic Alliance. Nor could the Western Powers accept German unification on conditions which would mean the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German soil and the creation of a nominally neutral Germany, as the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed. Strategically, the Russians could afford to withdraw from the Elbe to the Oder, but Western Europe would be indefensible if the NATO forces had to be stationed west of the Rhine. Quite apart from the loss of depth, the withdrawal of the Allied garrison from Western Germany would create the risk that the Russians might gain control of Germany by an internal coup, and, even if this should happen, there would be the constant danger that a united Germany would make an alliance with the Soviet Union in return for a revision of her eastern frontier.

Although these considerations lend strong support to the case for reëstablishing German military forces in close association with NATO, it must be recognized that the governments and peoples of Western Europe accept this policy with reluctance and misgiving. Their cautious approach is due not only to a rightful hatred of German militarism but also to the fear that a rearmed Germany might involve the West in war with the Soviet Union in the hope of recovering the lost German territories in Eastern Europe. In the case of the French, there is the further suspicion that as soon as German divisions are available the United States will want to withdraw American ground troops from Europe. Accordingly, any unilateral initiative by the United States to rearm Western Germany—in the event of the E.D.C. Treaty not being ratified—and to treat her as an ally outside NATO would be bound to cause a serious breach within the Alliance. In that event the gain in military depth would be offset by a weakening

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in political cohesion. But whatever the fate of the E.D.C. plan, it is already clear that no substantial German contribution to the defense of the West will be available before 1954. In the meantime the lack of adequate depth and strength on the central front makes it the more necessary for NATO to develop the positions it holds on the flanks of the Soviet Empire.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FLANKS

One of the decisive factors in favor of the Western Allies during the Second World War was the command they gained of the sea and air. This gave them the advantage of being able to threaten Axis-held territory from many different quarters. The strategic result was that Germany and Japan were compelled to keep their forces widely dispersed defensively, with the further consequence that after 1942 they could not concentrate at any one point the power necessary to gain an offensive victory or even to frustrate an amphibious invasion. In contrast to their aggressive mobility in the early years of the war, they became strategically immobile once they were eclipsed in the air and at sea, for they were then prisoners of their own conquests.

The flexibility provided by air and naval power was employed to better advantage—so far as the United States was concerned—in the Pacific campaigns than it was in the war against Germany. In the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz's bold penetrations and General MacArthur's skilful "island-hopping" proved the value of the indirect approach and the surprise move. In Europe, however, where the army not the navy was the predominant service, American strategy both before and after the invasion of Normandy was more conventional and direct. Here the policy of the American High Command—and especially of General Marshall—was to defeat Germany by overwhelming power, not by subtle manœuvre. Consequently, General Marshall advocated from the outset a head-on assault across the Channel into France and he grew impatient with the British in their determination to expose Germany's southern flank before attempting to attack her western front. In this respect the British strategy eventually prevailed—with the broad result that, before the cross-Channel invasion began, Hitler was obliged to deploy as many divisions in southern Europe as he had in the West, and the German reserves which might have defeated the Normandy invasion were pinned down on the Mediterranean front.

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In the present situation the Western Allies must again exploit the capability that sea and air power give them for exposing the enemy's flanks, since they can never hope to match the strength of the Russian ground forces in the main theater. In applying its strategy of containment, the NATO High Command must maintain pressure or the threat of pressure in northern and southern Europe if it is to limit the concentration of Soviet forces for a campaign in Central Europe. Hence the importance of Norway and Denmark on the one hand, and of Greece and Turkey on the other.

The northern flank has a special significance, for it protects the supply lines by which the NATO armies in Western Europe are maintained. It is now assumed at SHAPE that the Russians have built a large number—some intelligence estimates place it as high as 300—of the most modern submarines, developed from the revolutionary electro-U-boats which the Germans started producing in the last year of the war. These craft have an underwater speed greater than that of most merchantmen and they seldom need to come to the surface. They are thus extremely difficult to counter once they reach the open sea. The best answer is to "bottle them in," to prevent them debouching from the Baltic and the Barents Sea, but this remedy can be applied only if Norway and Denmark remain in Allied hands.

The Scandinavian flank plays an equally important rôle in the defense of Britain and the Atlantic ports of Europe against attack from the air. Russian bombers, following a Great Circle course from their bases in the Leningrad-Moscow area to London, would pass over southern Norway. To cover this northern approach effectively the NATO Powers need fighter airfields and radar stations in Scandinavia. So far, however, the Norwegian Government has refused to permit other members of NATO to station military forces or to maintain operational establishments in Norway in peacetime. This policy, which originated from an assurance given to the Soviet Union in 1949 when the Atlantic Alliance was formed, is liberally interpreted and does not prevent Norway from preparing bases for NATO forces to use during manœuvres or in the event of war. The Norwegians argue, however, that if Allied air squadrons were permanently based in Norway, the Soviet Union would extend its bases in northern Russia and might demand the right to use airfields in Finland. Although this caution is understandable politically, it is unrealis-

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tic militarily. The Norwegians cannot provide for their own defense, and if war were to break out it would be some weeks before any substantial reinforcements could reach Norway. Last year's large-scale manœuvres in Scandinavian waters (Exercise Mainbrace) were designed to reassure the Norwegians and Danes that their allies would and could come to their aid with considerable air and naval strength, but it also indicated that this aid could not be provided quickly enough to save their countries from invasion, unless stronger forces were stationed there ready to provide air protection and to fight a covering action on the ground.

The main weakness of the Scandinavian flank is the extreme vulnerability of its southern hinge in Schleswig-Holstein, for this cannot be protected until the Allied armies now in Western Germany are reinforced by German divisions. This is one reason why the Norwegian and Danish Governments have accepted the policy of rearming the Germans, but in return for supporting this policy they are likely to insist that a strong German force must be allocated to defend the neck of the Schleswig-Holstein Peninsula. In the far north of Norway the outlook is more promising. As in 1945, when the Russians pursued the Germans out of Finland, the lack of good roads would very strictly curtail the size of the force the Red Army could employ, and the Norwegians have a strong defensive position north of Narvik which they are confident of holding provided that their flanks are protected by Allied air and naval forces on the one side and by the Swedish army on the other.

Sweden remains neutral, but she is not so aloof from her Western neighbors as she was when they first joined the Atlantic Alliance, and there is no doubt that the Swedes will fight if their neutrality is violated by the Soviet Union. This provides an additional reason for the Western Allies to strengthen their foothold in Scandinavia. Sweden has a formidable air force, ranked in numbers and efficiency after the forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain. The Swedes have no fewer than 50 front-line squadrons, equipped with at least 800 jet aircraft, and these include several hundred of the Swedish designed and built J-29s, which are recognized as being in the same class as the American F-86s and the Russian MIG 15s. Such a strong air force deployed on the northern flank of the main Russian armies in Eastern Germany provides a threat which the Soviet High Command would be reluctant to ignore. This threat must al-

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ready be causing the diversion of a considerable amount of Russian air power, but in war it would remain alive only so long as the Western Allies were in a position to help Sweden defend her air bases.

The other NATO flank, in Southern Europe, is not perhaps of such direct importance for the protection of the Allied forces in Central Europe, but it offers much greater opportunities for compelling the Russians to disperse their forces defensively. The extension of the Atlantic Alliance to embrace Greece and Turkey was a diplomatic move of great military consequence. At one stroke it brought the Western Allies closer to the great Caucasian oilfields than the Wehrmacht ever came in 18 months of costly attack, and the diversionary influence of this development is being enhanced by the construction of a strategic road from Alexandretta in the Eastern Mediterranean across Turkey in the direction of the Caucasus.

With Turkey and Greece incorporated in NATO, and with Jugoslavia hostile to the Soviet Union and inclining towards the West, it seems fair to say that at least half the satellite forces in Eastern Europe would have to be used to safeguard the Red Army's southern flank in wartime. The impact of these developments on Soviet policy is already apparent. In rebuilding and re-equipping the satellite armies the Russians have given priority to Bulgaria, even to the extent of providing her with some "Joseph Stalin" heavy tanks, the most valuable equipment in the Soviet armory. The need for this priority is clear: the Greeks have eight active divisions and the Turks are steadily building up to a strength of 16 infantry divisions and half a dozen armored brigades. By the standards of Western Europe those are substantial forces, for these two countries between them have more divisions in the field than SHAPE has in Germany. They are neither so well trained nor so well equipped, but they are very much closer to areas the Russians must defend. As in the Second World War, therefore, the Mediterranean affords the Western Allies the opportunity of distracting strong enemy forces away from the potentially decisive battle in the main theater.

V. PROBLEMS OF COMMAND

The strengthening of the flanks and of the NATO forces in Germany during the last two years has made the strategy of containment very much more practicable, but America's superiority

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in atomic power is probably the greatest deterrent to further Soviet expansion in Europe and it may offer the only means of gaining a decisive victory in a "hot war." In that case the NATO forces at the disposal of SHAPE could do little more than hold the ring, while the U.S. Strategic Air Command endeavored to deliver a knock-out blow by attacking the main Soviet centers of population and production with atomic weapons.

The necessity for employing the atom bomb in reply to Soviet aggression is generally accepted by America's allies, but in Britain and on the Continent there is strong support for the view that the decision to use it should be a NATO decision and should not be taken by the United States Government acting alone. The resources, and the ultimate responsibility, are America's, but Russian retaliation is more likely to be directed at Britain and France than at the United States, since American strategic bombers operate from British and French bases. Because they are so exposed to counterattack, America's principal partners have a right to be closely consulted before atomic warfare is initiated, but at present there seems to be no agreement regarding the method by which the decision is to be taken, nor any assurance that the NATO Council will have a chance to intervene.

During the Second World War the American and British strategic air forces operated under the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but today these forces are not subject to any Allied jurisdiction exercised through the NATO High Command. Control rests entirely with the Governments of the United States and Britain. It is right that it should remain on the highest political level, since aircraft carrying atomic bombs cannot be regarded merely as military instruments, but there is reason to argue that this of all decisions should be endorsed by all members of the alliance, or at least by Britain and France. The natural reluctance of America's allies to entrust this decision to the United States is supported by the impression, which developed during the Second World War, that American military leaders are given too much discretion by their political superiors and are not accustomed to take account of the political consequences of their strategic decisions. This impression was reënforced during 1952 by the Yalu bombing episode which revealed an alarming failure in effective consultation not only between the Allies in Korea but also between the Pentagon and the State Department in Washington.

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The question of the employment of atomic weapons raises a further command problem which has not yet been solved. As Supreme Commander in Europe, General Ridgway controls no strategic air forces, but it is presumed that he would be able to call upon their support in an emergency and that atom bombs would be used tactically in direct support of the land battle. In that rôle the aircraft carrying atomic bombs would be employed under the operational control of SHAPE and plans for their employment must be made accordingly. At present, however, this planning cannot proceed on a NATO basis, because American security restrictions forbid General Ridgway to discuss even with Field Marshal Montgomery or Marshal Juin the operational implications of the use of the tactical atomic weapons which the United States has developed. Thus a vital phase of military planning has to be carried out solely by American staff officers even though non-American troops are directly concerned with the outcome. General Bradley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recently proposed that the McMahon Act should be amended so that the senior Allied commanders in Europe could know what atomic weapons will be available to them in wartime and what the potentialities of these weapons are. Without that information, much of the planning now going on at SHAPE and in the subordinate commands is unrealistic and may well be unnecessary.

The development of greater understanding and closer coöperation with regard to the employment of atomic power is perhaps the most important internal problem facing NATO today. Unless the Alliance can develop the mutual confidence necessary to solve this problem it is unlikely to achieve full success in its military purpose and there will be little chance of its expanding politically into a wider Atlantic Community.

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MILITARY PROBLEMS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

By Walter Millis

ON the morrow of the Presidential election the American people found themselves confronting a complexly interrelated series of urgent and difficult military problems—problems so urgent and difficult as to call, it would seem, for something like a complete review, and possibly revision, of our whole military policy. The hopes, passions and self-contradictory promises of the electoral campaign had served to intensify nearly all the grave issues involved. Unfortunately, the oratory (as is usual with American campaign oratory) had shed little light upon how, practically, these issues were to be met. It may be that with a fresh approach and fresh insights, avenues toward "an early and honorable peace" can be discovered. But it is safe to say that no policy can be discovered which will simultaneously satisfy the demands for an immediate withdrawal of American troops from Korea, an honorable peace there, support of the United Nations, a drastic reduction in military expenditure, a stronger and firmer military front against Communist infiltration and aggression, a full support of the Western European alliance, an intensification at the same time of the effort to arm and train Asians to fight "Asian" wars, and a reduction in the burden of military aid.

Such objectives are mutually exclusive; some will have to be abandoned or postponed in favor of others, and the task of choosing among them—of selecting the ends toward which the national energies and the national military potential is to be directed and of subordinating those others which cannot practically be realized—is a task in the redesign of the basic military policy of the United States. It is a task which we would have been compelled to face whether there had been an election or not. The election, so to speak, simply brought the chickens home to roost—chickens hatched in the inveterate confusions and evasions of American political life, in the half-measures and insubstantial hopes of the past few years, in the deep-seated American inability to understand either the rôle of power in the international world or the uses and responsibilities of the power over which we hold command. The election indeed brought the chick-

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ens home to roost; but sooner or later we would in any event have been obliged to look those ill-omened birds in the face.

"Military policy" is in itself an unfamiliar concept to American minds. We debate endlessly the details of military affairs—costs, strategies, inefficiencies, even such technical things as weapons systems and manpower usages—but seldom approach such questions on the large plane of underlying military policy itself. Military policy can be defined as the whole body of concepts by which a nation regulates and applies in practice its potentialities for bringing violent solution to the problems of world society. One does not have to read Clausewitz to understand that war is the application of violence to the solution of political issues which are otherwise insoluble. Military policy and military preparation simply define the ways in which a nation will organize and deploy its potentialities for violence and the ways in which it will apply these potentialities to secure a kind of international world which will seem tolerable to itself.

Ideally, military policy should be a self-consistent body of principle and practice, calculated on the one hand to mobilize the best military powers of the nation concerned as need may require, and calculated on the other hand to secure concrete and desired results, with the power thus mobilized, on the international stage. Of course, no real military policy ever actually fulfills these ideal ends. Particularly, no democratic nation, torn by all the conflicts and confusions of the democratic process, has ever worked out a policy that is more than a rough approximation to the ideal image. Nevertheless, the ideal must be assumed to be the goal of all the argument. It is this ideal toward which great numbers of Americans are now unhappily groping. In the deepest sense, the military problem now before the United States is the problem of reviewing and if need be revising all the various fits and starts of policy we have witnessed since 1945, in order to bring the whole body of policy and doctrine nearer to serving the ideal of what a rational military policy ought to be.

Since September 1945, American military policy has actually gone through several clearly-marked phases. We began with the headlong demobilization, which we carried through to the accompaniment of many pious expressions of the conviction that we should never demobilize again. We then spent some 18 months trying to organize a system which would provide a unified defense structure and (more important) a unified mecha-

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nism for national intelligence and policy-making, capable of controlling the military policy of the future. But by the time this had been achieved, in mid-summer of 1947, the world was already assuming a look of very present peril. We had no good answer for it. Our new military system was all set up on a future basis; it provided the organizational framework which might be necessary in order to mobilize for another total war at some distant time, but very little with which to meet the actual military problems of the increasingly ominous present. We watched, helplessly, as the long retreat through China began; we had no solution for Korea except to evacuate, set up a local government and hope for the best; initially, we had no reply to the processes of Communist erosion in Greece, Italy and France.

To begin with we relied, without ever quite being able to admit it, on the supposed atomic monopoly. We did not, to be sure, provide anything like the apparatus of airfields, long-range bombers, escort fighters, interceptors and domestic air defenses that would be required actually to wage an atomic war; we did, however, establish the rudiments of such a system, and fell back upon the hope that its value as a threat would insure that there would be no major war. Perhaps the threat was effective—there was, at any rate, no major war—but the fact soon became apparent that it could not check the processes of infiltration, propaganda and armed intimidation by which the Soviet Union was in fact expanding its world power and undermining the American world position.

Something else was needed. Beginning with the "Truman Doctrine" of Greek-Turkish aid in March 1947, we tried throwing money and military advice into the worst breaches which seemed to be opening in the Western system; and, with the Marshall Plan, a general strengthening of the economic bases of the non-Communist world. But with the continuing collapse of China and with the rape of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, these policies seemed more and more plainly inadequate. In March 1948, President Truman called for the first serious, but still modest, effort at rearmament.

It was a recognition that we must be equipped with more than future threats of possible atomic holocausts. We needed some armed power immediately available and on the ground in the threatened areas of the world, capable of controlling present events rather than waiting until the world situation had become

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so intolerable that extreme and intolerable solutions would become applicable. But the case was not well understood—not even, perhaps, by the President himself. The emphasis was still on a "posture of defense" rather than on the actual weapons of defense itself. The whole issue was badly confused by the ardent advocates of "air power," always jealous of any diversion of funds from their favorite weapon; there was no real enthusiasm for a heavy military expenditure in an election year; and it was the President himself who finally put a fiscal "ceiling" on military spending which rendered any real rearmament virtually impossible.

Even when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, it still represented primarily a political rather than a formed and active military alliance. We knew that something should be done, but with the Louis Johnson economies we were still hoping to do it with mirrors. And then came Korea, in June 1950, to smash the mirrors once and for all.

Korea was suddenly seen to be an absolutely vital military position, but one for which we had provided no sufficient defenses and for which we had almost no available reinforcements. "Conventional" air bombing quickly proved altogether futile, and the atomic bomb was simply inapplicable. We scraped together just enough reinforcement, both moral (in the U.N.) and material (in the bits and pieces of largely untrained ground divisions which we threw in) to avert disaster. And we started at the same time upon a new military policy which might be better suited to the real exigencies of the times.

Initially, this policy may have tended to err on the panic side as much as the previous policy had erred in complacency. As the first tremendous supplementals were flung into Congress in the fall of 1950 and in early 1951, the vision at the back of most minds was that of a possibly imminent all-out Soviet attack upon the West. Perhaps this was just as well. Everything, as it turned out, was going to take longer than anticipated; "lead times" and production bottlenecks were going to make it considerably harder to spend the money than to appropriate it, and only by starting on the grand scale was enough momentum generated to carry through the effort on anything like adequate levels. But before the end of 1950, somewhat calmer perspectives had obtained. As early as December, General Marshall, recalled to duty as Secretary of Defense, had laid down the critical decision that

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the rearmament effort should be planned as a partial mobilization for the long pull rather than as a base for a possibly immediate total mobilization.

An important effect of this decision was to weaken the categorical imperatives of "purely military need" and restore a larger measure of policy control to the hands of the President and his civilian administrators. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as was their duty, laid down a schedule of "force levels" appropriate to the partial mobilization policy. This called for 143 air wings, 21 Army and three Marine ground divisions, 16 Navy carrier air groups and about 400 combatant naval vessels. The Joint Chiefs have never explained in any detail the reasoning behind these numbers. One must infer that this was a reasonably balanced and expert estimate of what would be required to meet current military commitments in Korea and in the defense of Japan and Western Europe; to provide a training and mobilization base ample enough to support the full-scale mobilization which another total war would demand; and to provide enough naval instruments to enable us to make full use of the advantages which sea power would confer upon us in another war, and enough offensive and defensive air power not only to support the conventional arms, if need be, but also to wage "strategic" war of atomic mass destruction.

Presumably, again, the force levels were adjusted to a larger military policy which by 1951 had accepted the North Atlantic alliance as the foundation for European defense as well as the ultimate expectation of rearming Japan as a main bulwark of defense in Asia and the Western Pacific. Here was, at any rate, the numerical skeleton of a military policy which would put its main reliance on "conventional" methods of warfare, which would count heavily on the coöperation of European and Asiatic free nations to fill out the essential conventional armory and would support them strongly with money and materials in doing so, but which would also retain the threat value of atomic and mass destruction warfare as a final sanction of peace. It was, however, a skeleton only. It is not always realized that these JCS force levels (which remain unchanged today) are no more than a framework. On all the really vital issues—the rate of build-up to the prescribed levels, the kind and modernity of the weapons adopted, the schedule of manpower and material mobilization reserves—the JCS have been largely silent. The result has been

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to devolve a large measure of responsibility in these vital questions upon the civilian budget officers and administrators, and they have not hesitated to use their judgment and authority to a point at which the plaint of "civilian interference" is now sometimes raised.

The Joint Chiefs gave their opinion that mid-1954 would be a "critical" time with the inference that the whole rearmament program should be complete by then. But the President and his Budget Bureau, in late 1951, decided to "roll forward" the peak of the effort, with the result that in respect to some air and other important weapons the prescribed force levels will not now be attained until mid-1955 or even 1956. In early 1952 the Congress voted to stretch this "stretch-out" even farther. Most of the more damaging economies were ultimately restored, however, and essentially we now stand committed to the military policy evoked by the shock of the Korean War, except that we are not fully to attain the prescribed force levels until some time in 1956. The new military budget (to be presented in January 1953, and to control our military spending until June 30, 1954) has been constructed primarily on a "sustaining" basis. The big appropriations have already been made, though not yet spent, and the problem as it appeared toward the end of 1952 was that of maintaining on a continuous basis the structure of partial mobilization, of partial readiness both for a conventional and a mass-destruction war, and of more or less full readiness for such peripheral operations as events may require.

This is our present military policy. It has already taken us as far as it can go; and nobody is satisfied with it. It is under attack from every side and on diametrically opposed counts. It costs too much. It is inadequate to protect us from Soviet armaments. It is insufficient to save Europe and yet it involves us too deeply in commitments of men and money to Europe. It has not succeeded in ending the drain of life in Korea; equally, it has not restored the Korean Republic to freedom and full control of its territories. It is not firmly repelling Soviet imperialism or freeing the satellite victims; at the same time it is risking a third world war. It is wasting money in duplicative research into the new weapons; at the same time it is too conventional in its conceptions and does not give the new weapons the weight they deserve in strategic theory. It is badly organized. It is too much a product of service rivalries and conflicts, too little a broad-gauged

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adjustment of American means and capabilities to American political ends. The only agreement, in most of this, is that the policy is all wrong and we badly need a new start.

That a reëxamination is necessary is hard to deny. Some of this criticism is justified; some is merely cantankerous; some is no more than an expression of the inveterate human tendency to ask for miracles where no miracles are possible. A perfect military policy is no doubt beyond the capacities of fallible human political institutions. Yet we have reached a turning point. New decisions will have to be made in any event. Even if the election had not supervened, it would still have been apparent that we had come to the end of the policies hammered out under the stress of the Korean War in 1950 and 1951 and that we would have to review the whole position. The change of government makes such a review possible. What are the leading questions which the new administration must answer?

First, if not the most important, there is a basic question of organization. There is a widespread dissatisfaction today with the adequacy of the Joint-Chiefs system of military direction. The 1947 act, under which in essentials we are still operating, made elaborate provision for surrounding the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the apparatus of civilian review and control; yet the result has not been quite what was intended. Without relieving the military heads of their power, the act succeeded mainly in relieving them of responsibility. They are still the head and center of all military policy; but they do not appear so to the public and they are often able to avoid the public accountability which should go with their decisons. They are still too much a committee of rival heads of services rather than a board acting by genuinely joint and agreed findings. Unlike the British Cabinet, for example, they are under no joint responsibility; if they reach split decisions, there is no way of compelling unanimity, and if they are unanimous, there is no way of assuring that the unanimity is in a genuine national interest rather than in the interest of a working compromise between the rival services which they represent. The policies they may recommend—like the force levels, for example—are not subject to effective public scrutiny, while the policies on which they refuse to make recommendations —such as the date on which the force levels should be reached —cannot properly be determined by any other agency in government.

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Second, and growing out of the first, there is a question of the correctness with which our present military resources are allocated as between the various arms and services. Speaking very generally, the present scheme is one for a conventional defensive structure, backed by a certain allocation to the mass destruction weapons. We know that immense strides are being made in the unconventional weapons systems both of offense and defense. On November 16, the Atomic Energy Commission announced the successful completion at Eniwetok of an experiment in "thermo-nuclear research," which, if it does not mean a completed hydrogen bomb, certainly means that a hydrogen bomb will soon be with us. On the other hand, we also know that very great strides have recently been made in the defense, through electronic guiding and warning systems, against airborne nuclear attack. Are all these developments really being absorbed in the doctrines of the several services, and are their plans being corrected and emended in accordance with the new facts?

Third, are we really following a rational global strategy even by the light of conventional military force? Our policy is based upon the concept of creating European forces to sustain the main brunt of Soviet pressure in Europe and, ultimately, Asian forces to sustain that pressure in Asia. Are we doing enough to see that those forces are coming into being, or to reinforce their weaknesses? A defense, any defense, is useless unless it is sufficient. There is grave doubt as to whether the European defense, organized under NATO, can be made sufficient. NATO will meet its 1952 goals of 50 divisions and 4,000 airplanes, ready or in prompt reserve. It seems impossible that it can meet the 1953 tentative goal of 94 divisions. If so, what does our military policy do? Should we greatly increase our monetary and material aid? Should we write down the goals in view of our own powers of nuclear threat and the indications that a major war is not now in the purview of Soviet policy? Or should we abandon the entire European experiment and concentrate our whole effort on arming the Eastern peoples to meet the Soviet threat in that area of the world?

Fourth, there is Korea. Here we have in fact resorted to violent means to secure decision for an otherwise insoluble issue between the Soviet empire and ourselves. And at this writing no decision has been achieved. Are we to abandon the fight? Are we to continue, as we have been doing, rotating our men into the

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front lines and accepting the small but steady toll of casualties as the inescapable cost of maintaining our power position? Or are we to invest in a greatly increased military effort in the hope of forcing a military conclusion? Despite all suggestions about stepping up South Korean forces, utilizing the Chinese Nationalists from Formosa, intensifying naval blockade or air bombing, this would seem pretty well to exhaust the list of possible choices. Perhaps new forms of action can be devised, or it is possible that the Chinese Communists themselves will abandon the struggle? Short of this last, we must put our whole operation in Korea on a much firmer, more realistic basis of policy than the American people have as yet seen worked out.

Fifth, there is the underlying question of military costs, which is bound up in one way or another with all the others. The public is expecting a drastic reduction of military spending. Some reduction there will be, under present policies, in the course of the next two years, as the big initial effort of rearmament is completed and the new defense structure moves to a "sustaining" basis. It is difficult, however, to believe that any great amount of "waste and extravagance" can be squeezed out of the system without seriously impairing its military efficiency. It is possible that something can be done through redesign of the system itself. During the campaign, for example, General Eisenhower suggested that there could be a more economical use of military manpower. He also suggested that the weapons system could be revised and simplified. Others have seriously considered the potentialities of the new weapons. If, for instance, it becomes possible to replace most or all of our defensive fighter squadrons with pilotless guided missiles, the savings might be very great.

Yet for every such possibility of reducing costs, there are demands which must greatly increase them. Definite scientific advances have only recently opened up the possibility of a really effective defense against air-borne nuclear attack; but to install such defenses will require not less money but greatly increased expenditures. The scale of our present contribution to the NATO forces is being more and more insistently called in question. If it is really necessary to create a 94-division European Army with corresponding air forces, we shall certainly have to provide more arms to our allies and probably a greater commitment of our own manpower. This last would be possible if we established a true ready reserve, equipped and organized for prompt mobiliza-

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tion as a fighting force, behind our present active divisions. But no effective reserve of the kind exists, and to create one would call for much heavier expenditures of money and effort than we are now prepared to contemplate.

In summary, we have not really worked out a consistent and long-range military policy or given our military planning the support of the informed and agreed public understanding which it demands. There is no firm agreement on the organization of our military power, on the internal design of the system, on the scale of the effort which we should put into it, on its integration with our allied military systems or on the practical uses, in the present contexts of the cold war, to which we should put our formed military strength. On all these questions the new Administration must, in some way or another, render its decisions. It is unlikely that they will be complete or fully self-consistent or far-seeing. But the answers must be found; and out of them will come the new shape of American military policy, the new formulas determining how the American people will organize and apply their military potential to the creation of a world which will seem tolerable to them.

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THE GERMANS REAPPRAISE THE WAR

By H. R. Trevor-Roper

EVERY fatal political disease brings its literary post-mortem; and if this post-mortem is not so much an examination of cause as a dispute about responsibility—a competition in disclaimer by doctors, nurses, relatives and the chambermaid—this does not make it, to the historian, less interesting. It may not establish historical truth, but it adds to historical evidence—evidence not of fact, but of motive, character and political climate. It is now seven years since the defeat of Germany, the overthrow of Nazism, the death of Hitler. In those seven years thousands of documents have come to light which can illustrate the history of Nazism; in the same time several books have been written to explain those documents and hundreds to explain them away. Almost every class of public figure under Nazism has published its apologia; and these apologias, having been addressed to a society which has itself undergone, in the same period, profound emotional alterations, have naturally been adapted to those changes. In this article I propose to consider the literature concerning Nazi Germany which has been published in or for post-Nazi Germany; and I wish to consider it not for its contribution towards historical truth (which is but slight), but for the evidence which it supplies of the changing political climate of Germany since Hitler's death.

I have said that, historically, its value is slight. There has indeed been very little objective, academic study of recent history in Germany. This is not only because German academic historiography is not yet objective, nor because German historians, by an understandable intellectual escapism, tend to flee to remoter periods in which their own lives have been less uncomfortably involved. There is also another reason. If the best historical studies of Nazi Germany have almost invariably been written in English, we should remember that the documents essential for such study are still, for the most part, in British or American, not German, hands. This removal from Germany of German documents has undoubtedly had some good effects. It has ensured the publication of some important material which German historians might well have been tempted, or obliged, to conceal, just as the historians of the Weimar Republic, in their great documentary

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compilation, "Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette,"[1] contrived to conceal the effective and aggressive policy of the German General Staff before 1914. Indeed, whatever the political and legal verdict upon the Nuremberg and other war trials may be, the historian must be glad of them: for they put on record and exposed to legal verification important documents which any German government would probably have suppressed. On the other hand, this seizure of archives has also had effects which German historians may justly deplore. The Allied victors have replaced the German Government as the arbiters of publications. But are they necessarily more liberal? The Russian Government has chosen to publish (not entirely out of disinterested historical zeal) certain papers from the German Foreign Office, including some of the papers of Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador in London between Munich and the war. The British and American governments have opened some archives and published others. But much remains hidden, and the complaints of German historians that they are denied the opportunity of studying their own recent history at first hand are understandable. It is probable that such books as Sir Lewis Namier's "Diplomatic Prelude"[2] or Mr. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's "Munich"[3] could not anyway—if only on grounds of style—have been written by Germans. As it is, inaccessibility of sources prevents them even from trying, and the consequent ignorance among Germans, of their own true history, may well prove politically unfortunate in coming years.

Thus, while British and American writers have found it easier, as victors, to analyze Nazi history, German writers on recent events have almost necessarily been not objective or expository but autobiograpical, reminiscent, apologetic. Consequently their interest has been quite different: they provide evidence to the historian rather than conclusions to the student. What evidence do they provide? It is evidence both of continuous malaise and of clearly discernible shifts. At no time since the war have German writers shown themselves comfortable either in support of Nazism or in opposition to it. On the other hand, the mood which

[1] "Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914," edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme. Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922–1927.

[2] "Diplomatic Prelude, 1938–1939," by Lewis Bernstein Namier. London: Macmillan, 1948.

[3] "Munich: Prologue to Tragedy," by John W. Wheeler-Bennett. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.

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they represent has undergone, in seven years, significant change.

At first it was a mood of revulsion—hatred of Hitler, disillusion with all the broken promises of Nazism, disgust at its suddenly admitted brutality, indignation at its folly and frivolity, repudiation of its works; and, in consequence, dramatization of "the Resistance," apotheosis of the anti-Nazi conspirators, the men of July 20, 1944. This was the mood of the years 1946–7, represented in the books published in those years. Most of these books were published outside Germany, and this fact, although due to the temporary dislocation of the German publishing business, may of course have given an undue emphasis to anti-Nazi views. On the other hand, Swiss firms printed books for the German as well as the Swiss public and no doubt appealed to a German and not merely an Allied or neutral mood. The first of these books was the stout work of Hans Bernd Gisevius, "Bis zum bittern Ende"[4]—a slapdash, undocumented glorification of the anti-Nazi opposition, published in Zurich in 1946. Himself a genuine member of that opposition, who had played a personal part in the conspiracy of July 20, 1944, Gisevius had worked for the American O.S.S. in Switzerland and given evidence for the prosecution at Nuremberg. He had thus had exceptional opportunities and he used them to quick advantage: his book hit the mood of the moment and had a large sale; but it was essentially a *livre d'occasion*. Far better—more moving, more restrained, and more careful of fact—were two other books which also appeared from Zurich in the same year: Fabian von Schlabrendorff's "Offiziere gegen Hitler"[5] and the posthumous diary of Ulrich von Hassell.[6] Both these were conservative writers—Schlabrendorff a lawyer and historian, Hassell a diplomatist who had been ambassador in Rome, recalled by Ribbentrop in 1937, and murdered after the plot of July 20, 1944—of which, however, he had been unaware. Both these books enjoyed a wide circulation in Germany and were translated into English. Hassell's diary, in particular, which has the added clarity of pessimism and the added credit of contemporaneous, unedited comment, made a great impression: his hatred of Hitler's cruelty and vulgarity, his lament for the dis-

[4] "Bis zum bittern Ende," by Hans Bernd Gisevius. Zurich: Fretz and Wasmuth, 1946. ("To The Bitter End." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.)

[5] "Offiziere gegen Hitler," by Fabian von Schlabrendorff. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1946. ("They Almost Killed Hitler." New York: Macmillan, 1947.)

[6] "Vom andern Deutschland, 1938–1944," by Ulrich von Hassell. Zurich: Atlantis Verlag, 1946. ("The von Hassell Diaries, 1938–1944," Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1947.)

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appearance of European culture, his gloomy certainty that the future offered only the alternatives of victorious tyranny or ruinous defeat, his prophetic condemnation of Hitler's mad "plunge into the abyss"—all this mirrored perfectly the gloom and nostalgia of German sentiment in 1946. It was an appeal for decency, sanity, culture, in a mad, brutal world. And yet this philosophy, if it heightened, also limited the appeal of "the Resistance;" for it was, in the eyes of many, the philosophy of a class: a cultivated class indeed, and a class which Nazism had overthrown, but a class which the defeat of Nazism could not automatically reinvigorate—the old, cosmopolitan, conservative class which had once ruled in Europe, and now rules no more. In their mood of remorse the German people might listen to a voice from that class, but it was as the libertine listens, in a moment of misery, to a respected priest—not for long.

Throughout 1946 and 1947 accounts of "the Resistance" continued to be published in and for Germany. In 1947 Rudolf Pechel's pedestrian account of the German Resistance was published in Zurich.[7] Altogether some 50 books or pamphlets on the subject appeared in German in those two years. But by the end of 1947 the myth of "the other Germany" was already wearing thin. Its appeal was too conservative, too cosmopolitan, and its heroes were either (like the anglophil Rhodes Scholar Adam von Trott or the half-English aristocrat Helmuth von Moltke) sympathizers with or (like Gisevius and Schlabrendorff) actual agents of the Western Powers. To many Germans the movement thus appeared not only anti-Nazi but also antinational. As long as the German people, still staggering from defeat, felt emotionally as well as politically and economically dependent on the West, such "antinational" figures were useful as spiritual ambassadors to the protecting Powers; but what if a time came when Germany felt able to resent such humiliating tutelage? In 1947–8 the honeymoon between Germany's eastern and western conquerors was broken off. Thereafter, with currency reform and the creation of the West Zone, Germans began to recover confidence. Further, the German printing-houses were at work again, and authors were no longer dependent on foreign publishers. Thus in 1948 the situation was radically altered. From that date on a new attitude towards "the Resistance" was given expression.

[7] "Deutscher Widerstand," by Rudolf Pechel. Erlenbach-Zürich: E. Rentsch, 1947.

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This new attitude was represented in public by the German generals, whose memoirs and retrospective vindications suddenly flooded the literary market in the year 1949. In the literature of "the other Germany," the German generals had consistently appeared as inglorious, backsliding figures whose hesitancy had ruined the more consistent civilian opposition. They alone had commanded the means effectively to overthrow Hitler from within, but whenever the moment for action had come, they had always found it either inconvenient to miss their share in Hitler's victory or disgraceful to desert him in the hour of defeat. Boastful but vacillating, at best unpolitical, at worst corruptible by presents or promotion, the generals—especially Halder and Brauchitsch—feature almost as the villains of Hassell's diary. Now, in 1949, they struck back. Imprisonment and interrogation had cleared their minds; military specialists like Captain Liddell Hart had flattered them by their attentive questions,[8] and it was Halder himself, Hitler's Chief of Staff from 1938 to 1942, who, in a famous pamphlet, gave the signal for counterattack. This pamphlet, called "Hitler als Feldherr,"[9] consisted of a violent attack on Hitler's generalship; and in a few weeks it is said to have sold 100,000 copies. Its publication heralded a flood of similar literature which, taken together, interpreted the entire history of the German General Staff in its relations with Hitler.

Behind the natural differences of prejudice and presentation, what, if any, is the common denominator of this military literature? Briefly, the German generals claimed that they, as leaders of the historic German army, the basis of the German state, represented throughout the true interest of the nation, and that Hitler, having outmanœuvred them by corrupt politics in 1937–8, was able, by a usurped control and lunatic strategy, to ruin from behind both the army and the nation. The generals were thus not "the Opposition:" they were the legitimate authorities seeking still to perform their functions and save Germany from the results of Hitler's criminal irresponsibility. In this grave task they were embarrassed only by what they asserted was the frivolous irresponsibility of "dilettante politicals" like Hassell who, not being entrusted with the lives and souls of millions of Germans, were often unaware of the magnitude of the problem.

[8] "German Generals Talk," by Basil Henry Liddell Hart. New York: Morrow, 1948.
[9] "Hitler als Feldherr," by Franz Halder. Germany: Münchener Dom-Verlag, 1949. ("Hitler As War Lord." London: Putnam, 1950.)

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"The other Germany," these generals suggest, was disqualified by its "otherness" from handling German affairs: it was not, like the General Staff, a "responsible" organization. "Responsibility" is the keyword of the military apologists. "Of Military Responsibility"[10] is the title of one of its earliest manifestos.

Represented in sufficiently abstract terms, this thesis has a certain plausibility. Unfortunately, on closer examination, the apparent solidarity of the generals' front soon crumbles. Within it there is indeed one consistent group: the "Prussian" group which derived immediately from Seeckt and was represented by General Ludwig Beck. Beck's papers were published in 1949 by Wolfgang Foerster, under the title "Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg,"[11] and in the same year General Friedrich Hossbach, in his book "Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler,"[12] paid further tribute to his views. The party of Beck was certainly an anti-Nazi party which had supported Nazism only so long as it had thought that it could use it. In 1937–8, when it became clear that Hitler was in control and would carry out a revolutionary and aggressive policy far beyond the limits of that conservative rearmament which he had envisaged, Beck had resigned his post as Chief of General Staff, and, quite logically, had organized conspiracy after conspiracy against Hitler. After the failure of the last, on July 20, 1944, he had committed suicide. Of him and his group it can fairly be said that they opposed Hitler not because he lost the war but because he made it. Like Hassell they regarded it from the start as a "plunge into the abyss."

But this "Prussian" group among the generals was a small minority only; if we examine the majority of the memoirs of 1949, we find a very different picture. Their authors did not resign in 1938—or later; and although most of them were in some way victims of Hitler's vengeance after July 20, 1944, and many of them had been involved in the plot, it is perfectly clear that their opposition was based entirely on grounds of strategy, not of principle. Halder's whole pamphlet is an attack on Hitler's wasteful and impulsive methods which lost the war when more professional methods could have won it; General Speidel, who had been Chief of Staff to Rommel, states clearly that it was military

[10] "Von der militärischen Verantwortlichkeit," by Friedrich Hossbach. Göttingen: 1948.
[11] "Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg," by Wolfgang Foerster. München: Münchener Dom-Verlag, 1949.
[12] "Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938," by Friedrich Hossbach. Wolfenbüttel: Wolfenbütteler Verlagsanstalt, 1949.

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defeat and nothing else which turned Rommel into a somewhat ineffective conspirator;[13] and the burden of almost every other apologia is the same. Hitler's "irresponsibility," to these generals, appeared not in the making of war, or in the kind of war that he made, but in the unprofessional methods by which he threw away a possible victory.

The majority of the generals were not really anti-Nazi at all: they were fair-weather Nazis. This becomes apparent whenever they reach, in their memoirs, that crucial touchstone of politics, the plot of July 20, 1944. Theoretically, as the true opposition, they should boast of this attempt; in fact they were involved; but in retrospect they never approach it without uneasiness, and the fundamental questions which it raises are no sooner sighted than the authors shy away, leaving, like the cuttlefish, only a formless cloud of ink. Through that cloud one feature, however, remains visible: the writers recognize that whatever Prussian Junkers and cosmopolitan aristocrats may have thought, the broad masses of the German people, before whom they are now defending themselves, had still, in 1944, believed in Hitler and even now perhaps—in 1949—believed in the program which he had bungled. The war, in 1944, had still been a patriotic war; the Western Allies were still the enemies not merely of Hitler but of Germany; negotiations with them were still treachery; a *Putsch*, even if successful, would probably have foundered on the basic loyalty of the German people: in any case it would certainly be exploited by them afterwards as a stab in the back: a *Dolchstoss* of which not Hitler but the generals would be the villains.

This shift of emphasis from total anti-Nazism to modified Nazism, Nazism without Hitler, has its ironies, its accidental casualties. A good instance is provided by the literature concerning Admiral Canaris, chief of the *Abwehr* or German secret service, who was executed in the last month of the Nazi era. It happens that Canaris was himself a singularly evasive, cloudy, impersonal character, so that his panegyrists can easily ascribe to him whatever virtues seem most convenient to them at the time. In 1951 there appeared two biographies of Canaris. The author of one, Ian Colvin, was an Englishman, naturally sympathetic to the cosmopolitan Westerners and still breathing the atmosphere of 1946: in his book "Master Spy,"[14] he represented

[13] "Invasion 1944," by Hans Speidel. Tübingen: R. Wunderlich, 1949. ("Invasion 1944." Chicago: Regnery, 1950.)

[14] "Master Spy," by Ian Goodhope Colvin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952.

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Canaris not only as a consistent and well-intentioned opponent of Nazism (which he was), but also as a secret ally and informant of the British (which he was not). The other biographer, a German, Karl Heinz Abshagen,[15] was more sensitive to the change of climate in Germany and never approached the subject of Canaris' anti-Nazism without elaborate and apprehensive apologies. He was particularly anxious that no German reader should suppose that Canaris ever served Allied interests. Canaris hated Hitler and dreaded the consequences of a German victory—yes; but let not the reader suppose that he was unpatriotic or failed in his German duty: "in spite of all these mental doubts, the *Abwehr* under Canaris did its duty in full"—it worked for victory. On this essential and significant point the two biographies neatly cancel each other out.[16]

Thus, by 1950, the literary barometers already showed a perceptible shift in the German attitude to Nazism. Nationalism, the anti-Russian nationalism of Hitler, had recovered some ground. Though Hitler remained a criminal, his policy was not entirely wrong: his crime was, at least in part, his failure. This recovery of German nationalism profited, of course, from events in the outer world. In the summer of 1950 Russia and the West carried their differences to war—in Korea; anti-Communism received ever more violent expression in America; and the ideological hatred of Communism in the West could easily be transformed, in Germany, into a nationalist hatred of Russia, a revival of Nazism. The new bargaining position of Germany between now-divided conquerors, like the question of German rearmament, each added its opportunities; and in 1951 General Otto Ernst Remer's Socialist Reich Party suddenly captured attention. Appropriately, Remer made his public appeal through a pamphlet—an apologia centering on that crucial subject, the dilemma of Nazis and anti-Nazis alike: the July 20, 1944, plot. For that famous date, which had sent Beck and Hassell to death and Halder to prison, had made Remer a Nazi hero: it was he,

[15] "Canaris; Patriot und Weltbürger," by Karl Heinz Abshagen. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1949.

[16] Apart from the titles quoted in the text, the following military memoirs should be mentioned: "Der Fritschprozess, 1938," by Johann Adolf Kielmansegg. Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1949. "Befehl im Widerstreit; Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee, 1923-1945," by Adolf Heusinger. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1950. "Der Deutsche Generalstab; Geschichte und Gestalt, 1657–1945," by Walter Görlitz. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1950.
"Deutsche Schicksalsjahre," by Kurt Assmann. Wiesbaden: E. Brockhaus, 1950.

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more than any other man, "the little major," as Hitler called him, "who made the great decision," who by his prompt disobedience had saved Berlin for Nazism. In his apologia, entitled simply "20 July 1944,"[17] and published in 1951, Remer denounced the July conspirators as criminals and traitors, men who would have surrendered the Fatherland, in the East, to the "cruelest enemies of Europe," the Russians, and, in the West, to "the Jew Morgenthau," and against them he exalted, as the type of the Happy Warrior, "the soldiers and workers who stood by their oath" to Adolf Hitler.

The apologia and the career of Remer must not be taken too seriously. Already, in the court at Brunswick, his attack on the July conspirators has been condemned as libelous; and the Bonn government, in a special issue of *Das Parlament* on July 20, 1952, has canonized the conspirators of 1944; Remer's party is now outlawed. His movement may yet prove to have been a mere flash in the pan. If we wish to gauge the German climate, we would do better to look at the memoirs of those more practised politicians who themselves have based their whole careers on a capacity to gauge it: the politicians who, having served and survived Hitler, are now cautiously emerging to justify even their careers.

For if 1946–8 were the years of the opposition, and 1949–50 the years of the generals, 1951–2 have been the years of the politicians. There have been earlier instances indeed, but they were exceptional: men like Schacht, who was prepared to resign and go to prison rather than accept responsibility for amateur financial policy, and whose book, "Abrechnung mit Hitler"[18]—refreshing through its unusual clarity and trenchancy—puts him rather among the opposition than among those more prudent politicians who lasted longer and are only now, after years of careful reconnaissance, circumspectly venturing into print. Now that the opposition have spent their artillery in a premature exhibition, now that the generals have opened a breach, now that "resistance" is no longer a necessary virtue and the service of Hitler has been distinguished from Nazism, the way at last seems open for the trimmers. When so practised a survivor as Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, who served Hitler as minister from beginning to end, prefaces his recollections[19] with the firm (but

[17] "20 Juli 1944," by Otto Ernst Remer. Hamburg: Verlag Deutsche Opposition, 1951.
[18] "Account Settled," by Hjalmar Schacht. London: G. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1949.

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unnecessary) words, "I was not a member of the Resistance," we can be sure that it is safe to say so. Thus they emerge—the bureaucrats, the aristocratic neuters, the respectable "non-Nazis" who smoothed Hitler's way to power, blurred the ugly features of his rule, masked his intentions, anaesthetized his victims, and detaching themselves in time to avoid disaster, now remember their virtuous but unavailing efforts to civilize the régime. In vain! Each as he emerges is trapped by Sir Lewis Namier: his half-truths and evasions are exposed; and we wonder how educated men can ever have hoped to rehabilitate themselves by such methods. The answer is that they wrote not for us but for Germans, and the question we should ask concerns not the accuracy but the purpose of these former collaborators of Hitler who now think it worth while to appear before their compatriots sheeted not in white but in a curious, fugitive, variable tint of grey.

Once asked, the question answers itself with surprising clarity. Behind the multiplicity of excuses and evasion, and apart from their personal ambitions, the "non-Nazi" politicians of the Third Reich admit to a similar policy—a policy which was an essential part of Nazism and for which (we must assume) they reckon on a favorable reception in Germany today. That policy was, quite simply, eastern conquest. The extent of the conquest might vary —timid conservatives might not share Hitler's voracious appetite—but if some anticipated a longer banquet than others, all were agreed on the first few courses. Thus Baron von Weizsäcker,[20] head of the Foreign Office, while perpetually describing the scruples which he had to overcome before clinging to office, openly vindicates his policy towards Czechoslovakia: a policy of "chemical dissolution" and quiet absorption which differs from Hitler's policy only in method, not in aim. What Weizsäcker recommended was Hitler's policy—the conquest of Eastern Europe —without Hitler's risk—European war. Consequently he regards Munich as a great victory, "a defeat for Hitler's war mentality," and the men who, by surrendering to Hitler, made it possible—Neville Chamberlain and Sir Nevile Henderson—as "great men." Thus Herbert von Dirksen, who as a "Prussian" would have preferred agreement with Russia, supported, as an earnest of such agreement, the first stage of conquest: conquest

[19] "Es geschah in Deutschland," by Lutz von Schwerin-Krosigk. Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1951.

[20] "Erinnerungen," by Ernst Heinrich von Weizsäcker. München: P. List, 1950. ("Memoirs." Chicago: Regnery, 1951.)

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of Poland.[21] Behind the infinite evasions and duplicities of Franz von Papen's memoirs the same purpose, the same ultimate justification, is visible. In all his book[22] I can find only two positive aims consistently stated. They are "basic Christian principles" (which appear to mean social conservatism at home), and Germany's "historic mission" to defend Europe against the Slavs. Since, in historical fact, the Slavs have never in the past threatened Europe, while the Germans have persistently invaded and annexed Slav lands, this phrase can only mean, once again, the conquest of the East. This conviction even of non-Nazis that Germany was entitled to expand eastwards—if not, as Hitler hoped, to the Urals, at least, as Papen and Weizsäcker agreed, to Prague and Posen—was shared even by such anti-Nazi officials as Hassell and his friends, who in the draft peace terms which they offered to Lord Halifax in February 1940 through "Mr. X" (Josef Müller), stipulated that Austria and Bohemia must remain in the Reich and that the German-Polish frontier be reëstablished as in 1914. Now that Russia dominates equally all countries to the east of Germany, so that the distinction between a "Prussian" or anti-Polish policy and a nationalist or anti-Russian policy is again, as in 1938, blurred, while German cities like Königsberg and Breslau have become Russian or Polish, it is perhaps understandable that the Papens and the Weizsäckers should feel justified in reminding their compatriots that the part of Hitler's policy which they sought to further was not anti-Semitism or concentration camps but the *Drang nach Osten*.

Thus, however we examine it, the literature of Nazi history shows in the past seven years a gradual shift from anti-Nazism to revived nationalism. Intellectuals, aristocrats, cosmopolitans, Prussian traditionalists might preach total opposition to Hitler, and this waning minority among Germans might prove useful as ambassadors to the outer world in the days when Germany was crushed and her victors still united; but with the disunity of the conquerors and the recovery of German economy and confidence, that phase is over. German opinion is back to normal; and in spite of all the difference of circumstances, that normality seems to be the normality of the 1930's. The unappeased demands are for unity, independence, and not now conquest, but recovery

[21] "Moskau, Tokio, London," by Herbert von Dirksen. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1949. ("Moscow, Tokyo, London." Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.)
[22] "Memoirs," by Franz von Papen. London: Deutsch, 1952.

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of Eastern lands. This being so, the question naturally arises: Will the wheel turn full circle? Will nationalism without Hitler lead ultimately to nationalism with Hitler? Is there any evidence, in these publications, of a revival not merely of nationalism but of real Nazism?

In my opinion there is not. Whatever modifications of anti-Nazism have been made, there has been no sign, in these German memoirs, of any forgiveness towards Hitler. Even the politicians who served him to the last, and who now defend his aims, disown his person. Even Remer is careful to say nothing about him, and to deny any attempt to revive "the mistakes" of what he regards as a dead period. Of literature about Hitler, or about the other Nazi leaders, there has been in Germany so far surprisingly little. The most valuable German work on Hitler—Josef Greiner's "Das Ende des Hitler Mythos"[23]—was published in Vienna in 1947, *i.e.* in the anti-Nazi years. The best German book on Goebbels, Wilfred von Oven's "Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende,"[24] was published in Buenos Aires. Rudolf Semler's shorter but equally interesting diary of Goebbels' Table Talk was published in Copenhagen and London but not Germany.[25] Goering has had two biographies in English but none in German. Of Himmler there is total silence, and although his system of terror has been carefully documented in Eugen Kogon's "Der SS-Staat" (originally written for the Occupying Powers), the public edition of that book saw the light abroad, in Stockholm.[26] In truth, the Germans seem to be uninterested in Hitler. For 12 years he filled their lives, dominated and drove and deafened them, and even if some parts of his policy now seem to them again respectable, he himself remains not only a liability, but something of a bore. In 1951 Dr. Henry Picker published in Germany the texts which he had personally retained of Hitler's table talk.[27] Badly edited, arbitrarily arranged, and sometimes incorrectly quoted, these documents—of which a complete version is now appearing in France—are nevertheless of enormous historical value; never have the true aims, the personal program, the coarse but powerful mind of Hitler been so clearly and vividly expressed; and the news of their

[23] "Das Ende des Hitler Mythos," by Josef Greiner. Wien: Amalthea-Verlag, 1947.
[24] "Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende," by Wilfred von Oven. Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1950.
[25] "Saadan var Goebbels," by Rudolf Semler. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1947.
[26] "Der SS-Staat," by Eugen Kogon. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1949. ("The Theory and Practice of Hell." New York: Farrar, Straus, 1950.)
[27] "Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, 1941–42," by Adolf Hitler. Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1951. Edited by Henry Picker.

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impending publication caused some stir among liberal Germans who apprehended that this authentic utterance of the Führer's philosophy might provide neo-Nazism with a new gospel. But in fact the prophets of woe were confounded. "Hitler's Tischgespräche," in spite of their great historical interest, and in spite of great publicity caused by a legal struggle over the copyright, have sold, in Germany, only 6,000 copies. In the same year the labored and implausible apologia of Weizsäcker had sold 20,000 copies. Even more significant is the success of the vast, literary self-defense of a former Nazi sympathizer, "Der Fragebogen," by Ernst von Salomon,[28] which, in the same period, sold nearly 200,000 copies. Clearly, from such evidence, the Germans are not so much interested in Hitler as in themselves: every defense of collaboration, collusion, delusion, is indirectly a defense of themselves: the grey sheets in which Weizsäcker and so many others not too penitently stand are the penitential sheets of Germany, and what German wishes them to be too abjectly white? These books are not read in Germany for truth, but for comfort, and it is wrong, I suspect, to argue from the interest that some of them have aroused any great interest either in the history of National Socialism—that unhappy period which Germans would rather transform or forget than understand—or in the personality of Hitler whose "errors" are still more obvious than his undoubted nationalist virtue. I know that in saying this I run a serious risk, for even at this moment Thomas Orr's "Das war Hitler," "the first biography," is being serialized in the Munich periodical *Revue*, and Walter Görlitz's life of Hitler is due from the publishers; but whether these works will profoundly illuminate the subject or open a fourth stage in the history of Nazi historiography since the war, or will merely reillustrate the present division between Nazism and Nationalism, between truth and apologia, I must leave the later evidence to determine.

[28] "Der Fragebogen," by Ernst von Salomon. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1951.

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THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

By Philip E. Mosely

A GAP of thirteen and one-half years lay between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Congresses of the Soviet Communist Party instead of the three-year interval provided by the former Party statutes. Although various references were made, from 1948 on, to plans for holding a new Party Congress, *Pravda's* announcement, on August 20, of the date and the agenda came without forewarning. The assembling of the Congress on October 5 was preceded by many and varied speculations concerning its significance. Its conclusion was followed by no less puzzlement as to why it had been held. The delay in the calling of a Congress and its purely formal rôle once it had met emphasized the fact that in the Soviet party-state the self-chosen and self-perpetuating Party leadership has made the nominally ruling Party a handmaiden of its own absolute control over the state apparatus. In this Siamese-twin relationship, the power of the state apparatus has flourished, and that of the theoretically all-powerful Party has withered.

One formal purpose of calling the Congress was to change the Party name from "All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" to that of the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union." For this, was it necessary to call together 1,359 leading members? The official explanation is that the term "Bolsheviks" now has a purely historical significance, recalling the split of 1903 between Lenin's followers and the Mensheviks, who, after various manœuvres by Lenin, found themselves in a minority at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Perhaps another historic echo, better left unvoiced in view of the present Soviet dogma of the primacy of the Great Russian "elder brother" over the other Soviet peoples, was that the now discarded word "All-Union" recalls the period of 1922–1924, when the Ukrainian, Byelo-Russian, Georgian and other parties were fused with their All-Russian counterpart into a single "All-Union" Party on an allegedly equal and voluntary footing. The new terminology conforms to the fact of completely centralized control over the Party, and eliminates any faint recollection of the time when the various non-Russian Communist parties believed that, at least for them, there would be some element of

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genuine federalism within both Party and state in the Soviet Union.[1]

The newly-adopted Party statutes record current practice, rather than change it. They emphasize even more clearly the principle of hierarchical subordination spelled out in the new rules. Until the exclusion of a Party member from the Party cell to which he belongs has been ratified by higher committees—provincial, regional or Union Republic—he continues to take a full part in the work of the cell, including attendance at secret meetings. Obviously, the real right of expulsion is vested in the hierarchy of committees, and more specifically in their secretaries, who are appointed by the central Secretariat in Moscow.

By contrast, the Party "apparat"—the Party committees at the county, city, district, provincial, regional and Union Republic levels—is placed in a privileged position. The expulsion of these Party leaders cannot even be considered by any lowly Party cell; such a question can be decided only by a two-thirds majority of the plenary session of the Party committee to which the suspect belongs. Logically, therefore, the new statutes provide also that the exclusion of a member of the Central Committee is to be decided by a Party Congress, which is now scheduled once in four years, or, what is more important, by the Central Committee, meeting at intervals between Congresses. These provisions help to safeguard the position of the hierarchy—the "apparat"—against possible control by the rank-and-file membership, and emphasize again the principle of hierarchical obedience within a monolith controlled and directed from the top.

The new statutes are, of course, silent on the question of limiting the power of the political police over Party members. In its early decades the Party assumed that the political police was intended to control the "enemies of the people," not to supervise and punish members of the Party, which had its own Control Commission for this purpose. During Stalin's struggle for dominance and then for monopoly of power, the powers of the police, not only over known oppositionists but also over all party members, expanded rapidly. However, efforts to uphold the tradition of Party control over members—the best known efforts were associated with Satz and Akulov—persisted as late as 1934. Ar-

[1] Or perhaps, in dealing with nine ruling parties within the Soviet power-bloc, there is a convenience of terminology in referring to the Soviet Party by a name which identifies its geographical and political status.

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ticle 13 of the new statutes clearly reinforces rather than limits the complete ascendancy of the political police over the membership of the Party. It provides that "in cases when a member of the Party has committed misdeeds which are subject to punishment under judicial procedure, he is excluded from the Party together with communication concerning the misdeed to the administrative and judicial authorities." Apparently, this clumsily worded provision refers only to "misdeeds" which have been discovered first by Party organs and are then to be reported by them to the political police or the state's attorney. There is no reference to any action to be taken by the Party committees in case a Party member is accused or convicted of "misdeeds" under any of several public or secret procedures. The inference of the unchallenged supremacy of the political police over the "vanguard of the toiling people" is clear.

No little puzzlement has also arisen over the disappearance of the *Politburo* of the Central Committee, with, usually, nine members and two alternates, and its replacement by the Presidium, with its 25 members and 11 alternates. In an otherwise wordy report on the draft statutes, Khrushchev was a model of laconic brevity when it came to a discussion of this change. He stated in a single sentence that "such a reconstruction [*Politburo* into Presidium] is opportune because the term 'Presidium' corresponds better to the functions which are, in fact, being carried out at present by the *Politburo*." Obviously, the "functions" of the *Politburo*-Presidium were so clear to the Party Congress that no further explanation was appropriate, and the entire draft statute was "adopted unanimously."

The only way to guess at the difference between the old and the new organs of dictatorial rule is to examine the composition of each. The enlarged Presidium contains three elements. The most important part of its membership consists of Stalin and nine other members (Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Beria, Khrushchev, Shvernik), with long service on the *Politburo*. The portraits of these ten, and only of these ten, leaders were featured prominently in the November 7 celebrations at Moscow, in accordance with the Soviet principle of hierarchy. Aside from the disappearance of Andreyev, following Khrushchev's attack in 1950 on his methods of organizing collective farm work this "leading cadre" has shown a remarkable stability for many years.

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Among 15 other less prominent members of the Presidium are four Party leaders from three key regions: Andrianov from Leningrad, Aristov from Cheliabinsk, Korotchenko and Melnikov from the Ukrainian party. It is probable that Melnikov has the greater authority in the Ukrainian Communist Party, but it would have been awkward not to include a representative, such as Korotchenko, with a Ukrainian family name. While another member, Otto Kuusinen, is nominally the head of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, a relatively unimportant region, it is more probable that he was included as an adviser on Communist Parties abroad because of his many years' service as a high official of the Communist International prior to its formal dissolution in May 1943.

The third element in the Presidium consists of important central executives just below the top rank, such as Pervukhin, head of the Russian Republic, Kuznetsov, head of the trade-unions, Shkiryatov, chairman of the Party Control Commission, and Saburov, chairman of the State Planning Office, while Mikhailov, Ponomarenko and Suslov are members both of the Presidium and of the all-important Secretariat of the Central Committee, which controls appointments, promotions and demotions within the Party "apparat" and participates in similar decisions affecting the higher ranks in the administrative, economic and military bureaucracy. Among alternate members of the Presidium are other second-rank executives, such as Vyshinsky for foreign affairs, Zverev for finance, and Kosygin for light industry.

Saburov's new-found prominence deserves a special word. When he replaced Voznesensky in 1949 as chairman of *Gosplan,* he was referred to abroad as a "mere technician." In a sense all Soviet executives except Stalin are "technicians." As early as 1945, Saburov had emerged as the most important economic expert in Stalin's secretariat. In that year he was in command of the Soviet campaign to round up and ship to Russia all possible supplies and equipment found in Eastern Germany. In this field his authority overrode that of the Soviet military command. American negotiators who dealt with Saburov at the Potsdam Conference and later in the Allied Council at Berlin found him incisive and efficient, extremely well-informed about economic and reparation problems, very direct and, in that sense, "unideological" in his approach to concrete problems. Incidentally, Saburov was reportedly one of some 80 young Soviet party-spe-

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cialists selected to study engineering and production methods in the United States between 1931 and 1933. He and Mikoyan are probably the only high Soviet leaders who have a first-hand acquaintance with America's industrial power. His speech to the Congress, which supplemented and expanded Malenkov's treatment of economic issues, was forthright in treating both achievements and defects of Soviet production.

The most important and least known factor in the operations of the *Politburo*-Presidium is its system of committees. There are, it is believed, standing committees on foreign policy, on economic development, on military affairs, on ideological controls, on the direction of foreign Communist parties, and perhaps on other topics. For example, it is probable that Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and perhaps on occasion Mikoyan and Beria, form a committee on foreign policy, to which Vyshinsky and some other leading officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs report. Zverev may report on financial questions to a committee consisting perhaps of Molotov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich and Saburov. A similar committee on foreign Communist Parties might consist of Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Kuusinen.

In the absence of permitted channels for freely expressed pressures and competing views, "cabinet committees" of this type, backed by careful staff papers, are essential if divergent demands and interests are to be taken into account in policy-making. Given the almost complete continuity of persons and responsibilities from the *Politburo* to the Presidium, the committee system has presumably also continued its functions. The only slight change is that about ten responsible executives who were immediately below the *Politburo* in terms of their functions have received outward recognition through membership in the enlarged Presidium. Whether the Presidium will actually function or even meet as a body is a matter of sheer speculation.

A study of the hierarchical details of the Congress confirms the impression that Malenkov, who was chosen, trained and raised to power by Stalin, has emerged as a probable successor, after having outmanœuvred and outlived his rivals. Conceivably, a Khrushchev-Beria-Molotov combination might offer competition to his influence over general policy and over the power of appointment, but no such "combination" would be imaginable unless Stalin fostered it. At the same time there is no logical ground for assuming that Stalin would allow access to him to be

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centered in a single person, however much trusted, or that he will not continue to remain in close touch with important decisions through the committees and their agreed and unagreed recommendations to him.

Malenkov's deportment at the Congress was well designed to mark him as the "modest second" reporting on behalf of the "incomparable" leader. While his very long report, dealing with the whole range of domestic and world policy, was referred to with approval by subsequent speakers, no "adjectives" similar to those inevitably coupled with Stalin's name were applied to Malenkov. By comparison, the background rôle assigned to Molotov was striking. The hierarchically planned proceedings strengthened the impression that active conduct of policy—"leadership" must remain unique—has been passing since the war into the hands of men of long administrative and party experience in their fifties, backed by administrators of substantial experience in their forties.

The Congress itself reflected this important shift of executive responsibility to the post-revolutionary generations. Of 1,192 voting members, 61.1 percent were between 41 and 50, 15.3 percent over 50, 17.7 percent between 35 and 40, and 5.9 percent were under 35. This is a striking reversal in age-structure, compared with the 1920's and even the 1930's. In terms of length of party membership, 1.2 percent were members before 1917, 6.2 percent joined between 1917 and 1920, 36.4 percent between 1921 and 1930, 36 percent between 1931 and 1941, 16.1 percent between 1941 and 1945, and 4.1 percent since the war. The importance of advanced education for entry into the leading ranks of the Party is indicated by the fact that of 1,192 delegates 709 had completed their higher education and 84 had received some higher education.

In effect, the Nineteenth Congress consolidated the fusion between Party and state, ratifying the interdependence which had been clearly outlined by the mid-1930's, consolidated by the great purges of the late 1930's, and extended further by the mass inflow of military and civilian administrators during the Second World War. The power of direct appointment or of review of appointment, increasingly monopolized by the Party Secretariat from the mid-1930's on, would in itself have sufficed to consolidate the direct authority of the *Politburo* over all ranks of the Party, administrative, economic and military apparatuses. There

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is evidence that the power of the Secretariat over appointments in the Party machine includes the posts of Party committee secretaries down to the level of counties, cities and important factories. All ministerial appointments in the central government and the Union Republic governments are believed to be similarly centralized, as well as the appointment of the principal administrators in the provinces. In the army, all appointments from the rank of colonel up are believed to be subject to review and ratification by the Secretariat. Within the central government, the state and the vast economic machine, actual policy is made by the *Politburo*-Presidium of the Party. Probably the unwieldy Council of Ministers never meets, and the ministries are grouped by subject matter under the direction of relevant committees of the Presidium. The original parallelism between state and party organs, expressed in the duality of the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, has been replaced by the direct rule of the Party leadership which utilizes for its ends both state machinery and Party apparatus.

For the rulers the Party performs three principal functions: mass indoctrination, supervision of performance, and recruitment of personnel. While Khrushchev emphasized the rôle of the Party as the bearer of doctrine, the Nineteenth Congress added nothing to the picture of this function beyond exhortations to improve its methods and to strengthen its propaganda efforts. The listing of the principal Party schools, as given by Moskatov, Chairman of the Party's Central Review Commission, gave some insight into the organization of indoctrination. Among such schools he listed "one-year courses for the advanced training of first secretaries of provincial committees, of regional committees of the Soviet Party and of the central committees of Communist Parties of Union Republics, chairmen of provincial and regional executive committees, and of presidents of the Councils of ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics." The fusion of Party and state apparatuses could not be better illustrated than by the picture of both Party and state high officials, including Presidents of Union Republics, attending the highest Party school for a year, presumably to receive their final initiation into the arcana of Soviet rule.

Khrushchev's speech on the work of the Party gave many illustrations of the failure of Party organizations to exercise supervision over the quality of the work of its own members and

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of state officials, and emphasized the duty of Party members to organize continuous criticism and review of the work of the entire apparatus. According to Malenkov, the basic duties of the Party are: to develop "self-criticism" (officially sanctioned criticism), while punishing "slander;" to improve discipline of Party members and of all organizations within the Soviet system; to select personnel for both Party and state organizations; and to improve "ideological work" both within the Party and within "the non-Party masses."

The exact relation of Party to state apparatus has fluctuated greatly in the past. Until the mid-1930's the two were to a considerable extent distinct in personnel, and the authority of even low-level Party groups or Komsomols to interfere with all levels of the state apparatus in the name of "Bolshevist vigilance" constantly made itself felt. As the apparatuses of state operation and economic management, of the military and of the secret police expanded during the 1930's, the filling of higher posts by Communists and the tendency to concentrate the best administrators on concrete tasks rather than on the more generalized functions of the Party itself gave greater authority to the administrative corps. The purges accentuated the tendency of administrators to regard with distrust any overemphasis of the Party's rôle as a nagging supervisor of their "practical" work. During the war, administrative talents were concentrated on the urgent concrete tasks of producing and fighting, and the ideological test for admission to the Party was blurred at the edges by the emphasis upon the patriotic rather than the "ideological" character of the war. By the end of the war Party officials were often merely "whippers-up" of sentiment, while power, prestige and party-influence went to those who "did things."

The revival of emphasis upon Party doctrine, upon the unique rôle of the Party, and the concept of "Party duty" as supplementary to administrative efficiency, had begun before the end of the war, and has been reinforced steadily, to be stressed again at the Nineteenth Congress. Criticism of the failure of Party units to exercise ideological leadership and supervisory control over other apparatuses suggests that within the Party real power continues to be exercised in the main by the managerial élite concerned with the manipulation of large units of power, and that purely Party functionaries are often chary of challenging the power of industrial and political "magnates."

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The fusion of Party membership with operational responsibilities was illustrated by Marshal Vasilevsky's comment that 86 percent of the generals and officers of the Soviet armed forces are members of the Party or Young Communist League. He also added that since the war the principle of "single command" has been further strengthened. Before and at the beginning of the Second World War the position of "political advisers" or "commissars," Party officers attached to the military commanders, had been reinforced; they were often able to veto operational orders of the commanders, whose authority over their men was seriously undermined. In the later course of the war the rôle of the commanders was greatly strengthened. Now, with most of the officers members of party-cells, direct ideological supervision of the officers can be strengthened without lessening their outward rôle as "single commanders" over the troops.

In the past three years there has been a good deal of discussion of the nature of the projected "transition from Socialism to Communism." The Party Congress referred frequently to the "preparation" for this transition, but failed to supply a concrete description of the road to be followed. The earlier assumption that the state would begin to "wither away" during the approach to "Communism" had already been rejected by Stalin. But some Soviet economists speculated that the approach of Communism would be signalized by some dramatic changes in economic life, for example, that a basic commodity like bread would be distributed free to all. Without directly attacking this notion, Stalin chose this time to emphasize in his September article in *Bolshevik* the idea of the continuity of the basic laws of the economy and to insist that economists should aim to discover basic laws inherent in its working and should cease "inventing" new laws.[2] If Stalin's article, his first major "ideological" work since his explosive article on Soviet linguistics, failed to define the steps for the achievement of "Communism" and in fact emphasized that the Soviet economy cannot "leap over" the basic laws of economic development, it would obviously be imprudent for lesser economic "geniuses" to speculate too far. Perhaps the task of defining "Communism" has been put off until the new Party Program can be unveiled.

[2] "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," October 18, 1952, *Supplement* to the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press; Bolshevik*, September 1952, p. 1–50 (placed on sale October 3).

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Since the Eighteenth Party Congress, held in 1939, had appointed a special Commission to prepare a new Program to replace that of 1918, it had been suggested that the delay in calling a postwar Congress was due to the difficulty of carrying through the postwar reconstruction of the country and at the same time devoting sufficient time to the major effort of "ideological reconstruction" which the drafting of a new Program would entail. Perhaps, also, the new Party Program would find it embarrassing to reduce to exact definition the relation of the Soviet Party to the Communist Parties of the European satellites and of China, not to mention its relation to Communist Parties in other countries, such as France and Italy, where the Communist leaders have pledged their followers to the active defense of the Soviet Government. Any reasonably frank definition might make it difficult for that government to advertise its policy as one devoted to the joys of "coexistence" with the non-Soviet world and to the defense of "national sovereignty" and "peace" against the wicked "imperialists" and their "lackeys."

At the recent Congress the problem of effecting a comprehensive restatement of the Party Program was again postponed, and a committee of 11 was appointed, without announcing a date for its report. Whether it will report to a plenary Congress four years from now, or whether the Party will simply have to make shift with the Program of 1918, is anyone's guess. Since the transition from "Socialism" to "Communism" has already begun, the Soviet people may simply go on working their hides off as heretofore, only to be told some fine morning that they have already attained the stage of "Communism."

The Party Congress was at least told by Malenkov that "the Fifth Five-Year Plan marks a big new step forward on the road to our country's development from Socialism to Communism."[3] And the economic goals of the 1951–1955 Plan were set forth in more concrete terms than has been usual in recent years. Without going into detail on this aspect of the Malenkov and Saburov speeches, or the "debates" which followed them, one can say that there is nothing improbable in the Soviet claim that in 1952 the production of steel will reach 35,000,000 metric tons, pig iron 25,000,000, rolled metal 27,000,000, coal 300,000,000 and petroleum 47,000,000 tons. These figures are generally in line with the

[3] *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, page 4, col. 3; available in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, November 1, 8 and 15, 1952.

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high tempo of recovery and development which has been shown by the Soviet economy since 1947 when it came out of its postwar slump, and with the high rate of investment and the relatively low rate of consumption, which has been held to levels lower than before the war. Experts estimate that the increase of steel production in 1951 over 1950 amounted to 12 percent; therefore the goal of an annual average increase of 10.1 percent in steel during the current Five-Year Plan appears a reasonable one.

A striking factor in the new Soviet plan is that annual percentage rates of increase, as illustrated in the plan for steel, are beginning to slacken off. This is a natural phenomenon in a society which is attaining a fuller degree of industrialization, but a declining percentage of increase against a steadily expanding base means a continued rapid growth in quantitative terms. While United States steel production is estimated at 102,000,000 metric tons for 1952, as compared with 31,400,000 for 1951 in the Soviet Union, we must not forget that Hitler challenged the world with only 22,700,000 tons (1938), and Japan with 6,900,000 (1940). Marshal Bulganin also emphasized, in his speech of October 12, that the Soviet economy was unusually well prepared to shift to a war economy.

Whether the planned increase of 50 percent in productivity per worker can be achieved depends not only on the proposed maintenance of high rates of investment and on better methods of organization, but on improved satisfaction of the consumption needs of the non-agricultural labor force, which was reported as totalling 40,000,000 for 1951 and a planned 44,000,000 in 1955. As usual, the planned rates of increase in the production of consumer goods are lower than those for extractive and heavy industries, and in the past achievement in this field has usually fallen short of planned goals.

Especial significance attaches to Saburov's statements concerning the continued rapid development of industry east of the Volga River. Here, he claimed, industrial output had been tripled between 1940 and 1952. In 1951, after the reconstruction of industry in European Russia and Ukraine, the eastern areas accounted for one-half of the total production of steel and rolled metal, and one-third of total industrial output. The gain, as against 1941, in relative strategic protection of vital industries represents a major shift.

Whether the new and, as usual, ambitious goals in agriculture,

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which have regularly failed of fulfilment in the past, will be achieved in this plan is more doubtful, especially since only 15 percent of 1951–1955 investment is slated to go into agriculture. There is a real possibility that Soviet industry now rests on an inadequate agricultural base, especially in terms of basic foodstuffs. Certainly the per capita avalaibility of livestock and livestock products is well below what it was in 1928, at the beginning of the drive for intensive industralization.

Malenkov summarized in a few lifeless bureaucratic sentences a profound revolution which has been carried out in the life of the Soviet village, when he stated that 254,000 collective farms have been consolidated into 97,000 amalgamated collectives since January 1950. Obviously, this has been intended as an important step in improving agricultural techniques and in strengthening the grip of the state upon the labor and life of the peasantry. Malenkov repeated earlier criticisms of the "bureaucratic" tendency to amalgamate villages "mechanically," by taking down and moving the buildings to a central settlement, while neglecting the more basic factors of improving farming techniques and organization.

On this subject, Stalin's article in *Bolshevik* was more revealing than any of the speeches at the Congress. Before the stage of "Communism" can be reached, according to Stalin, it will be necessary to do away with the present mixed system by which agricultural land and machines are the property of the state, while the produce is the "property" of the collective farm, and to reach a stage in which agricultural produce will also be the property of the state. In his newest ideological pronouncement, Stalin has thus returned to the idea that all agriculture must be operated by the state, with the peasants working, in effect, as hired laborers. Whether such crude "organizational" methods are best suited to raise the productivity of agriculture is more than doubtful, but it is significant that Stalin, and hence his followers, still see the means of solving the agricultural dilemma primarily in increasing the grip of state control and compulsion upon the peasantry.

As an important intermediate step toward securing complete control over the lagging agricultural sector, Stalin recommends the rapid extension of the system of "product-exchange." This arrangement, which has long been applied in the government's buying up of especially valuable crops like cotton, sugar-beet

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and tobacco, involves the deliveries of agreed amounts of consumer goods to the peasants at low prices, in return for fixed amounts of produce delivered by the collectives, also at low prices. In respect to other crops such as grain and livestock the collective makes some deliveries to the state at low prices, other deliveries in kind to the machine-tractor stations in payment for their services, and sets up reserves; it may then sell the balance to the government under a "product-exchange" contract, sell it in the open market, or divide it among its members, allowing them to sell their shares directly in the open market. Under the present system a considerable part of the crops escapes the direct control of the state, and, as Stalin stated, a large part of exchanges between city and village is regulated by the market. What Stalin is proposing is that all deliveries by the collective farms should be channeled through government agencies, which will, in turn, meet the peasants' need for consumer goods by supplying them under contract at low prices.

This would, from the point of view of the operators of a planned economy, be a great improvement. What would be an even greater improvement, from the peasants' point of view, would be for the government to increase the output of consumer goods, to reduce both prices and the extortionate turnover taxes now levied, and to expand the retail trade network. These steps, which seem Utopian under the current plan, would stimulate farm production, lower prices of consumer goods and food, and economize a great deal of time now wasted by consumers in searching for scarce, shoddy and high-priced goods. However, since Stalin's slightest "ideological word" is the law for his Party, and since he has always set his face against "consumer psychology" in Soviet planning, we may expect to see a reinforced campaign to do away with the collective-farm markets, which now supply the cities with about one-third of their food, to put an end to free-market selling by the collectives or their members, and to make government agencies the sole "organized" channel for exchanges between agricultural and industrial sectors. While the Soviet apparatus is better equipped to monopolize trade than it was in 1918–1921 and in 1930–1933, when it was tried out with disastrous results, this step toward "Communism" is not likely to meet with coöperation among the peasants, including even peasant managers of collectives.

In his report, Mikoyan announced that Soviet foreign trade is

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now three times greater than in prewar years. This statement was not very enlightening, for he did not indicate, nor was he asked by his listeners, whether he was speaking of constant rubles, variable rubles, constant prices, or quantities. One can hope, for his sake, that he was not speaking in terms of dollars, constant or variable, since the ruble has been proclaimed the "most stable currency" in the world. That Mikoyan's failure to indicate the basis for his calculations was no oversight is indicated by his reference to Soviet trade with Finland, measured "in comparable prices." Mikoyan complained bitterly of the "boycott" of Soviet trade by the West, and in the same breath declared that it was of no importance to the Soviet economy. He went on to boast that dealings with the "people's democracies" represented 80 percent of Soviet foreign trade in 1952. Trade within the Soviet bloc, by which he seems to mean trade among all members of the bloc and not merely their trade with the Soviet Union, had, he reported, increased more than three times over from 1948 to 1952, while the Soviet export of machinery to the members of the bloc had risen ten times over.

In what appears to be a curious lapse from Marxist concepts, Stalin has now argued, in his *Bolshevik* article, that the "people's democracies" are raising their production so rapidly that . . . "these countries will not only have no need to import goods from capitalist countries but will themselves experience the need to dispose of surplus products of their own production."[4] Presumably, under a planned economy the appearance of any such "surplus" represents a failure in planning, since "surpluses" should be used to raise consumption or increase investment. Perhaps Stalin suffered a Freudian lapse into wishful thinking. If the satellites no longer needed to import from, and hence to export to, capitalist countries, they would be even better able than at present to donate their "surplus products" to the glory of the "Socialist Motherland," the "citadel of progressive mankind."

When attacking with the customary battery of Soviet vituperations America's "enslaving 'aid' " to European and other nations, Mikoyan also outlined a Soviet policy of offering "unselfish" assistance to underdeveloped countries. This is a cold-war weapon which may become of real importance over the next few years, witness the Soviet propaganda effort in India. Despite the

[4] "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Special Supplement, October 18, 1952, p. 7.

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urgent requirements for industrial expansion at home and in the satellites and China, Soviet industrial production is reaching a level at which it could, by a purposeful effort, establish economic bastions of its own in countries like Iran or Afghanistan. The possibility that Soviet economic conquest might precede rather than follow political conquest of weak neighbors cannot be ruled out, and this Soviet ambition should not be left out of account in any appraisal of the purposes and scope of United Nations, American and other programs of economic development.

Stalin's concluding speech of October 14 was devoted to the problem of coöperation between the Soviet Union and the "fraternal parties" abroad. His words were heard by delegations representing 44 "fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties," while addresses of devotion and "loyalty" were received from several other parties, including the Communist Party of the United States. Stalin and the Congress singled out for special praise declarations by Thorez and Togliatti that "their peoples will not fight against the peoples of the Soviet Union." In turn Stalin pledged the support of the Soviet Party to "the fraternal parties" and "their peoples" in "their struggle for liberation, in their struggle for the preservation of peace," adding, to "stormy applause," that, "as is well known, that is exactly what it [the Soviet Party] is doing."

Stalin made it clear that this "fraternal" support from abroad, while not decisive, was extremely welcome, when he added:

> It would be a mistake to think that our Party, having become a mighty force, is no longer in need of support. That is untrue. Our Party and our country always have been and always will be in need of the trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples abroad.

Stalin went on in a fatherly and patronizing tone to assure the "fraternal parties" that, however difficult their struggle for power may seem to them, they must realize that "it is not as hard for them as it was for us Russian Communists in the period of Tsarism." Stalin further asserted that "not a trace of liberalism" or of national independence now remains under "bourgeois" rule, and urged the parties abroad to pick up the abandoned banners of personal freedom and national sovereignty. "It is obvious," he concluded, "that all these circumstances should lighten the work of the Communist and democratic parties which have not yet come to power."[5]

[5] *Pravda,* October 15, 1952, page 1, column 2; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* November 1, 1952, p. 10.

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Stalin's condescending attitude toward his foreign auxiliaries and their leaders was expressed even more plainly in his *Bolshevik* article, whose starting-point was the discussions of the plan for a new textbook on economics. The textbook, Stalin wrote, is "especially needed for the Communists of all countries . . . who want to know . . . how . . . our country, only recently poor and weak, has been transformed into a rich and powerful country . . . in order to learn from us and to use our experience in their own countries. . . . It will be a handbook of Marxist political economy, a fine gift for the young Communists of all countries. . . . In those countries such a textbook could also be of great benefit to veteran Communists who are no longer young."

Stalin's concluding speech, like all others at the Congress, expressed without deviation the basic theme of his postwar foreign policy, first stated in detail by him in February 1946. The world is now divided into two blocs, one of "Socialism, peace, national independence, human liberty" led, needless to say, by the Soviet Union, and another of "capitalist chaos, warmongering, suppression of all national and human rights," which the United States is accused of organizing and bullying. Stalin's newest instructions repeat and summarize the present basic Communist line abroad, which calls for the defense of "freedom" and "independence" against non-Soviet governments and against American influence. This finds tactical expression in Communist support for forces hostile to or fearful of American policies.

However, it is not probable that Communist Parties will attempt to seek direct organizational alliances in a new "Popular Front," as in the 1934–1939 period. At that time Communist Parties were directed to seek coöperation with politically adjacent Socialist and democratic groupings: today they seek temporary alliances with ultra-nationalist and semi-totalitarian forces against the democratic center. In view of the enhanced power of the Soviet Union, it is more useful for it to maintain the Communist Parties abroad as small, disciplined and highly manœuvrable auxiliary legions rather than risk "confusing" their membership and even their leaders by close coöperation with parties which compete with them for the allegiance of the same social strata.

If foreign supporters of the Soviet-led "peace campaign" harbor illusions concerning Stalin's attitude toward their efforts, these should be removed by his frank words in *Bolshevik:*

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> The aim of the present movement for peace is to arouse the masses of the people for the struggle to preserve peace and to avert a new world war.... It is most probable that the present peace movement . . . will, should it be successful, result in prevention of a *given* war, in its postponement, a temporary preservation of a *given* peace, to the resignation of a belligerent government and its replacement by another government, ready to preserve peace for the time being. . . . With all these successes of the peace movement imperialism still remains and remains in power, and consequently the inevitability of wars also remains. . . . Under a certain confluence of circumstances, the struggle for peace may possibly develop in one place or another into a struggle for Socialism. This, however, will no longer be the present peace movement but a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.[6]

The place of the "peace campaign" in Soviet strategy is that of a tactic to be applied against governments which oppose or resist Soviet policy and are thereby guilty of "warmongering." The double equation—"Soviet policy equals peace, therefore opposition to Soviet aims equals warmongering"—remains in full force.

But is not this concept of Soviet policy, which stresses Soviet-American conflict as the determining factor of world politics, incompatible with Stalin's further statement, also set forth in his *Bolshevik* article, that new wars are most likely to break out between capitalist countries, not between the "capitalist" world and the Soviet Union? Stalin nows calls upon his followers to reject the assumption, which his own actions and propaganda have created, that "the contradictions between the camp of Socialism and the camp of capitalism are greater than the contradictions among capitalist countries," although he admits that " theoretically, this is, of course, true." Stalin then goes on to explain why this "theoretically true" proposition not only need not be, but is not, "true" in practice. "First capitalist Britain and then capitalist France will ultimately be forced to . . . enter into conflict with the United States in order to assure themselves an independent position and, of course, high profits," while there is "no guarantee" that "Germany and Japan will not again rise to their feet, that they will not try to wrest themselves from American bondage. . . . It follows from this that the inevitability of wars among the capitalist countries remains."

From the illustrations which Stalin offers of the conflicts of economic and political interests which certainly exist within the non-Soviet world, it is not clear on what basis he assumes that

[6] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Special Supplement, October 18, 1952, page 8; sequence of sentences has been modified.

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these conflicts must take the form of "inevitable wars." If Stalin believes even one-tenth of his own propaganda he must doubt the desire or the capacity of Britain or France, of Germany or Japan, to prepare and launch a war against the United States. Perhaps the "genius-teacher" also underestimates the degree to which the leading nations in the non-Soviet world have been made aware, through his own pedagogical efforts, of the fate which would overtake them if they fell to fighting among themselves. Why did Stalin adopt this *ex cathedra* position, which, if accepted literally, undercuts the emotional force of his "hate-America" campaign? If he believes what he said, he would logically direct the Soviet and foreign Communist propaganda machines to forget about Soviet-American conflicts and to give all stress to conflicts within the "capitalist" world. The Soviet Government might even make a few minor gestures of conciliation, such as giving Austria back its freedom, to lend more plausibility to the new "line."

The apparent incompatibility is, however, an incompatibility in logic rather than in real politics. After Stalin's pronouncement as before, Soviet propaganda maintains that American "warmongers" are preparing to launch a war upon the Soviet Union. All that is new is Stalin's assurance that the "capitalist" world cannot be unified, and the instruction to go all out to promote disunity and even armed conflict within the non-Soviet world. A "good Bolshevik" does not rest on his oars when his leader tells him that a certain line of development is "inevitable" but is expected to work with redoubled zeal to hasten the "inevitable." Stalin's *Bolshevik* article, which is addressed to the leaders rather than the masses, is not a scientific prediction, but an instruction to Communist Parties abroad to do everything to intensify conflicts *within* the non-Soviet world, in the hope that this may even lead to that most desirable event, a war *within* the "capitalist" world, leaving the Soviet Union and its allies uninvolved and hence capable, in the predicted "third round of wars and revolutions," of establishing Soviet power throughout the world.

In his new statement Stalin is also attempting, for tactical reasons, to play down Soviet and foreign Communist fears of the "inevitability" of war between the Soviet Union and America. For one thing, Soviet propaganda is unable to convince all Communists and their sympathizers of the "inevitability" of a Soviet victory. Once the West has grown stronger in arms and in unity of action, as it has since 1948, the doctrine of an "inevitable" war

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causes discouragement, apathy and passivity among Communists outside the Soviet bloc, and also passivity, furtive hope and withdrawal from effort among non-Communists and pseudo-Communists within it. If Communists abroad accept the "inevitability" of an East-West war and also agree with Stalin that the decisive factor in it will be the Soviet Union, they are tempted to "disarm" and to rely on the "automatism" of history to make them into sub-tyrants exploiting their peoples for Soviet aims. Stalin's pronouncement is designed to reawaken them from daydreaming about an "inevitable" war between the Soviet Union and America, to indicate the urgency of intensifying all factors of disunity within the non-Soviet world, and to indicate his belief that in a prolonged and even indefinite period of "cold war" the Soviet régime can manœuvre among "capitalist contradictions" so as to preserve its own power untouched by war.

This reassurance to the faithful, backed up by the continued Spartan enforcement of rapid industrialization and armament at home, is Stalin's reply to the secret fears of the "faithful" as they watch the steady though uneven growth in the power and determination of the free world to defend its future. Stalin's pronouncement is a call to his foreign legions to help him contain the reviving strength of the West until it can be dissolved, as his dialectic conveniently insists it must be, by its own "inner contradictions," without risking the survival of the Soviet system in an all-out war.

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TOUCH-AND-GO IN ITALY

By Ugo La Malfa

ITALY is heir to great traditions, for she has been a leader in art, philosophy and indeed all fields of culture throughout the centuries. But the industrial revolution came to her late and found her poorly supplied with the natural resources essential for the development of a modern economy. As a result, she occupies a paradoxical place in modern history—a highly civilized nation, indispensable to the Western World, yet socially, economically and politically one of the "borderline" countries where the battle between democracy and everything that is anti-democratic is a touch-and-go affair. Like the countries of the Far East, she is vulnerable to the Communist experiment, and she needs help if the forces of democracy are to prevail.

Italy's fundamental problem is still what it was at the time of national unification—a problem of glaring contrasts. The manifestations of a long-standing culture stand beside the evidences of long-lasting poverty. On the one hand are such progressive provinces as Piedmont and Lombardy; on the other, the island of Sardinia and the Lucania portrayed in the novel "Christ Stopped at Eboli." The north is now heavily industrialized. There are efficient mechanized farms, railways and shipping lines with international ramifications, enterprising businessmen, workers with high technical training—and also with a heritage of acute class consciousness. The south has a backward agricultural economy, communications are lacking, towns and villages are isolated; there are masses of unskilled laborers and listless upper and middle classes whose members rely on government subsidies and government jobs. Vast inequalities of income make for the existence of two very different Italys, both in one political body. This state of things, handed down from the last century, has been aggravated by the destructions of two world wars and the great increase in population which has made itself especially felt since 1921, the last year of mass emigration. (In 1913 alone, some 870,000 persons emigrated.)

In southern Italy in 1950 the average individual income was no more than $115 a year. There were seven automobiles and 35 radios to every thousand inhabitants and a correspondingly low consumption of food and expenditure for clothing and for ferti-

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lizers to grow food. In the north there were 131.4 industrial workers to every thousand inhabitants in 1938 and 133.4 in 1951, while in the south the number went down from 46 per thousand to 40, thereby worsening a situation that was already bad enough. As a result, 17,000,000 south Italians do not constitute a domestic market that anywhere near corresponds to their numbers. Their extreme poverty and lack of skill at any particular trade mean widespread unemployment and the multiplication of petty middlemen, whose profits prevent any increase of consumption.

The Fascist régime attempted to satisfy aspirations for a solid, modern economy by denying the need for its existence, by making a great fuss over unsolved problems and throwing dust in people's eyes with the slogans of nationalism. The democratic government of today cannot hope to evade the issue. The last war, the military occupation, the breakup of the Fascist state and the ravages of inflation have made the contrast between the two Italys more obvious and made the people on both sides more aware of their differences. Once upon a time, in the poorer regions, the presence of petty government officials and representatives of the Church was sufficient to keep things calm. But now there is an open demand for a wider participation in the benefits of modern life.

These are the circumstances under which democracy and Communism are in conflict, each of them championing its own solution to the age-old Italian problem. The democratic aim is to provide government aid to improve conditions in the depressed areas sufficiently to enable a healthy private enterprise to take over. Communism repudiates the more complex free society and claims as its goal equalitarianism in which the simplest and most obvious needs of the people will be the common denominator. To this end it offers the hopelessly poor a new dogmatic faith which satisfies their instinctive desire to revolt against social injustice. The natural search for companionship in misery, the sharing of the same drab lower-class existence, the understanding so quickly kindled among those whose common inheritance is stark need—all these things are used by the Communist Party under the ideological mantle of "unity of the working class." And the Communists are not the only ones working against a democratic solution. In the backward zones, the parasitic neo-Fascist group has attached itself to the parasitic social structure, playing upon the inferiority complex of the lower middle class and offering in com-

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pensation vaguely heroic ideals and the mirage of nationalistic expansion.

Improvement of living conditions in the depressed areas is not the only challenge that Italian democracy has had to face. Postwar readjustment was a monumental problem. Housing, roads, railways, equipment of every kind, as well as the very structure of the government itself, had to be rebuilt from the ground up; the framework of everyday life had to be restored before other tasks could be tackled. And in the immediate postwar period the Italian national economy had to free itself from the restrictions of enforced self-sufficiency, imposed first by Fascism and then by war, and to fit itself into the pattern of world trade. Moreover, it soon became plain that Italy shares with the rest of the West the task of contributing to the military defenses of the Western community and of working toward greater economic and political unity—an obligation which required the sacrifice of immediate advantages for an eventual greater gain.

These three tasks—social reform, economic adjustment and cooperation with the other nations of Western Europe—laid a heavy program before the Italian republic which came into being after a crisis more profound than most other Western nations have experienced. And the government was called upon to carry them out under the attack from totalitarians of both the right and the left within the country. The fact of capital importance is that work has begun.

II

Italian democrats have sometimes been reproached for the slowness with which they attacked the social, economic and political problems of the new nation. But these problems are complex and, as a result of 20 years of Fascism in which Italy lived in a vacuum, her leaders had to get their bearings through the actual exercise of political power. The groundwork for social reform was laid in the postwar battle to stem inflation. Until the people's purchasing power was restored, through the safeguarding of their savings and other capital, no further steps were possible. Thanks to the credit policy, the battle against inflation was won by the end of 1947, though defenses had to be maintained against those who still found it easier to let prices and wages spiral than to face painful financial realities. The eternal disproportion between the country's natural resources and its population, and the pres-

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ence of 2,000,000 unemployed, were a constant temptation to over-produce, or to swell the budget with public works regardless of the limits of the national income. In maintaining a stable currency under the shock of international disturbances, Italy did better than might have been expected in view of her frail economic structure. Neither the devaluation of the pound sterling nor the outbreak of hostilities in Korea shook the lira or destroyed the stability of prices. And the measures taken fitted well with the necessities of domestic business development and the new efforts at European economic coöperation. Popular confidence in the government's ability to hold the line against inflation resulted in an increase in savings, which helped provide funds for increased governmental needs and for private investment.

The Marshall Plan afforded strong support in this struggle to attain monetary stability, and opened the way to reforms in the backward areas which were to be the most characteristic expressions of the new democratic action. Toward the end of 1949, it became clear that a strictly orthodox balanced budget would never allow for an attack on the real causes of backwardness and depression, and the government began to appropriate money for land reform and large-scale investment in the southern part of the country. First and most important were investments in projects designed to lay a foundation for subsequent private enterprise—reclamation and irrigation schemes, aqueducts, roads and the creation of new rural settlements.

Land reform or redistribution, and the creation of a new credit agency, known as the *Cassa del Mezzogiorno,* were major steps, typical of the government policy not only on account of the instruments to which they gave rise, but also because they dealt with the most conspicuous problem of a whole region—inefficient use of the land. The *Cassa del Mezzogiorno* was established in 1950 on principles which students of the southern economy have always held to be indispensable for effective results there: special legislation, powers of independent action, and funds for a long-term program. The *Cassa* has staked out 112 distinct areas, with a total of 10,000,000 acres, in which it proposes to triple the annual output and the number of peasants that these areas can support. Another 10,000,000 acres of mountain land are also to be reclaimed. And provisions have been made to follow up this program of reclamation with a plan to improve privately-owned land

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by means of capital subsidies and credit on easy 3 percent terms; the lack of funds has been a severe obstacle to all previous attempts to reclaim the soil.

During the ten years of its expected existence, the *Cassa* will spend 750 billion liras on public works and 560 billions on private projects; since some of the latter will be repaid, the total expense to the government will be 870 billion. The mountain-land project will cost another 400 billion liras. Other projects are the irrigation of 1,000,000 acres, the building of a network of 1,000 miles of roads, the supplying of water to 1,628 villages which have insufficient water or none, and the improvement of 232 mountain basins, amounting to 9,300 acres. Recently the *Cassa* has also made a plan to spend an additional 280 billion liras mostly on railway construction, which will facilitate exchanges between the markets of north and south.

The aim of land reform is to create conditions permitting steady employment, and the agencies empowered to carry it out have proposed measures which provide for the expropriation and redistribution of 1,700,000 acres to tens of thousands of peasant families. These families will receive not only land, but houses, livestock, tractors and other agricultural machines. Today, two years after the first steps taken to revive the south, the productivity of the land taken over by the peasants is steadily increasing. There has also been a constant rise of employment, accompanied by a diminishing outlay by the *Cassa del Mezzogiorno*, whose maximum expenditure was 10 billion liras a month. In the years 1950 and 1951 industrial production rose by 26.6 percent, a truly remarkable figure in view of the fact that the annual increase during the years 1932–38 averaged only 4.7 percent. And the government's investment policy has cushioned the setback of export industries by the creation of new domestic purchasing power, notably the textile industry, which has been able to place within Italy a large part of the output it was unable to sell abroad.

Of course, the whole recovery program for the south hinges upon financial backing, and this depends not only upon what the government can afford, but also upon the money made available by international trade. The outlay in the depressed areas makes for tightness in the balance of payments. If the country can cope with that problem, then progress will continue to be rapid, but if not, the continuing struggle to maintain a stable currency will slow down the program. The money invested in agriculture can

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bring a return only if there is increased consumption by a unified European market. Italy is producing more fruit and vegetables, and if certain other European countries pursue a protectionist policy, then the whole program in south Italy will have been in vain. Here, as in other particulars, Italy's interests go hand in hand with the trend toward European integration.

III

So far, fortunately, the defense of the lira and the program of recovery in the south have been accompanied by an increase of foreign trade. The circumstances of foreign trade have never been favorable for Italy, for she has few raw materials and a lack of some of the most important foodstuffs. She *must* buy these things, but other countries can, if they have to, go without her chief exports of textiles and garden produce.

Italian trade benefited from the trend toward inter-European coöperation and the loosening of tariff restrictions, which unfortunately recently began to reverse itself. In the good year of 1951, Italian foreign trade amounted to $3,700,000—a rise of 80 percent in exports and 50 percent in imports, with due allowance for the difference in the rate of exchange. Without this gain, the economic picture would have been dark, and in view of the increase of population it would have been impossible to maintain the national income on a level with that of prewar days. Even so, there is a large excess of imports over exports. Without the invisible elements of the balance of payments (the rental of shipping facilities, tourist expenditures and emigrants' remittances) and without Marshall Plan aid, Italy would not have been able to put her financial house in order, much less to inaugurate a program of recovery in the south or build up her military defenses.

The questions of Italy's trade balance, and of the international balance of payments, cannot be understood unless a distinction is made between the possibilities of trade within the dollar area and outside it. In the course of 1951 the divergence between the two was especially pronounced. Beginning with May of that year, Italy piled up credits equivalent to $205,300,000 within the European Payments Union, an amount larger than that assigned to her. But she had to pay out in the same year $714,600,000 in actual dollars, from receipts of $364,700,000; in fact, with the inclusion of some pending business, her deficit came to $326,000,000. It is obvious that a credit balance within the Euro-

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pean Payments Union, even if used to the full, cannot purchase certain goods which must be bought in the dollar area, since the two sectors are economically and monetarily separate one from the other.

It is important to note what use Italy made of her European credits. She did not hold onto them and continue to regulate her import trade, but kept faith with the program of multilateral European coöperation by freeing of all restrictions 98 percent of her imports from the other member countries. In this way, Italy was, to be sure, able to obtain certain supplies which she could otherwise not have afforded at the time when the programs of southern reclamation and national defense were draining her finances. But she contributed to the functioning of the mechanism of European economic unity, which cannot work unless creditor nations foster the trade of their debtors, as in the brief history of the Payments Union they have not always done. Through this policy Italy wanted to do her share in staving off a threatening crisis of French franc and pound sterling payments. That crisis came to a head, however, and Italy's exports to France and Britain were reduced by some 56 to 60 percent. Even so, Italy has continued her policy of unrestricted imports in order to help these two debtor nations and also to make good use of her credits during a period of heavy government expenses at home. Unfortunately, a crisis of the Italian export industry has followed, wiping out some of the gains made in the south.

Meanwhile, there remains the problem of making up for the deficit in the dollar area. It cannot be done through an increase of imports from the area of the European Payments Union, for, as noted above, the two sectors do not touch one another and any increase is a stopgap conditioned by new restrictions on the pound and franc. Italy cannot solve her economic and social problems unless she lays out a twofold foreign trade policy. First, within the European Payments Union, she must continue to ease import restrictions in spite of the curtailment of her own exports. But she must ask the debtor nations to make a more equitable division of the sacrifices they impose upon their creditors, and must ask the other creditors to follow the Italian example of letting down tariff bars. Second, within the dollar area, Italy must meet—and gain assistance in meeting—the threat which a continued deficit brings to the program of reform and reclamation in the south.

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The trade deficit which was $384,000,000 in the first half of 1951 came to $640,000,000 in the corresponding period of 1952, a sum greater than the deficit of $489,000,000 for the whole previous year. Of course, a healthy financial relationship with other countries does not depend entirely upon trade; it must be measured also in terms of currency valuation and the balance of payments. Nevertheless, the tendency is a disquieting one. In spite of the aid furnished by the United States, reserves have been lessened by $32,100,000. And while this aid is in the process of diminishing, the pressure of the southern investment upon the balance of payments increases.

The national budget, too, is expanding beyond the point of safety. When one realizes that even with 200 billion liras of aid, only 300 billion out of the expected 500 billion can be covered, it is plain that the breaking-point is near. And the Treasury, which according to figures from last June had to face liabilities of 335 billion liras, has an equally serious problem. Although there was an increase of receipts, the step-up of government investments caused disbursements to mount, and they will be accelerated by the outlays for national defense and the program of rehabilitation in the south. The expected deficit in the national budget for 1952–53 will have disproportionately strong repercussions upon the Treasury.

With government expenses steadily increasing, there is little hope that receipts can come near to covering them in the near future. The tax reform, and improvements in the machinery of tax collection now being carried out, will bring new income to the government, but the reform calls for a new civic conscience which only time can develop. No miracles are to be expected from this source. Neither the currency situation inherent in the balance of payments nor the long-range results to be gained from tax reform can bear the weight of the program of economic transformation without adequate coöperation from abroad.

In order to understand completely the need for this coöperation, we must recall the premises upon which the large investment in the depressed areas was made. The purpose of the effort was to create new sources of wealth—to set up a better balance in the economy whereby a large group of people who at present can neither produce, consume nor save will eventually be able to contribute to the national income. Such a program does not bear fruit immediately. Any plan to raise the standard of living must

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take social as well as economic needs into account; purchasing power must be developed before there is greater productivity. This process is just the opposite of that of increasing production, and then purchasing power, through the investment of private capital; private capital can play its rôle in Italy only after the structure of society has been radically changed.

Other parts of the government's investments have gone into public works, such as roads and schools, of which the population enjoys free use, or into projects which take a long time to complete and yield very little return, such as land reclamation and water supply. There can be no comparison with the investment of money in an industrial area, furnished with modern equipment and ready to do specialized work. Thus, in France, the Monnet Plan for industrial development was carried out within the expected term of five years, while Italy's scheme to revive the south will take 12 years at least. Experience has proved that in Italy time must be allowed for discussion and emendation of plans if they are to be carried out efficiently. In the depressed areas Italy is starting from scratch.

With the small capital at her disposal, the country could never have undertaken a long-range program of the sort had it not belonged to an international community held together by bonds of mutual aid. And on the other hand, Italy cannot play an effective part in this community unless her social and economic conditions are brought up to the level of those in the rest of the Western World and her capacities boosted to enable her to solve the problems which have so long held her back. In the last analysis, a definite stabilization of the purchasing power of the lira and of the balance of payments depends upon elimination of the weaknesses in the nation's economic organism. Without an increase in the national income, there can be no increase in savings or tax yield; the budget will remain in permanent deficit, and, in order to avoid inflation, the standard of living will have to be very low. In that event, it will be impossible to keep up the volume of exports; and imports, in their turn, will have to be restricted. There will be an end to the liberal tariff policy which has been Italy's contribution to European economic union.

In short, international coöperation is the most important factor in Italy's social and economic revival. Once there is a grasp of this truth, which was at the heart of all the late Count Sforza's political thinking and action, any difficulties that develop will

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serve as incentives to greater coöperation instead of less; there will be no more playing with Fascist notions of self-sufficiency. To be helpful to Italy, coöperation must be expressed in terms of economic aid. Whatever the foreign policy of the United States may be, the Italian people hope that America will remember that Italy is in the peculiar position of being a highly advanced nation, yet one afflicted with vast depressed areas.

IV

The effort to make over these depressed areas is fundamental in the financial and economic policy of Italy's democratic government. The plan is great and complex, and the amount of money involved is large. For years Italy's economic life will be affected by the vicissitudes of this program. Ultimate success hinges upon a solid currency, a steady influx of capital, and—very importantly—political stability. The political stability necessary to carry out the plans, as well as to fulfill Italy's Atlantic Pact obligations, can be assured only by coöperation among the four democratic parties that make up the present government majority: the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans. And the reverse is also true—that is, the continued cohesion of these four parties depends on the working out of the plan.

The precarious balance of the Italian parties calls for sustained effort from Italian democrats. In their attempt to improve the nation's economic and social structure, they have to combat the vested interests which are opposed to any change and also the extremists on the other wing who would begin by destroying everything. For the moment, they have to reckon with the loss of right-wing support; and they cannot hope to win the support of the masses until the undertaking has begun to benefit them. The government is now fiercely criticized, yet much time must pass before the profound modifications which it seeks can be achieved. The recent electoral campaign for administrative offices brought into relief the tactics of the opposition on both sides. The Communists sought to undermine the Social Democrats and Republicans, while the monarchists and neo-Fascists leveled their attacks especially upon the Christian Democrats.

The Communist effort, as the leaders of the Party have more or less explicitly stated, is to keep a grip on its revolutionary followers among the industrial workers in the northern cities, and at

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the same time to raise up an ultra-radical following in the south. The Party hopes that discontent will drive the electorate to embrace its ideology. As to the other side, Italians who respect democracy feel that a right-wing opposition, legitimate enough in principle, should find some way of expressing itself other than in the slogans of the Fascist past. In short, the democratic forces of Italy are engaged in a life-and-death battle. They can go on with their gigantic enterprise of reconstruction only if the enterprise itself comes to fruition. That is another way of saying that continuity of Italian national policy and continuity of the policy of the international community are interdependent.

Italy is today in the process of shifting to a new political and economic balance. It is a time of crisis, with all the dangers that the word connotes. Italy could take any one of three paths: a return to the benighted conditions of the past, a plunge into the Communist experiment, or a gradual raising of standards of living accompanied by a consolidation of the democratic régime. A definitive choice in any of these three directions would have immediate effects upon the other Western nations. With the cooperation of the free world, Italy can win her battle and create internal unity. The agreement reached by the democratic parties in preparation for the coming elections bears witness to their possibilities for vigorous, intelligent effort. The continuation of the battle against poverty will ensure their success.

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THE FISSURE IN NATO

North American and Sterling Area Trade

By W. A. Mackintosh

EXPERIENCE has twice shown us that the thinking and planning about economic policies done immediately after the close of a world war soon have to be revised. A nation is fortunate indeed if the revision is not radical and drastic. Though at such a time we intend to look forward, all but the most imaginative economic policy-making is likely to look backward. Thinking is conditioned by the past—a tendency strengthened by the fact that despite well-meaning efforts to make the objectives of a war seem positive, the war aims of peace-loving countries are essentially negative. A war is undertaken to prevent certain disastrous things from happening. It destroys—though it destroys in order that other people and other policies, good or bad, may live. Postwar planning in a democratic country also is biased by the determination to prevent certain things which happened in the past from happening in the future. A great deal of thinking and planning in the forties was unavoidably concerned wtih the problems and difficulties of the thirties; we were intent on full employment when in fact the real enemy turned out to be inflation. The experts and governments were at fault in this but, if they had not been, electorates would have selected other governments and other experts.

It is only after a lapse of time, when the real shape of postwar problems begins to be clear, that we readjust our thinking and come to grips with the real problems, not the imaginary or traditional ones, and to wrestle with the tough issues of the world-as-it-is. Thus, one of the moves toward reality in our postwar world has been the formation of the North Atlantic community. The impetus for this, of course, was supplied by the policies of the Soviet Union, but its usefulness is not limited by that. One of the merits of this North Atlantic policy is that in breaking down an unmanageable global problem, it brings into closer relationship a group of countries which, with one or two exceptions, had been forced to come together in two successive wars when circumstances underlined the strategic importance of the narrowness of the North Atlantic. Between the wars these countries

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drifted apart; and it is probably true that only the threat of the Soviet Union brought them all into a single organization. Yet this integration has a solid base in geography and a genuine foundation in common interest; it may be that this community is an organism and not a mere aggregate.

But cutting across NATO is a threatening fissure. The North Atlantic community is not simply an organization of countries with common interests. It is a community which embraces parts of both the dollar and sterling areas, and also the countries of Western Europe with their limited and fragile unity. The economic position of the sterling area and the scarcity of dollars with which it is plagued separate it seriously and dangerously in trade and policy from the dollar areas. Here, evidently, is one of the real and deep-rooted problems with which we must cope if the North Atlantic community is to have strength, unity and growth. It is a problem which must be grasped firmly now if the alliance is to develop into an enduring institution.

It is well for us on this side of the Atlantic, in the midst of our prosperity and preconceptions, and our own political excitements, to remind ourselves that the sterling area is vitally important both to the dollar area and to the North Atlantic community. In this year of a record wheat crop it is obvious to any Canadian that the United Kingdom (with Western Europe) is important as a cereal market, though the demands of the Far East have reduced that importance. It has always been of substantial importance to Canada as a source of imports, and in lesser measure similarly important to the United States. Beyond these obvious facts, however, the sterling area plays a primary rôle in the establishment of any kind of stable balance, economic or strategic, in Western Europe. In the constricted non-Communist world, it is a great trading community. It is equally important because of its outposts in Asia and Africa, both great present and future battlegrounds of the struggle to keep the world free. We on this side of the Atlantic need not only the presence of members of the Commonwealth and the sterling area in those regions in which North America is unrepresented. We need the help of British experience and institutions, without which we are likely to be less effective in our Asiatic and African policies than we might otherwise be. Our interests can be greatly injured if economic limitations prevent the United Kingdom from pursuing a vigorous policy in areas where she has interests and responsibilities.

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II

Before this article appears in print, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers will have convened in London to examine the problem presented by this economic fissure in the Atlantic community. The question, of course, is much larger than the Commonwealth, and the discussions in London can no more than make a beginning toward a solution. But a preliminary survey here of some aspects of the problem may perhaps help put the findings of this conference—whatever they may be—in perspective.

In brief, what the Prime Ministers are considering is the second postwar crisis of the sterling area. The crisis of 1949, which resulted in the devaluation of sterling, was quickly dissipated and seemed for a time to be replaced by a growing abundance of dollars which appeared as if by magic. There were optimistic statements to the effect that the dollar scarcity was ended. But this period of ease and hope did not last long, and the crisis quickly recurred. In the past months it has again abated, but only with the help of a drastic curtailment of imports which holds no assurance of future health. We have been granted a respite and an improved atmosphere, not a solution.

The weakness of sterling, or the security of dollars, is chronic only in the sense that it has recurred repeatedly over a long period. There is nothing inherent or inevitable in it, though it is imbedded in stubborn facts of economic and political history. It calls for remedies in the United Kingdom, the sterling area and elsewhere which may be difficult and unpalatable and from which there is an inclination to turn aside in the hope that by some miracle of nature the patient may recover anyway.

Since the closing years of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom has been slowly adjusting itself to changed conditions of technology and world markets. But two wars diverted it from this gradual economic adjustment and left it each time with an accumulation of many years' changes to make up if it was to maintain a competitive position. And it was weakened also by wartime economic damage and losses of markets in the Far East, Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

In sharp contrast, the two world wars thrust the United States and Canada rapidly forward along the lines of their development and accelerated rather than retarded the attainment of their appropriate economic positions. Quite apart from any shortcoming of British policy, the United Kingdom was inevitably faced in

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two postwar periods with the specially keen competition of the United States, Japan, Germany and other countries. In each case, it was left with a heritage of structural unbalance, particularly in coal and textiles, and faced a dilemma of policy. Now the situation has become particularly acute because Germany and Japan, deprived of their former sources of food, are going to have to buy it by competing exports in the markets of the West. And the problem has been made still more serious by the revolution in Asia and Africa.

After the First World War, the United Kingdom's long-term problem of adjustment was in some measure concealed by the existence of large external assets and substantial overseas income, but in World War II the external assets were substantially liquidated and the stark problem of adjustment was laid bare. There is also a political heritage which handicaps present action. The close contest between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party goes back to the years before 1931 when Labor, carrying on a minority government, was replaced by a National Government on the ground that only thus could the necessary but unpalatable cuts in expenditure be made and the pound sterling saved from disaster. Yet the National Government soon, perforce, agreed to abandon gold and the fixed parity of exchanges which it had been formed to defend. The action was followed by the explanation that the supposed disaster was in reality a blessing which had delivered Britain from the worst pressures of the depression. It is small wonder that the present Government in Britain, holding power by a slender margin, finds it difficult to gain substantial support from the Labor Party for measures to maintain the international balance; Labor naturally fears that this is again a device for confirming its opponents (or those of little faith within its own party) in positions of authority.

It can be said of the United Kingdom, as of many Western countries, that in the past few years, voluntarily or involuntarily, it has been attempting too much and overloading its economy. Britain has inherited overseas commitments appropriate to a much larger economy; and she has assumed defense obligations relatively beyond those of other countries. British investments both at home and elsewhere in the sterling area have been very high. Consumption has been forced upward by social security legislation and by food subsidies. There is no doubt that the total burden must be reduced by cuts somewhere, as virtually every-

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one has admitted. Messrs. Bevan and Wilson would cut defense expenditures; others feel that housing must be cut back; and still others would be prepared to take the props out from under consumption. It is worth pointing out that while the aggregate expenditures of the United Kingdom are obviously too great, no country has striven more heroically to carry the burden with safety. Further, the aggregate expenditures would not be too great were circumstances such as to promote some flow of capital into the various parts of the sterling area. But instead of this, there has been a continuing and debilitating leakage of capital out of the area.

It is commonplace to say that recent experience has shown the inadequacy of direct controls in dealing with the disparities between economies. The disparities are in fact just differences in level, and the direct controls can do no more than minimize the leaks from one level to another. They do nothing to change the levels or to create any balancing counterflow. They have in the past proved necessary in dealing with sudden and catastrophic disparities, but they have proved very unsatisfactory long-range instruments.

Of all the direct controls those governing imports are the most effective, because they can be linked to long-established and experienced customs administration. Controls for the efficient allocation of investment and industrial enterprise have proved much less effective, and this difference has produced an important result. In times of difficulties with currency, import controls have generally been shaped to prohibit importation of nonessential goods and to permit but limited importation of goods which are only moderately necessary. If such controls are to be effective the machinery for allocating investment and industrial enterprise must be precise and efficient; otherwise the high protection afforded to nonessential products by import controls will draw labor and capital into producing them at home. It is quite obvious to anyone who has made even a casual survey in countries such as the United Kingdom or Australia that the combination of relatively efficient import controls of this kind, and relatively inefficient machinery for the allocation of investment, have resulted in the promotion of nonessential industry. This, together with extended provisions for social security, has intensified the trend toward urbanization and has dangerously limited food production.

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The resumption of the use of monetary policy in the United Kingdom after a long moratorium has been a great forward step which has already produced very useful results. It is clear to many, however, that there is need also for the influence of a price system which moves freely in a reasonably wide latitude. In a directed economy, controls and incentives work in opposite directions. Incentives in the sterling area should work to move exports, directly or indirectly, to the dollar areas, and should encourage the importation of capital. Yet the experience of the last six years has shown how difficult it is, either by controls or persuasion, to impel firms to invade and exploit the more difficult hard-currency markets when price and profit incentives lure them to markets close at hand.

It is easy for the outsider to say that this or that is wrong with the efforts of the United Kingdom, but in fairness we should remember how great its problem has been. No country achieved a more complete war mobilization. Its export industries felt the withdrawal of manpower with particular severity; and its overseas markets were closed for years. External assets of 4.5 billion dollars were sacrificed, and by the beginning of the reconstruction period sterling balances abroad amounted to more than 11 billion dollars. The United States and Canadian loans added another 5 billion dollars of liability; and the merchant fleet, one of the chief earners of dollars, was reduced by one-third. Costly commitments both within and without the Commonwealth constituted a heavy drain on reduced resources and in addition weakened the bargaining power of the United Kingdom in reaching settlements. Expenditures for Burma, the Malay States, Iran, Egypt, Korea, West Europe—these and others made up a formidable overseas burden; and the costs and readjustments resulting from the revolution in Asia and Africa have fallen disproportionately on the United Kingdom.

It is not too much to say that the future of the North Atlantic community depends on the action taken by the United Kingdom and the associated countries of the sterling area to meet this problem. Canada and the United States, no less than the United Kingdom and its partners in the sterling area, will gain if these countries put their houses in order and reintegrate their price systems with those of the Western World. Only such an integration can provide an economic solution to the problem of the relation of population to resources in the United Kingdom, and only

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a decision to accomplish this integration will induce North American capital to flow into the sterling area. Long and persistent effort will be required to carry out such a policy, but when the decision has been firmly made its effect will at once be felt, and currents favorable to the economy of the United Kingdom will be set in motion.

III

But if the central and critical decision must be taken by the United Kingdom and her associates, other nations must also face important choices. The problem of economic unbalance is a world responsibility: the view sometimes put forward that the recurring weakness of sterling is merely the result of mistaken policies of the sterling area countries is much like the idea that the depression of the 1930's was wholly made in the United States. All countries have made singularly effective contributions to the creation of these problems, and their solution will require equally effective contributions from all countries with which the sterling area has relations.

The United States can help in more ways than one. Since the end of the war the United States tariff, through the medium of the General Agreement, has been subject to substantial and far-reaching reductions. These reductions have, however, been biased by the growing United States interest in imports of raw and semi-processed materials and in the growing intake of United States industry. The reductions have been much less generous on highly-processed goods. This reflects in part the reluctance of the United States to reduce tariffs, but also the unwillingness of the United Kingdom to reduce the British preferences irrevocably on U.S. products and the reluctance of Western Europe to abandon its protection of favored sectional interests. The result is a tariff structure which implies that the economic world order in which the United States is the dominant country requires other countries to produce raw materials to feed the ravening industrial machine of the United States, and that the responsibility of the United States as the great creditor nation of the world is met by this pattern of trade. It does not seem to have been noticed how close this is to the pattern of trade laid down by British colonial policy against which the United States rebelled in 1776. In fact, British industry soon broke up this pattern. The system is no more tenable for a great industrial nation such as the United

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States in the twentieth century than it was for Britain in the eighteenth.

There are ominous signs that this pattern of United States tariff policy is being strengthened rather than relaxed. Two results flow from it. The first is conditioned by the elementary fact that the only plentiful resource left to the United Kingdom and Western Europe is labor. On the other side, the whole of United States economic development has been directed by the scarcity of labor. Comparative advantage east of the Atlantic is in goods with high labor content. In the United States, the scarcity of labor is met by mass production, by large units of capital equipment per worker, and high quotas of power per worker. It is precisely in highly-processed goods or in capital goods which involve also extensive services that the exports of Europe and the United Kingdom should be greatest; but on these classes of goods United States tariffs are not only high but prohibitive. Like the rich young man in the parable, the United States has done well many things that are important for the reëstablishment of world trade, but there still remains the one thing needful.

The second result of this policy is that, denied access in highly-processed goods, the efforts of the sterling area are necessarily concentrated on indirect access to the United States market through the absorption of the highly-processed goods of the United Kingdom within the sterling area, and the export of materials such as rubber and tin to the United States. To a degree this is an economical enough detour, and indeed one which must be used, but in an extreme form it makes the dollar supply of the sterling area fluctuate with the wide swings of raw material markets. It has been a significant factor in the costly shifts in the terms of trade and in the recurring sterling crises. This bias in the United States tariff is reinforced by unsatisfactory United States customs law and its equally unsatisfactory administration. The deficiencies here particularly affect goods with high labor content, and the remedy has been long delayed.

There is no need to do more than mention the lapses of the United States from its obligations under the General Agreement, and the conflict between its international obligations and the political improvizations of its agricultural policies. It is quite true, of course, that no country is without sin in this regard, but it is of some importance that we in North America who are sometimes inclined to lecture the United Kingdom and others on the lofty

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virtues of a freely working price system should bear in mind that prohibitive and flexible tariffs also inhibit the working of the price system and make more difficult the problem of attaining equilibrium.

Even under the most favorable tariff terms there is no reason to expect any large expansion of direct exports of manufactured goods to the United States either from the sterling area or Western Europe. Were there no tariff at all these countries would have difficulty enough in reaching a competitive position. Their greatest chance for enlarged exports is likely to be in third countries and their efforts should be largely directed to making themselves fully competitive in those countries. Their need for increased exports is very great, however, particularly in the light of the present terms of trade or, in layman's language, the disproportionately high prices which they are paying for their imports. Even a moderate increase in their exports to North America would make more feasible the targets which they must reach elsewhere.

There is another field where North America can help and, for its own salvation, must help. The United States is, and must be, the great capital exporter of the world. The evidence that Canada has been able to maintain a very high rate of investment with comparatively small capital imports or, when capital imports were large, an appreciating exchange rate, is an indication that there will be a time in the future when Canada also has capital to export. In the new circumstances, capital or economic aid (as contrasted with military aid) should not be channeled to Western Europe, but rather to the underdeveloped countries of the world where the great revolution that is sweeping Asia and Africa like a cyclone has increased the demand for and enhanced the importance of capital for development. Quite apart from the interest of North America in a more stable world, the United States in particular has a direct interest in investments which will enlarge the world output of raw materials to feed the enormous industrial machine which is developing. No one need underestimate the difficulties of investing prudently, rapidly and productively in countries where the effective use of capital is limited by low standards of living, lack of technical and administrative knowledge and of appropriate institutions. But even though the progress be slow and some of the early results disappointing, it is quite clear that this is the road which North America has to travel.

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IV

Despite expected and unexpected difficulties we have moved forward in the postwar world, chapter by chapter. The patterns of our policies have been provisionally affected by the attitudes of the Soviet Union but we have not been prevented from making progress. The International Monetary Fund lacks resources and organization for dealing with many of the problems which have actually arisen, though it has had equipment for dealing with problems which in fact did not arise. The International Bank has made a significant contribution to progress and has gained invaluable experience and competence for the future. The Marshall Plan has carried the Western World through a crucial period and has contributed a noble chapter to the history of the relations of free nations. The degree to which, through all the strains and disappointments, it has been possible for the United States to proceed in assuming larger world responsibilities, and for other countries to coöperate even if not without complaints and strife, represents solid achievement.

We have not yet, however, surmounted all the difficulties and come out on a smooth and well-defined path. There are still great projects to be carried through before the economic unity of the West can be put squarely behind the organization of the Atlantic community, and before the ties of the West with Africa and Asia can be strengthened and made enduring. We have come to the place where we are no longer forecasting an imagined world but have come to grips with the real problems which beset us. Several of the weapons we devised have proved feeble or useless. Many of our preconceptions were a hindrance. What is most significant is that amid all the unexpected changes and events the economic objectives set up in the conferences under the Lend-Lease Agreements have proved their worth. Economic freedom, multilateral and non-discriminatory trade and currency arrangements, and revived international lending are now looked at with more realism but also more informed respect.

There is need at this juncture for a new approach, broad in scope, uninhibited in methods, and of a magnitude such as to insure success. The precise form and timing of the initiative rest on many considerations not to be assessed in a brief article. The items to be included within it must be analyzed in detail. Some alternatives may be easier to adopt in particular circumstances

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than others, but in broad terms the objects and the components of the program are reasonably clear.

We ought to aim in the near future at convertibility of the pound sterling, accompanied by such measures as are necessary to maintain that convertibility. It has become clear beyond doubt that the maintenance of the British system of controls is no longer practical nor profitable, and that the further rehabilitation of the price system must be called to aid in the economic direction of resources in the sterling area and Western Europe. This is not now a matter of preaching orthodoxy to the sterling area. It is a matter of its own interest. Beleaguered as the United Kingdom is by the "free traders" of other countries, such a step is all but a matter of necessity. No one should pretend that such a decision would be other than a bold and difficult venture, and if it is undertaken, North America should lend what aid is necessary to insure that the long and arduous effort which it would demand of the British emerges ultimately in a success in which we all have a stake. To guarantee time for the completion of that effort whatever is prudent by way of a stabilization fund may well be contributed by North America.

For years United States aid has been going into Western Europe and the sterling area. It is fairly clear that we have reached the end of the appropriate period of Marshall aid. Its disadvantages are now outstripping its advantages. Here and there there may well be special needs, but in the main aid should now take the form of a greatly enlarged stream of directed capital to the underdeveloped countries, generous regard being had to the effects of this outflow of dollars on the reserves of London and other financial centers of the world which may be expected to benefit and to help. There is need to liberalize and extend the operations of whatever institutions and arrangements can be useful in this movement—the International Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the Colombo Plan and possibly newly devised institutions.

We need not underestimate the great difficulties of increasing the capital investment in these countries which must build themselves up to the points where enlarged capital investment can be economically used. We should, however, bear in mind that such an outflow can perform the double function of alleviating a dollar scarcity and at the same time giving fresh life and hope to those areas of the world which have been swept by an epoch-

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making revolution. If North America believes in the retreat of imperialism before national autonomy, and believes that other continents can be held in amicable relationship with the North Atlantic, it must be prepared to help in building up workable and profitable relationships based on mutual respect and sound economy. The interest of the United States in particular in enlarging the output of raw materials, and of the foodstuffs on which the production of raw materials depends, is in itself a strong justification for a fresh initiative in directing and enlarging the outflow of capital. This would not be for relief or for reconstruction but for productive investment capable of yielding dividends both in money and human welfare over many decades.

Beyond the narrow confines of GATT and the restricted machinery of the Trade Agreements Act there is need for a new United States approach in the field of trade and tariffs. It is probably true that United States tariffs are much less important both to the protected interests in the United States and to the traders of other countries than they are ordinarily considered to be. It is not clear that the complete removal of the tariffs would greatly increase imports to the United States, but substantial and essentially unilateral action by a Great Power which had achieved economic leadership in the world would be a potent assurance that the United States itself believed in the integration of the world economy and was ready to accept for its own use prescriptions which it has given abroad. Few things can be more important than steps which would encourage other countries to embark boldly on the paths of multilateral trade and non-discrimination which the United States has itself prescribed.

The difficulties in the way, both political and economic, are still great and numerous. Seven years have passed with their setbacks and defeats. But there have been great achievements. The targets set up have proved to be the right ones. The world is moving to a conjuncture in which a bold initiative can achieve the goals which the United States and its associates have never wholly given up, even though it and they have fallen woefully short at times in the particular measures undertaken to achieve them. Together we can give the Atlantic community a fresh vitality and meaning which will determine the history of the next half century.

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THE SIEGE OF THE WEST

By Arnold J. Toynbee

WHY are we Westerners feeling so uneasy today? Many answers might, no doubt, be given to this question; but one answer, at any rate, is that we are disconcerted at suddenly finding ourselves in a situation that is unfamiliar as well as unpleasant. For more than 250 years ending in the year 1945, the West was besieging the world. The last and farthest wave of this modern Western tide of aggression brought German armies within sight of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. And now, since 1945, the tide has turned, and today it is the West that is having the novel experience of being besieged by Russia. In Korea, in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and in Europe, we Westerners today are conscious of standing on the defensive against a formidably rising concentric pressure.

This experience is novel for us in the West in the sense that it is one that has not previously overtaken either our generation or its predecessors within living memory. But it is perhaps consoling to remind ourselves that, on a rather longer view of past Western history, this state of siege turns out to have been the rule of Western life rather than an exception. The Ottoman siege of the West, which ended, Stalingrad-fashion, under the walls of Vienna in 1683, had been sustained for about 300 years before the Turkish tide at last began to ebb. Before that, in the thirteenth century, there was a Mongol siege of the West which came and went in a flash before our forefathers had had time to wake up to the deadly danger that had overshadowed them.

Yet there was a moment when the European and Indian peninsulas of Asia were the only two continental fragments of the Old World that still stood high and dry above the Mongol flood; and there was a year in which, in England, there was a glut of herrings because the continental fishermen and shippers had stayed at home to defend their wives and children in case the Mongols might sweep on from the Carpathians to the Frisian coast. Before that, again, there had been an Arab siege of the West which, by the time of its ebb in the course of the tenth century, had been sustained (like the Turkish siege in modern times) for about 300 years, reckoning from the first Arab invasion, in the 640's, of a Northwest Africa that, like Spain, was

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at that date an integral part of a Latin speaking Western Christendom.

This state of siege, then, has been at least as usual in our Western history up to date as our two great Western outbursts of aggression—the unsuccessful Crusades and the likewise unsuccessful modern Western attempt to conquer the globe through the conquest of the ocean. The more recent and more violent of these two Western outbreaks began as an oceanic encircling movement in answer to the Ottoman siege of the West in the Danube Valley and in the Mediterranean Basin. It went on, virtually unopposed, for a quarter of a millennium after the final collapse of the Turkish offensive in 1683. And it is only in our own day that it has reached its high-water mark and has begun to recede from it. Yet these two outbreaks, which have given us Westerners the reputation of being habitual aggressors in the judgment of the great non-Western majority of mankind, are—so we Westerners may plausibly plead—merely exceptions to the normal state of affairs. Normally the Western World has been under siege by its neighbors; and, indeed, to have to live normally in a state of siege is surely the destiny of a geographically ecccentric society like ours, clinging precariously to a bridgehead on and off the tip of one of the peninsulas of a vast alien continent.

At this point I can see an American Western reader turning restive. "What a characteristically European blinkered point of view!" he will interpellate. "The Western World an Asiatic bridgehead! Why, surely all this has been changed by the modern Western discovery and settlement of a New World. Happily our Western World has long since outgrown the dimensions of a Western Europe which you can, I admit, fairly describe, if you choose, as being merely an Asiatic bridgehead."

Yes, happily the Western World has grown in size as a result of the expansion that began with the West European oceanic voyages of discovery more than 450 years ago. But in this connection it has to be borne in mind that, while the Western World has been growing in size, its non-Western neighbors and rivals have been growing *pari passu*, and this as an effect of the same Western technical causes. A constantly accelerating process of Western technological development, beginning with the invention of a Portuguese caravel and continuing at this moment in the invention of a British jet-plane, has resulted in "the annihilation of distance;" and, while these unprecedented Western means

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of communication have made it possible for the Western World to expand out of Western Europe over the Americas and South Africa and Australia and New Zealand, they have also made it possible, in the stubbornly non-Western heartland of the inhabited world, for Russia to build a land-empire on the likewise colossal scale of the ephemeral empire of the Mongols.

As the world has grown smaller, the Great Powers have grown bigger; but, in these world-wide changes of scale, there have been no appreciable local changes of proportion. The Western World of 1952, relative to the Russian World of 1952, is no bigger than a pre-Columbian Western World, confined to Western Europe, once was relative to an Ottoman Empire or, before that, to an Arab Caliphate. It is true that the pair of American isles that lie anchored off the Old World across the Atlantic Channel are, in absolute magnitude, vastly larger than the pair of British Isles that, on the pre-Columbian map, lay anchored off Europe across the English Channel; but then the absolute magnitude of the Soviet Union, together with its satellites and associates, is vaster, in the same ratio, than the absolute magnitude of the Ottoman Empire. When all the magnitudes have increased in approximately the same proportion, the balance of power remains much as it was; and, while it is true that, without its new arsenal and citadel in North America, our Western World would be doomed today, it would also be a delusion for us to feel secure today because the resources of America have been added to those of Western Europe—considering that our Russian antagonists have performed the same acrobatic feat of piling Pelion on Ossa.

And now the world has become "round" for strategic and political, as well as for mere navigational, purposes. Before the Second World War, the world's surface had not yet become global for military purposes. For these unpleasant purposes it was then still an oblong area with edges; and a world that has not yet rid itself of war is a less dangerous world to live in when it has some edges, against which combatants can set their backs without fear of being taken in the rear, than it is when it has become a continuous global surface with no edges anywhere; for, in this new global world, everybody is all the time encircling, and being encircled by, everybody else. Our old comfortable militarily oblong world was transformed into this new perilous militarily global world when Admiral Nimitz welded the world's two surviving edges together by "annihilating the Pacific." Today, the world has no

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sheltering edges left in it; and this means that Russia, who seems to us to be besieging our Western Community all the way round a circumglobal front, seems in Russian eyes to be being besieged, all the way round the same front, by us.

After all, when there is talk of being besieged, Russia can perhaps make out almost as good a case as Western Christendom can for the thesis that her normal experience, throughout her history up to date, has been to find herself under siege. Such competitive claims to innocence are, of course, as unprofitable as they are unconvincing. On the other hand, the "geopolitical" transformation of the world's surface from an oblong into a globe does point at least two morals: one for us in the West and one for the human race as a whole.

II

The moral for us Westerners surely is that, in a world that has now become global for military purposes as the result of a technological "annihilation of distance," we can no longer afford the luxury of political disunity in which we were able to indulge during the recent exceptional chapter of Western history in which we were enjoying a temporary ascendancy over the non-Western majority of mankind. In those brief spacious days, when the Western peoples had the whole habitable and navigable surface of the globe for their playground, they had plenty of elbow room and no menacing clouds on their horizon; and so, when they found one another's company irksome, they could apply the simple remedy of sheering off from a tiresome Western neighbor.

This was, for example, what the American people did in the eighteenth century when their political association with the United Kingdom had become annoying to them as the result of a shift in the balance of power between them and the British people—a shift which the British Government and people had been unwilling to recognize. The Americans wanted to have the control over their own affairs which was the logical corollary of their growth in numbers, wealth and strength; the British were obstructive. The Americans found their remedy in setting up a new sovereign and independent state of their own. This was practical politics in an eighteenth century Western World, because there was still room there for new sovereign independent states. There were still open spaces; and the Western countries that had been making relative, as well as absolute, gains in power were

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communities that, like the United States, were on the edge of those open spaces and were expanding into them and developing their resources. They could go on developing them, as independent states, without fear, because at that time the Western World as a whole was not threatened by any outside power, while the threats, within the Western World, to one Western country from another, were not very serious.

This remedy of parting company is not, however, open any longer today to a Western country that is irked, as America was two hundred years ago, by a shift in the balance of power between itself and its Western neighbors. It is irksome today for France and Great Britain—states with long memories of greatness, which, within living memory, were great Powers of the highest caliber—suddenly to find themselves dwarfed by a super-Power of the caliber of the present United States; and their natural human inclination might be to apply the remedy—which the American people applied in the eighteenth century—of sheering off from an irksome associate. But in fact this remedy is no longer open to any Western country in the new circumstances of our twentieth century. New lands, new markets, new opportunities are no longer to be found in a world in which the former empty spaces have now been filled and in which the political horizon is no longer cloudless. In old days, when Great Britain lost her mediæval empire in France, she could find a new opening in the New World; when she lost her American colonies, she could find a new opening in India; but, now that she has lost India too, she has nowhere to turn, outside the limits of the Western World. The Dutch, again, built up an empire in Indonesia after they had lost their status as a Great Power in Europe; but now the Dutch have lost Indonesia too.

At the same time the Western World as a whole is now beset once again by a threat from outside; and this new threat from the Soviet Union is more formidable than the old threat from the Ottoman Empire ever was. Today it is not just the border cities or marches or countries of our Western World that are under siege; the Communist siege of the West is pressing upon the whole of our Western community. In these new circumstances, if Britain or France sought to relieve herself from the pressure of an American ascendancy by disengaging herself from the United States, the effect would be, not to reëstablish France's or Britain's independence, but merely to place France and Brit-

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ain at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Today, the lesser states of the Western World cannot sheer off from the United States without walking into the Soviet Union's jaws; and the United States too, relatively powerful though it is today by comparison with any other Western country, is really in the same plight as the rest. However tiresome it may find its West European junior partners, it cannot afford to throw them off, because it cannot afford to see their weight fall into the Russian side of the Russo-American balances.

In a world in which the Western peoples have no longer either a cloudless horizon or a reserve of untapped resources, the moral for all is clear. We must make the most economical use of the aggregate resources that we do command. We must overhaul the management of our Western affairs, cut out waste and renounce luxuries. Our greatest luxury has been to live divided into some 40 sovereign and independent Western states, each pulling against the others; and this is a luxury in which we can no longer afford to indulge. No doubt, our hearts are still far from reconciling themselves to this renunciation, however clearly our minds may accept its logic. Yet the logic is inexorable. The non-Western majority of mankind is now once again besieging our Western fortress. Considering that this non-Western majority is a great one, and that this great non-Western majority is rapidly mastering the "know-how" of the technology which has been the secret of our recent Western power, we must expect, in the round world of today, to continue to be under siege for as long as we can see ahead; and who has ever heard of a besieged city that did not fall when the troops refused to submit to the military necessity for a unity of command? Western Christendom's retort to the first of the sieges that it ever had to face—the Arab siege of the West in the early Middle Ages—was to unite under the single command of Charlemagne. A modern equivalent of that Carolingian union is what the West needs again today. If we refuse to submit to this military and political necessity, a divided Western house will certainly fall. If we decide to build a united house, NATO is already there to serve as the foundation.

So the United States, like its West European associates, today finds itself in an ironical situation which is made all the more exasperating by the fact that it has resulted from their common victory in the Second World War. The United States is now more powerful than ever, relatively and not only absolutely. But the

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source of this enhanced American power is a change in the world which has deprived the American people of the possibility of satisfying their dearest wish. The American people's dream has been to disentangle America from the Old World in order to build an Earthly Paradise in the New World. But now they are inextricably entangled with the whole of the rest of the world because America's present mighty power comes from a recent vast increase in the scale of all human operations—technological operations in the first place, and therefore economic and political and military operations as well. This change of scale is comparable in magnitude to the change that came over the world 450 years ago, as a result of the West European peoples' conquest of the ocean. In consequence, the United States today is so powerful that it can do anything—except the one thing that the American people want to do most.

Thus the American people are finding themselves faced with the necessity of having to change one of their fundamental ideas if they are still to pursue one of their fundamental ideals. In order to make the United States or any other part of the world safe for democracy, the whole world under present conditions has to be made safe for democracy. This psychological readjustment is an excruciating experience, and the fact that the necessity for it comes from an increase of power and from a great victory is an aggravation of the malaise.

Yet we Western peoples no longer have a choice. We are bound to unite with one another, considering that we have no intentions of allowing ourselves to go under, and that our downfall would be the inevitable penalty of a continuing disunity.

The technological revolution that has "annihilated distance" also has another moral—which is one for the Russians as well as for us Westerners. It looks as if, in a war fought by air forces armed with atomic bombs, there would no longer be any distinction between "the front" and the relatively sheltered "interior" behind it. Every target worth attacking in either camp would be exposed all the time to being attacked at any moment. Since a war of this unprecedented kind would spell almost certain death for both belligerents, both parties have the strongest common interest in keeping the peace. In the world in which we find ourselves today, to live and let live is the first and last word of wisdom for both the armed camps into which mankind has unhappily allowed itself to be sorted out.

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HARD CHOICES IN SOUTH AFRICA

By C. W. M. Gell

THE events of the last few months in South Africa have justified the prediction that the most effective opposition to apartheid would come from the non-Europeans themselves. The South African crisis developed during 1951 over legal and constitutional issues dividing the two European political groups. In March 1952 the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court decided these issues against the present Government. The crisis then entered its second phase, with the Government seeking a solution by political action which for a time seemed to bring the Union within measurable distance of civil war. That possibility has now receded. But the launching of a well-organized and disciplined passive resistance campaign by non-Europeans, under joint Indian and African leadership, has brought to the surface the question of white-colored relations which underlies all South Africa's politics and was the basic cause even of the constitutional crisis.

The moral and material issues raised by the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign will in fact dominate the 1953 election, despite the present efforts of the political parties to evade their implications. To understand the actual form in which these issues will be put to the almost entirely white electorate, it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the story of the last two years. When Dr. D. F. Malan's Nationalist Party, allied with Mr. N. C. Havenga's Afrikaner Party, won the 1948 election, the two parties (which have since been amalgamated) had a majority of only seven out of a total of 153 seats in the Assembly. One of the new Government's first acts was to curtail severely Smuts' program which had brought 80,000 European immigrants into the country in the previous three years. Secondly, it extended from two to five years the period required for British and Commonwealth immigrants to qualify for South African citizenship and the vote. The first measure was justified by the need for selective immigration, and the second by the desirability of ensuring a single loyalty; many Afrikaners still regard with suspicion English-speaking South Africans who have several generations of Union residence behind them.

A no less powerful motive was the desire to maintain the pres-

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ent preponderance (64 percent) of Afrikaners in the white population. Political nationalism has canalized the historical grievances and aspirations of the Afrikaans-speaking people. In the last six years the Nationalist Party tried to broaden its appeal to all Europeans in face of the colored danger, but with very limited success. In 1948, it polled only 45 percent of the total vote. Few immigrants, British or continental European, vote Nationalist, preferring the broader basis of the United Party. The one major exception is the German immigrant who, for obvious historical reasons, opposes the party which General J. C. Smuts twice led to war with Germany. The Nationalists capitalized this hostility by cancelling Smuts' deportation of 250 families from South-West Africa for pro-Nazi activities during the war, and by allotting to the mandated territory six seats (two more than Smuts had proposed) when it was politically incorporated in 1950. They won all six by a majority which was almost exactly equal to the strength of the German vote.

With an increased majority of 13, the Nationalists introduced legislation early in 1951 to take the Cape Coloreds (half-castes) off the common electoral roll. The Coloreds had had qualified male suffrage on the common roll in the Cape Colony since 1853. This was guaranteed to them at the time of Union by the South Africa Act of 1909; under that Act, restriction of the franchise is possible only by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament sitting together. By 1950 nearly 50,000 Coloreds were registered voters in the Cape, where they constituted 8 percent of the electorate of that province. They are generally thought to hold the balance between the major parties in between five and ten constituencies—and few vote for Dr. Malan. Their disfranchisement would, therefore, cause a swing of between ten and 20 seats in favor of the Nationalists, less the four separate Colored seats which were to be created. Both parties realized that this swing might decide the 1953 election.

In justice to the Nationalists it must be said that they were not merely concerned with the electoral advantage. It distresses them deeply that non-Europeans should partake in the common political life and possibly be able to decide the result of a European election. Further, since Smuts' United Party had coöperated in 1936 to pass a very similar measure disfranchising the Cape Natives by the constitutional two-thirds majority, the Nationalists knew that opposition among Europeans to their Separate

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Representation of Voters Act derived not so much from dislike of curtailing non-European rights as from fear of the electoral consequences. Thirdly, the Nationalists had reason to believe they were acting within the letter of the law. There was a considerable body of legal opinion and a judgment of the Appeal Court in support of their contention that, when the Commonwealth of independent Dominions was created in 1931, the legal safeguards in the clauses of the South Africa Act entrenching the Colored franchise and some other matters fell away.

The Opposition parties contested the legal issues and further insisted that, whether or not the entrenched clauses were held to be of full legal effect, the Government was morally bound to observe the constitutional procedure laid down in the Act of Union. Ethically, this argument is incontrovertible. In accepting the autonomous sovereignty offered by the Statute of Westminster in 1931, all parties in the Union Parliament had bound themselves unequivocally to honor the entrenched clauses of the Act of Union. General J. B. M. Hertzog, the then Nationalist Prime Minister, amended the resolution of Parliament accepting the Statute to include words suggested by General Smuts, then leader of the Opposition: "On the understanding that the proposed legislation will in no way derogate from the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act." Smuts with his usual prescience exactly foresaw the present controversy when he said:

> I think we ought to put it on solemn record that we adhere to the South Africa Act, the entrenched provisions of which are looked upon very seriously by the people of this country. We do not want to depart by an indirect method from the deliberate provisions laid down twenty years ago.

This attitude toward the entrenched clauses was most explicitly endorsed in the debate of 1931 by at least three Ministers of the present Government. Mr. C. R. Swart, now Minister of Justice, said:

> We feel that the entrenched clauses are a matter of good faith, and I cannot imagine that any Government would alter them by a bare majority . . . I feel just as strongly as hon. members on the other side that the entrenchment of certain clauses is a matter of honor.

Those who believed with the Government that the Colored franchise was no longer legally entrenched had, therefore, to close their eyes to the moral obligations, or pretend that the Coloreds were not being deprived of their rights because they were to re-

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ceive "equivalents." Legally, they relied upon the wording of certain clauses of the Statute of Westminster, the technicalities of which are no longer important; they were settled by the Appeal Court's ruling of March 20, 1952, which held that the entrenched clauses were still of full legal effect and that the Separate Representation of Voters Act, having been passed by simple majorities, was "invalid, null and void and of no legal effect and force."

II

For the tensions and apprehensions of the next few months the Government really had only itself and its supporters to blame. Shortly before the judgment was delivered, Dr. Malan made the provocative statement that, if the decision went against him, he still had a "trump card" to play. A few hours after judgment he declared that for an appointed judicial authority to thwart the legislative sovereignty of parliament "had created an intolerable and unacceptable situation." Reviving the myth that the Act of Union was imposed by Britain upon an unwilling South Africa, Dr. Malan and his three senior Ministers issued a manifesto on March 24 which saw in the judgment of a Court, none of whose members were of British extraction, "a revival of the attacks of imperialism on Nationalism" in an effect to maintain "the constitutional enslavement of South Africa to the legislation of a superior British Parliament." The Afrikaans press, stigmatizing the Colored franchise as "the last vestige of Cape-British liberalism," called on the Government to rely on the "National nation" in its struggle for "the freedom of the Afrikaner." At a rather later stage, when feeling was running very high over the Government's legislative reaction to the judgment, Mr. Japie Basson, M.P. for Namib, said: "We are in the middle of a life and death struggle. It can rightly be considered as the Third South African War for Freedom." And the most responsible Afrikaans daily wrote that the crisis was due

> to the British Imperialist Jingo unleashing a struggle against Afrikanerdom to win back what had been taken from him since the beginning of the century. The English-language press attacks us in a manner reminiscent of the lying propaganda which preceded the Jameson Raid and the Second War for Freedom.

What the Nationalist Government actually did was to introduce an Act, described by Dr. T. E. Donges, the Minister of the Interior, as "courtproof," creating a High Court of Parliament to

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sit in appeal on the Appeal Court. This High Court was empowered to revalidate the Separate Representation of Voters Act by the same simple parliamentary majority which is not legally competent to enact it; and did so. Nationalist politicians and press admitted that they did not much care for this device, but saw no alternative.

The Opposition points out that the Act of Union was a solemn compact, freely devised by a purely South African National Convention and voluntarily entered into by the elected legislatures of all four provinces. The compromises on certain fundamental points, which are enshrined in the entrenched clauses, represented the minimum measure of agreement without which one or another province would not have accepted Union. In enacting it the British Parliament, which alone had full legislative authority in South Africa in 1909, added nothing to and subtracted nothing from the agreement which South Africans had reached among themselves.

Legally and historically, this argument is unassailable. It is possible to regret that the founding fathers decided for a semi-rigid constitution. There are men on both sides today who would prefer a completely unfettered Parliament on the British or New Zealand models. And there are others who believe that the Union, with its deeply divided racial blocs, conflicting political traditions and subject races, needs a more, not a less, rigid constitution. But until the present constitution as contained in the Act of Union is legally amended, there is no legal way round the two-thirds provisions of the entrenched clauses. As for the Act creating the High Court of Parliament, the Opposition considers it as illegal as it is immoral. The Cape Division of the Supreme Court has upheld that belief, and on November 13, the Appellate Court ruled unanimously that the High Court of Parliament set up by the Government was illegal.

The Opposition had bound itself to accept the verdict of the Court and to fight the moral issues of the Union compact and a Bill to establish written constitutional rights at the coming election. The Government had, however, consistently refused to give a similar undertaking, if the decision should go against it. Until very recently there was a real possibility, which its press and politicians seemed to endorse, that it would in fact try to nullify or evade an adverse verdict and proceed to disfranchise the Coloreds as if both the Separate Representation Act and High

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Court were valid. This is what many people understood Dr. Malan to mean when in May he declared: "We are going ahead with our plans to protect the sovereignty of Parliament, no matter what happens." Mr. J. G. N. Strauss, leader of the Opposition, speaking on behalf of the United Democratic Front of his own United Party, the Labor Party and the Torch Commando,[1] felt constrained to warn the Government that the Front would oppose illegal measures by every legal means and would meet force with force, if the Government sought to impose invalid laws. Certain elements in Natal took a rather different line, threatening that the province would secede if the Government withdrew from the contract of Union by abrogating the Constitution.

But even though Dr. Malan had remarked that "we as a Government cannot allow ourselves to lose," he announced, after the Appeal Court had spoken, that he would abide by its decision and would keep the Coloreds on the common voting list for the elections in April. He intends to fight the elections on the two main planks of the sovereignty of Parliament and the black menace. The change of emphasis is almost certainly due to a belief that the second of these issues has now been raised in a form which will materially assist the Nationalists at the polling booths.

The depth of conviction with which the Nationalists hold their racial doctrine must not be underestimated. The Afrikaner people derive (with, of course, many later accretions and some continuous assimilation) from the original Dutch settlers and Huguenot refugees of the later seventeenth century. They came to a continent whose peoples knew nothing of Christianity or European civilization. Biblical fundamentalists and Calvinist predestinarians by religion, the Afrikaners explicitly reject the doctrine of "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family," which forms part of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. They are certain, on the contrary, that a man gets what he deserves only when it is allotted to him by God. In their surroundings the Afrikaner settlers found abundant justification for their conviction that "everyone should be treated according to what God ordained for him after the pattern of inequality which He Himself created." Early and naturally, their consciousness of

[1] The United Party forms the main Opposition. The Labor Party holds a few industrial seats on the Witwatersrand, representing white labor. The Torch Commando is a popular, extra-parliamentary movement of some 250,000 members, loosely pledged to get the Government out and safeguard the Constitution.

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being chosen took on a racial aspect. Genesis IX 25 ("a servant of servants") and Joshua IX 23–27 ("hewers of wood and drawers of water") were cited as scriptural sanction for the view that "God not only willed the existence of different races with different functions, but gave to each people a specified epoch and a place in which to live." All available evidence supported the view that South Africa had been selected for the Afrikaner people to rule.

There are, of course, many Afrikaners today who no longer apply their Calvinism so literally. But in considering the forthcoming election, it is the majority belief which matters. Although a minority in the total population, Calvinists are a majority of the white population of the Union. And wherever Calvinism has been a majority faith, it has been authoritarian. The South African trend is, therefore, authoritarian—all the more rigidly so because the whites fear that they will be swamped by the nonwhites who outnumber them four to one.

It is true that the authoritarian and theocratic tendency of South African Calvinism is in conflict with the strong individualism of the Voortrekker tradition, and if there was no colored majority to be considered, this conflict would certainly be more apparent. But the possibility, however remote, that the Opposition, unfortified by scriptural or religious dogma, might weaken on the color question, gives the Calvinist theocratists great political strength.[2]

This leads logically to the demand that democracy be qualified so as to minimize the possibility of victory by a "non-Christian" party. And the repeated declarations that "South Africa is subordinate to no power on earth but is under the authority of God alone," present the franchise not as a symbol of individual freedom, but as a duty to be rendered to God who has created the State as an instrument of His sovereignty. Properly, only Christians should qualify for the franchise; possibly, some think, only Calvinists. One of the suggested tests for selecting immigrants is that they shall at least be Protestant. This combination of religion, racial pride and fervent patriotism is well exemplified by a recent article in *Die Transvaler,* which declared:

Dr. Malan has asked us to trust the Government in this crisis at the cross-

[2] There is a secret Nationalist society known as the *Broederbond* (Band of Brothers) which is thought to be the driving force behind Afrikaner Nationalism. Dr. Malan and the majority of his Cabinet and Parliamentary supporters are members. Apostates have revealed that of its 3,460 members, 2,039 are teachers and 356 ministers of the Dutch Reformed Churches. The heavy representation of Church and school reflects a deliberate emphasis in the Nationalist program.

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roads of color. We do it with all our hearts. They, the Government, are the patriot's ark of faith under God's dispensation. They will lead the *volk* to the heights of complete freedom, to the other side, on the road which under Nationalist leadership has been followed step by step since the days of Andries Pretorius in order to liberate South Africa from the conqueror and his accomplices.

As J. W. Patten made clear in an earlier article,[8] there is a great deal of difference between pure, total apartheid on the one hand and practical apartheid on the other. Despite the continued protests of a section of the ministry of the Dutch Reformed Churches and of the Afrikaans intelligentsia, Nationalists still reject the former as wholly impracticable. Apartheid, therefore, means in practice an attempt to stabilize the present position of exclusive white political supremacy (the *baasskap*), cheap black labor with an industrial color bar confining non-Europeans to unskilled employment (at least in theory), residential segregation in the urban areas, social segregation in all public places and transport, the prohibition of sexual intimacy between the races, and the total denial of non-European rights except "in their own sphere." With all of this the Opposition parties agree in principle, and wish merely to amend some of the laws in order to make them less arbitrary and more amenable to appeal in the courts. The difference is between explicitly and aggressively asserting a permanent racial superiority and tacitly assuming it. The difference is important, for those who explicitly commit themselves to a *herrenvolk* ideology cannot compromise, even on details, and the conception of racial superiority as a duty to be fulfilled adds daily an increasing quota of discourtesy and petty bullying to the slow but massive accumulation of racial bitterness. Yet even so, it should be noted that of the four Acts of the present Government to which the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress called attention in January 1952 when they warned Dr. Malan of their intention to resort to passive resistance against discriminatory laws, the Opposition substantially disagrees with only two. It almost entirely concurs with the other regulations which the sponsors of the passive resistance campaign singled out for special mention.

III

The Defiance Campaign was launched late in June 1952. It has proceeded so far with a dignity and discipline which even experi-

[8] "Alternatives to Apartheid," by J. W. Patten, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1952.

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enced and sympathetic observers did not believe possible. The Government has used its arbitrary powers under the Suppression of Communism Act to proscribe most of the leaders, only a few of whom are genuine Communists, and is said to be considering more severe penalties, including flogging the demonstrators; so far, only juvenile demonstrators have been beaten with light canes. At the time of writing, more than 7,000 resisters have submitted passively (even joyfully) to arrest and have gone to prison rather than pay their fines. But though the organized Defiance Movement has remained peaceful, there have been ugly riots at Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and East London, in which blood has been shed and lives lost. None of these arose from a Defiance incident, but they have been stimulated by the rising tension. They exemplify the extent to which racial relations have deteriorated and show the danger that hooligan or extremist elements may take control of the non-European movements.

The response of the Nationalists is straightforward: the movement must be sternly suppressed and the non-Europeans taught who is *baas*. As Mr. J. G. Strydom, the Minister of Lands and a likely Nationalist Prime Minister in the near future, said on September 13: "The white man will only succeed in remaining in South Africa if there is discrimination, in other words, only if we retain all power in our hands." But Nationalists are not unaware of the difficulties that the campaign has raised for the Opposition parties, who must condemn it or commit electoral suicide by seeming to accept equal citizenship as an ultimate goal. But Mr. Strauss, their spokesman, has repeated his party's long-standing pledge to consult non-Europeans and obtain their coöperation. However, his four-point program—social segregation, no miscegenation, residential segregation, and the use of non-European labor for the benefit of the community as a whole "on our farms, in our kitchens, in our factories and in our mines"—is so far short of what even moderate non-European leaders could reasonably be expected to accept that it clearly illustrates his dilemma. He cannot obtain the agreement of non-Europeans without making concessions which the white electorate will reject. His promise to "lift the color question out of politics" seeks to postpone the attempt to resolve this dilemma. His second promise of greatly increased white immigration is offered as a long-range solution.

A few months ago, before the Defiance Campaign began, an election on the present rolls would almost certainly have gone to

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the United Party. Now much, perhaps all, of the ground which the Nationalists had lost by their constitutional manœuvres has been regained for them by their greater certainty and firmness toward what appears to be the beginning of a social revolution. The United Party and its allies try to blame the Defiance Campaign entirely on the Nationalist Government. But the latter's greater forcefulness in legislation and administration has merely precipitated something which has been long maturing among the colored peoples and which was some day bound to break. The tensions and frustrations which the campaign expresses will not disappear with a Nationalist defeat.

The hard core of voters on either side will not be much affected either way. Some of the floating vote of about 20 percent may be led to believe, as Mr. Strauss assures them, that there is a way back to the policy of Hertzog and Smuts, in other words, that more moderate language and less militant application of laws, plus some small concessions, will restore tranquillity to race relations. But it is rather more likely that the tactics which paid the Nationalists so well in 1948 will be even more successful today. They will ably and relentlessly expose the inner contradictions of the United Party's color policy, arguing (as Mr. Strydom and Mr. E. H. Louw, the Minister for Economic Affairs, have already done) that coöperation must lead eventually to votes for non-Europeans and the abandonment of the industrial color bar. They will exploit the remarks of the United Party's tiny liberal wing and brand the party as pro-Communist because it opposes the present refusal of the Nationalists to allow alleged Communists the right of trial and appeal. Offered the choice between the full-blooded white supremacy of the Nationalists and the United Party's more moderate version of the same attitude, many unattached voters may well take an even more short-term view of their own self-interest than they did in 1948, when there was no organized colored agitation.

But, in fact, the apparently "safe" way of European self-interest is no longer safe. The Nationalists' aggressive racial ethos has brought to the surface all the latent contradictions of South Africa's traditional racial policy—the precarious balance between compromise and repression which Hertzog and Smuts so long pursued and which lesser men cannot maintain. Faced squarely with the logical implications of "white leadership with justice" which both the European parties profess, the non-Europeans have

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chosen to work out their own salvation. The present movement may be crushed temporarily; but sooner or later it will revive and go gradually from strength to strength, providing a tangible focus for all the discontents of the "have-nots," stimulated by persecution and self-sacrifice, possibly even by martyrdom. If the whites remain intransigent, the Defiance Campaign can hardly hope to continue non-violent. And, indeed, in view of the temperaments of both white and black, few expected it to remain so as long as it has. Even with a monopoly of modern weapons, one-fifth of the population will find it impossible, physically, morally and economically, to hold down indefinitely the other four-fifths, once these develop a capacity for mass action.

The Nationalist policy of practical apartheid has two aspects —the control and subordination of non-Europeans in the "European areas" and the development of non-Europeans "in their own areas." So far, a good deal has been done about the first and nothing at all about the second. As Africans are to lose even their present pitiful freehold rights in the urban locations and are to be offered a special type of education "in keeping with their national characteristics and traditions" and their future rôle in a white-dominated economy, it seems that only the Native Reserves are to be really "their own areas." These are the permanent home of 40 percent of the Bantu, many of whom, however, need to work in the "European areas" as migratory laborers. During the last 16 years a promise to increase the Reserves by 2 percent has been less than half redeemed, and European opposition virtually rules out any hope of enlarging them significantly. Even though much might be done to increase their productivity and carrying-capacity, they can never provide homes and jobs for more than a minority of the Natives.

Practical apartheid, therefore, hardly differs from the United Party policy of accepting the majority of non-Europeans as permanent residents of the European areas. The Nationalists are even being forced to acquiesce in the urbanization and integration of unskilled black labor in the European economy, which theoretically they hope to reverse but which the United Party approves. And despite the warnings of their Churches and intellectuals, both parties hope that these processes can continue to provide an exclusively privileged white community with cheap and submissive labor, conveniently kept in its place without any political or economic concessions.

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Present prospects are that the Nationalists may win another bare majority on a mandate to enforce apartheid and establish the sovereignty of Parliament. Without a two-thirds majority, they will still be blocked by the Act of Union, and there may be a renewal of the constitutional conflict between the two European factions. Senator H. F. Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, has promised that his Party will go ahead with or without the two-thirds majority, if it wins the election. This is, however, the lesser issue. For their color policy, as Dr. A. Keppel-Jones recently said, is certain to make South Africa untenable for the white man within this century. And how much else of Africa too? All over southern, central and east Africa the Nationalist breach of pledged words and moral obligations, their attempt to evade legal obligations and the decision of a much respected Court when it was favorable to colored interests, have created suspicion among Africans which is paralyzing efforts to work out a basis for genuine interracial partnership. For the success of that effort, everything depends upon mutual respect and trust. If uncompromising white nationalism and implacable black nationalism finally confront each other in the Union, European leadership will end long before the Native peoples are ready to carry the burden alone.

IV

The Defiance Campaign has really posed the issues between white and black in their final form. The present political crisis reflects a divided European mind which will not yet face any of the three alternatives. The first is the elimination of the white man—an outcome which neither the Europeans nor non-Europeans desire, but which is the logical result of the present policies of both the Nationalists and their opponents. The second alternative is the one urged by the Afrikaans Church and intellectuals —total apartheid, with complete partition and exchange of populations as its goal. This demands that the Europeans make tremendous material sacrifices, eliminating African labor from their economy[4] and surrendering sufficient land and natural resources to create a viable African society. The third is that those who favor economic integration must accept the moral and material implications of such a policy: that non-Europeans must be gradu-

[4] At present, nine-tenths of the mine-workers, three-quarters of agricultural labor and two-thirds of industrial labor are non-European.

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ally admitted to equal citizenship and equality of economic opportunity, as they attain to the standards of civilization; and the corollary is that Native education, housing, health, nutrition must be tackled on a national scale with high priority, not for racial reasons but because a large mass of people live in conditions of ignorance, squalor and disease which threaten the welfare of the whole community as much as they degrade the sufferers.

All these alternatives are fraught with risks and unpalatable sacrifices, either material or emotional—the inescapable consequences of a multiracial society and the penalty for previous procrastination. It would be expecting too much of human nature to hope that either party will fight the coming election on a truly constructive platform while traditional policies hold out any chance of success. But the next five years will be crucial, no matter who wins in 1953. If the Nationalists declare for total apartheid as their ultimate objective, or if the United Party declares for total integration, the way will be open for honorable compromise on the details of a gradual policy and all men of goodwill will have a rallying-point and a goal to work for. But if neither party budges from its present position, the non-Europeans will be driven against their will to oppose white men as such, and the two white groups will move toward solidarity over the short distance which separates them on color questions. For lack of a constructive policy, both black and white will find themselves near despair, and near the temptations of force to which it leads. Moderate leaders will inevitably give way to extremists, reason to passion and the baser political motives. Then, indeed, events will justify the prophecy of a prominent Nationalist who said: "All we can hope to do is to stave them off, stave them off for as long as possible."

The number of white South Africans who are thinking of emigrating for their children's sake shows a growing awareness of how close the country is to that sort of moral and material bankruptcy. Another piece of evidence pointing in the same direction is the appalling increase in Native crime, as shown in the following figures for the Witwatersrand, the industrial and mining area around Johannesburg in the Transvaal.

	Murders	*Grievous Assault*	*Serious Crime*
1945	186	2,475	69,036
1948	231	3,381	89,130
1951	472	4,776	158,513

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W. P. Schreiner, an Afrikaner and one of the Cape leaders at the time of Union, said:

> It is idle to think of building anything permanent in South Africa by the mere goodwill of ourselves, the European-descended minority of its people. We shall, if we deserve it, remain dominant, where career is open to talent and to civilized men, with no discrimination or distinction upon such grounds as color or race. Life's experience has taught me that the golden thread of justice in every matter is the only way out of the labyrinth.

The future of white civilization in Africa depends on a revival of the faith and vision which inspired those words, and of the old indigenous liberal tradition which seemed to die with J. H. Hofmeyr, Smuts' Deputy Prime Minister, in 1948. Total apartheid seems to ask too great material sacrifices ever to be practicable. It is, in fact, against the best interest of all races and likely to reduce both white and black to penury. Africa needs European leadership and enterprise for generations to come, if that can be contrived without affronting African self-respect or closing all avenues of advance to the colored races. The sole justification for considering partition is the well-founded apprehension that racial attitudes may at last prove ineradicable, that the European's fear of being swamped and his consequent refusal to allow any substantial opportunity to non-Europeans in a mixed society may never abate. Only those who have lived in South Africa long enough to understand the depth and persistence of these prejudices and emotional responses to the racial situation can fully appreciate how slender are the chances of the liberal solution being applied in time.

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FINLAND MAINTAINS DEMOCRACY

By Arthur Spencer

THE Finns of old were famed as wizards—and there has been more than a touch of wizardry in the way the Finnish people have rebuilt their country since the war. In paying Russia reparations valued at at least $570,000,000, in the eight years up to last September,[1] they achieved the seemingly impossible. The feat has attracted much attention, which is indeed deserved. But in focusing admiration on that achievement, the West has tended to overlook an even greater one—the maintenance of democracy in Finland. In the critical months of early 1948 the Finnish position was so grossly misinterpreted that in some quarters it was considered knowing to say "Czechoslovakia last week, Finland this week." And up to the time of the Olympic Games it was not uncommon to hear Finland described as virtually a Russian satellite, with the implication that if outspoken protagonists of the Western way of life ventured into Finland, they did so at their peril.

In the tense and dispiriting spring of 1948 morale in Western Europe was low as a result of a combination of economic and political setbacks. When, therefore, on February 26, Stalin addressed a personal note to the Finnish President, Juho K. Paasikivi, stating that he desired a "radical improvement" in Russo-Finnish relations and a Russo-Finnish "treaty of friendship, coöperation and mutual assistance analogous to the Hungarian-Soviet and Rumanian-Soviet treaties" everyone expected the worst. The now classical pattern of Communist domination seemed almost complete. The Prime Minister, Mauno Pekkala, was a fellow-traveler. The Minister of the Interior, Yrjö Leino, was a leading Communist, married to the most dangerous tactician in the Finnish Communist Party, Mme. Hertta Kuusinen-

[1] The basic agreement on reparations of December 17, 1944, required the delivery of goods worth 300,000,000 "reparation dollars" in six years. A "reparation dollar" was equivalent (with certain small adjustments for some categories of goods) to the 1938 U.S. dollar at its gold parity. In December 1945, the period of payment was extended to eight years. Half the deliveries were made after July 1948, with the result that final payments were worth 226,500,000 reparation dollars. Professor Bruno Suviranta estimates that this is equivalent to $570,000,000 (current U.S.) on the assumption that the Finnish mark is overvalued. The Bank of Finland, using official exchange rates, gives a figure of $720,000,000. In Professor Suviranta's calculation the whole Finnish war indemnity, including reparations, amounted to $949,000,000 (*cf. Nordiska Foreningsbanken's* Quarterly Review, No. 3, August 1952, p. 77).

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Leino, daughter of Otto Kuusinen, the President of the Finno-Karelian S.S.R. and onetime head of the inglorious puppet government set up by the Russians when they attacked Finland in November 1939. Her first husband, Tuure Lehen, an authority on street fighting, now a Russian citizen and Red Army brigadier, was training "barricade squads." The reorganized State Police were being developed under an ardent Party member into an instrument of Communist control directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The Minister of Justice was a fellow-traveler, the Minister of Social Affairs a Communist. Indeed, the whole Cabinet had a definitely pro-Communist bias.

Communists and fellow-travelers held 51 seats in a Parliament of 200 members and had received 24 percent of the total vote in the 1945 general elections. The Communist following in the trade unions was large and the Party controlled several key unions, among them the forest and transport workers. The Army was proving a more difficult nut to crack. There was not one Communist sympathizer among the officers, but in the lower ranks there was a sprinkling of Finns who had been trained as officers in the Red Army and were active in various ex-servicemen's organizatons. By the terms of the Reparations Agreement the Russians seemed to have an economic stranglehold on the country with almost limitless opportunities for political pressure, and the guns of the Red Army covered the Finnish capital from the new Russian base at Porkkala-Ud.

But, if one looked more closely, one saw that though the Communist tide had swept an alarming distance inland, it had reached a high-water mark; the solid obstacle with which it was confronted was, simply, the Finnish character. If any single factor is to be selected to account for the failure of the Finnish Communists, it is just that—the dogged patriotism and bold shrewdness of the Finns. Moreover, the historical experiences of the Finns were very different from those of the unfortunate Czechs. The Finns are not Slavs and have never entertained any Pan-Slav dreams which might incline them to take a too rosy view of Russian imperialism, whether under Tsar or Commissar. They have never been confused by any supposition that they were destined to play the rôle of a bridge between West and East. For centuries they have looked on themselves as an output of Western civilization: the Finnish lion on the country's coat of arms tramples a scimitar underfoot, while brandishing a straight "Cru-

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sader" sword. Nor have the Finnish people cause to fear German irredentism, the other great complicating factor for the Czechs.

Furthermore, the influences that helped to produce a large Communist Party in Finland served to unite non-Communists. At that time I had the illuminating and encouraging experience of hearing a leading Finnish industrialist describe how he, a staunch conservative and thorough capitalist, was deliberately aiding the Social Democrats in their activities aimed at thwarting the Communists. "I abhor Socialist policies," he said, "but I realize that our Social Democrats are the spearhead of our national resistance to Communism and possible foreign control, and to that extent I give them all the help I can." His help in this case had consisted of permission to hold union elections in working hours in the factory. The result was that every worker attended and the Communists, heavily outvoted, lost control of the important local branch of a key union which they had earlier gained by their customary device of spinning out meetings until only Communists remained to vote on crucial issues.

In the general mood of 1945, and particularly since Russia had treated Finland better than had been feared, it was not surprising that many Finns supported the party which seemed to offer the best chance of obtaining reasonable treatment from their mighty neighbor and late enemy. Nevertheless, the number of Communist Party members proper was, in early 1948, only about 35,000, or about one-tenth of the voting strength of the Communist-affiliated Democratic League. In a population of just under 4,000,000, however, with a pro-Communist vote of more than ten times the Party membership, this might well have been sufficient to ensure a Communist triumph. In the event, although the "workers militia," such as it was, did make a vague attempt to emulate the recent triumphs of their Czechoslovak comrades, the Communists never came near to gaining control.

Squabbles between the "Parliamentarists" and the "Activists" in the Party leadership prevented agreement on a Communist plan of campaign. And the Social Democrats, after a period of uncertainty and divided counsels, had begun by 1947 to regroup their forces. In the early summer of 1948, it was not uncommon to hear Communists complain of "unfair" penetration of their organizations by the Social Democrats. This renewal of confidence by the Socialists provided a rallying-point in Parliament against the more dangerous manœuvres of the Cabinet. In May, a vote

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of no confidence was passed on Leino, the Communist Minister of the Interior, and when he refused to resign he was dismissed, under Article 36 of the Form of Government Act, which states that Members of the Council of State "must enjoy the confidence of the Diet," and which the stout and cool Finns had the nerve to apply.

The Finnish Constitution divides the executive power between the President and the Cabinet. As a result the President, particularly one so wise, experienced and forceful as M. Paasikivi, is always able to control the Cabinet to some extent. Indeed, as a last resort, he may dismiss it. Moreover, as happened during the Popular Democratic (Communist) régime, President and Parliament together can prevent the Cabinet from carrying out an extreme policy. Thus, the nature of the Finnish Constitution helped frustrate the customary Communist technique of gaining control of the whole machinery of government by gaining control of the Cabinet. It was aided by the stubborn determination of the Finn to see that his constitution is observed.

Of the other standard components of a Communist coup, the Army, as already noted, was barely affected by Communist intrigues, and the ordinary police—not the Communist-led State Police—were similarly immune. They were not under the orders of the Minister of the Interior, but of the local civil authorities. This had the valuable effect, on occasion, of virtually limiting the authority of the Communist Minister of the Interior to Helsinki, and there his few hundred ruffians were vastly outnumbered. Finally, the trade unions as a body were increasingly anti-Communist.

One other factor in the Finnish situation was unusual. The policy of the Kremlin, as distinct from the activities of the local Communist Party, was correct and at times almost helpful. Indeed, two staunch Communists who took part in the Finno-Russian treaty negotiations are said to have been so disillusioned by their revered leader's readiness to disregard them and treat with bourgeois members of the delegation that they took to the bottle and drank themselves out of politics. Various rather unconvincing explanations of this Russian restraint are offered: that Finnish reparation deliveries were too valuable to be jeopardized; that Stalin was repaying a debt for good treatment which he received during a short stay in Finland as a political refugee in his early days; that the Finns, from long coexistence, know how to

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handle the Russians, and so on. The truth seems more likely to be simply that it pays Russia at present to leave Finland alone. An independent Finland ensures a neutral Sweden and supplies certain useful goods; and it provides an illustration of Russian toleration that is valuable for propaganda purposes. Be that as it may, the net result of all these factors was that only the active intervention of the Red Army would have been able to impose Communism on the unwilling Finns in early 1948. And by that time such an action could no longer have been confined to Finland.

II

Such, then, was the general mood of confidence when a Social Democratic Government took office at the end of July. Elections at the beginning of that month had reduced the Popular Democrats' following in the Diet to 38 members, with a corresponding gain for the Socialist and the bourgeois parties. The very act of forming a Social Democratic régime was a risk, for the Finnish Communists and Moscow Radio kept threatening dire results from such an "anti-Soviet" move. But the risk that Karl-August Fagerholm, Social Democratic Prime Minister, then took has been handsomely justified, for in the next year and a half his government set the country on a firm foundation as a free and democratic state. The stress of war, the influence of the Allied Control Commission and the activities of the Popular Democratic Cabinet had all tended to reduce the power of the Diet. M. Fagerholm's conduct of affairs during his term of office not only restored it to its rightful position but raised its authority to new heights.

It was not easy for him to do this, for the largest party in Parliament was not the Socialists, but the Agrarians, who had 56 seats against 54 Social Democrats. Their leader, Urho Kekkonen, was an able man and an ambitious politician. He felt slighted by his Party's exclusion from office, and his personal relations with M. Fagerholm were not of the best. He therefore began a series of attacks which three times in 1949 came within an ace of bringing the Fagerholm Government down. The reasons for his failure are significant. First, all non-Communist parties except the Agrarians supported the Social Democrats in the critical votes, feeling that a party triumph over the Socialists was too big a price to pay for the possible return to office of the Communists. And,

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second, an influential part of the Agrarian Party itself counselled restraint. It is an encouraging fact, and greatly to M. Kekkonen's credit that, now in office, he has so matured that in March and October of last year it was he who disciplined his own followers with the threat of resignation in order to obtain their support for measures which benefited the nation rather than the party.

The Fagerholm Government abolished the infamous State Police, after a commission of inquiry revealed not only that it had grossly exceeded its powers (by tapping Cabinet Ministers' telephone lines, among other practices), but also that most of its members lacked educational qualifications, and that many had criminal records. This was the last of a series of battles in a campaign already won. The government was addressing itself with success to the more prosaic but not less important task of damping down inflation when M. Paasikivi began his second term as President on March 1, 1950. But the Social Democrat Government, in accordance with Finnish political tradition, had to hand in its resignation at that time.

It was hoped—and half expected—that the next government would be a "Red-Green" coalition between the Socialists and the Agrarians, which the Socialists had favored for nearly two years. But in the middle of March, M. Kekkonen formed a predominantly Agrarian régime without Socialist participation. It was generally interpreted as a move toward more cordial relations with Russia. When Finns explain their policy toward the U.S.S.R. they are given to speaking of the "Paasikivi line." In essence, this means an acknowledgement of the fact that Russia has legitimate strategic interests in Finland, which it is folly to deny, and that up to a certain point Finland must, and will, collaborate with Russia. But it also means that all non-Communist Finns will oppose any Russian advance beyond a certain point —in other words, that the Finns must honorably carry out their obligations to the Soviet Government, but will oppose the spread of Russian-sponsored Communism inside their country. The general line of demarcation is fairly clear. But there are sometimes strong disagreements on its application. Granted, for example, it is said, that Finland must admit that certain Soviet interests are legitimate: should it be Finnish policy to help the Soviets secure them, or should the Finns merely not oppose the Russians in their efforts? For example, when Prime Minister Kekkonen made his now famous statement from his sick-bed in January 1952, to

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the effect that the Swedish policy of neutrality should be adopted by all the Scandinavian countries, he was making what the Finns call an "active" application of the Paasikivi line, for which he was criticized by M. Fagerholm. Earlier, in June 1950, the Kekkonen Government had concluded a five-year trade agreement with the Soviet Union, hoping thereby to find use for the industries which had been built in order to supply reparations to Russia.

On January 17, 1950, after a period of labor unrest, which included the threat of a general strike, M. Kekkonen at last agreed to a coalition of seven Agrarians, seven Social Democrats and three members of minor parties. The formation of this coalition, reorganized in January 1951, marked a new epoch in postwar Finnish politics. The sterling work of M. Fagerholm's Government had secured the continued existence of democratic government in Finland. The coalition now set about building on this foundation a stronger and more durable structure than the previously narrow interpretation of party loyalties had permitted. It is a development that does great credit to the political sagacity and patriotism of the Finnish leaders and one which gives encouragement and pleasure to Finland's foreign friends. Of course, old habits die hard, and there are plenty of internal stresses in the government. But the really significant aspect of the situation is the fact that they are no longer allowed to disrupt it.

This development was undoubtedly helped by the export boom of 1951. The Finnish net national income then rose to 611 milliard marks, an increase of 32 percent over 1950 at current prices, and of 10 percent at fixed prices. When there is prosperity all round, there is likely to be little disagreement on economic matters. But when times are bad, sectional interests tend to predominate as each party strives to maintain its own position at the expense of the others.

Times are bad now. The 1952 balance of trade is expected to show a deficit of 15 to 20 milliard marks; and the harvest was ruined by the catastrophic autumn weather. Thus it was not surprising that, last October, certain elements in the Agrarian Party, which had opposed M. Kekkonen in spring when prices for farm produce were fixed, again protested against the restraints which the government's policy, in the interests of economic stability, imposed on agricultural incomes. Yet once again M. Kekkonen, after resigning for a week, prevailed. For to have given in to the sectional interests of his more extreme supporters

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would have made nonsense of the whole policy of stabilization which, after many difficulties, had been thrashed out and applied so successfully in the previous two years.

III

This conscious and sustained drive for political unity based on economic stability affords strong grounds for a reasonably optimistic view of Finland's future—assuming always that she is left to her own devices. The country's outstanding weakness is twofold. She depends on virtually a single commodity (forest products) for her vital foreign trade; and her whole economy has been distorted and her costs inflated in the process of paying reparations.

As early as the middle of 1948 a committee was set up to work out a long-term plan for counteracting the potentially adverse effects on Finland's economy of the ending of reparations payments, and although no full report has been published, the main points of the committee's proposals are known. Agricultural output is to be increased until Finland can produce sufficient food for herself and, if possible, eventually export grain. The metal industry in the long run will probably be scaled down, though the industry is resisting this recommendation, since NATO's strategic controls on trade with Russia in other Western European countries hold out the prospect of increasing orders for Finland from the Soviet bloc. But, in the long run, reduction of Finland's metal industry is undoubtedly sound on both economic and political grounds. The growth of this industry has included a development of mining, mainly iron at Otanmäki and copper at Outokumpu and Ylöjärvi, and of steel production; but though all this is intrinsically valuable, it is not likely to solve the problem of selling machinery at a competitive cost on the world market.

The vital forest industry is to be rationalized and reëquipped. Various changes in financial policy, in particular an increase in rents, are also suggested. But the main aim in this sector is to ensure continued stability while channeling investment into specific projects to increase the country's productive capacity. Arrears of capital investment have to be made up. Financial policy has included the ruthless and realistic use of the bank note to stop inflation; the official minimum rate is 5.75 percent at the time of writing. For most of 1951 it was as high as 7.75 percent.

It may also be noted that over the last two or three years repa-

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rations have been less of a burden on Finland than rearmament has been on other Western countries. Finland's expenditure for defense is very small, since her armed forces are strictly limited by the Peace Treaty. Indeed, in 1950, 1951 and 1952, expenditure on reparations and defense together ran at only about 2.5 percent of the gross national product. Now that the Finns have proved to themselves what they really can do when faced with a stiff problem, they have a new pride in developing the country; and what is more, they have learned that they can afford to do it. Perhaps this outlook is best epitomized in the book which M. Kekkonen produced last spring with the significant title, "Has Our Country the Patience to Prosper?" The industrialization of northern Finland, where schemes are afoot to convert the Kemi Valley into a miniature T.V.A., is the most dramatic of the visions. But the true significance of this book, as of the work of the long-term planning committee, is that they suggest that Finland, having triumphantly paid off enormous war indemnities, has a new "cause" which captures the imagination of the people. The road to success in the development of Finland is not short or easy. The opposition of a section of M. Kekkonen's own supporters to his program shows that many problems will have to be met. Fluctuations on world markets will add to Finland's difficulties. But in the light of the achievement since 1945, one would indeed be a pessimist to discount the ability of the Finns to plod along their road to the end.

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GERMAN LABOR ASKS CO-MANAGEMENT

By Hedwig Wachenheim

THE vote of the Bonn Parliament in May 1951 conceding "co-management" to labor in the coal, iron and steel industries of Western Germany was an international sensation, raising the question whether a new form of Socialism had appeared in Germany. Ever since its foundation in 1949, the German Trade Union Federation has sought *Mitbestimmungsrecht*—the right of labor to share in the management of industrial firms as well as in decisions on national economic planning. Its object has been to establish labor in a key position in the new German state while the social and political forces of the Federal Republic were still in flux, and to use this strength in fighting for full employment and a higher standard of living. In 1952 the issue again became acute. The Government invited the Federation to join a committee on productivity which the Vice-Chancellor sought to establish under his auspices. The Trade Union Federation countered with demands for a national economic council on which it would have equal representation with industry, as well as the extension of co-determination to workers in all major industries, including the public service. It backed its demands by a series of strikes; and negotiations last July between the Federation and the Government broke down almost as soon as they had started.

The strikes of last May were intended to warn Chancellor Adenauer against making a bargain with the right wing of his Government, by which he would oppose further extension of co-management in return for support for the Contractual Agreement being negotiated with the Western Allies. But this attempt of the unions to bring pressure upon the legislature aroused public indignation. Chancellor Adenauer, taking advantage of the opportunity to dispose of the unions' demands while the public mood was unfavorable to them, and to eliminate the issue before the debate on foreign relations, pressed for acceptance of a new law on co-management which gave labor much less than it wanted. The unions pleaded for postponement; but on July 20 the law was enacted by the Bundestag, against the opposition of the Social Democrats. The measure was likewise accepted by the Bundesrat. There was some talk of a general strike, but the Fed-

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eration dropped the idea and announced that it would fight the law by democratic means. The election of a new president of the Federation, Walter Freitag, at the congress in October 1952, was a result of resentment at defeat and a sense of insecurity in the unions' general position.

The history of labor's demand for co-management goes back to 1920, when an act of the Weimar Republic provided for the establishment of works councils in industry and their representation on some boards of directors. In fact, this law gave labor little power over management; but after the Second World War it provided the inspiration for a set of laws establishing plant councils in eight of the 11 West German states. On these councils labor had the right of proposal, consultation and even of veto in "economic matters," such as methods of production, plant expansion, reduction of jobs and mergers; in one state it was even granted the right of consultation and initiatory advice on investments. In some *Laender* the works councils had two seats, a minority on the company boards of directors.

General Clay suspended the provisions of laws which went beyond the old German act of 1920, on the ground that such questions should not be decided in advance of the establishment of a Federal Republic. High Commissioner McCloy lifted General Clay's veto, however, on April 1, 1950, since no federal legislation had been introduced. The new law which caused the uproar last summer is a composite measure which includes parts of three different drafts which had been submitted by Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and the Government in 1950.

The unions claim that the new law offers only the pretense of co-management; and, in fact, they enjoy fewer powers under it than they possessed under the *Laender* acts. The "economic matters" to which it applies are production and labor methods, the production program, and the market and economic conditions of the enterprise. In plants with 100 or more workers, so-called economic committees, on which the employer and labor have equal representation, must be kept informed on these topics. The works council is given what the law explicitly calls co-management in questions involving reduction of staff or lay-offs, moving of plants, mergers, basic changes in the purpose of the plant or plant structure unless evidently required by market conditions, and new working methods unless based on technical progress. If differences of interest between employer and labor cannot be

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reconciled, the employer or the works council may appeal to a board of mediators. The finding of the board is not binding on the employer, though the workers will receive special protection if lay-offs become necessary because of failure of the employers to follow the board's recommendation. Representatives of the employees, elected by secret ballot, will occupy one-third of the seats on the board of directors. If only one or two representatives are to be chosen, they must come from actual employees of the company; if more than two seats are to be filled, "outsiders," *i.e.* union representatives, may be selected to fill the additional seats. Because of special features of German law governing the number of members of boards of directors few representatives of unions outside the plants will in practice be members of the works councils. Moreover, by defining the matters that come under co-management the new Act thereby excludes all others; the 1951 Act does not define the scope of co-management but simply establishes it by seating labor on the boards of directors, giving the workers the same number of seats as shareholders.[1] It also permits the unions to fill three-fifths of the labor seats and to control the nominations made by the works council.

Under German law, a company is run not by the board of directors but by a board of managers. The board of directors appoints the managers, supervises them and receives their report. It also submits its proposal on the amount of dividend to the general meeting of the shareholders. The 1951 Act compels the board of directors to appoint to the board of managers a labor manager, who has equal rights with the others; he cannot be chosen or discharged except by agreement with the labor representatives on the board of directors. In the 23 iron companies in which co-management was first established, the board of managers was three in number—a technical, a commercial and a labor director. The unions assumed that the boards in general would be similarly composed. The labor manager is understood to be responsible for the social and personnel problems in the plant, though his duties are not necessarily limited to that field. The new Act makes no provision for a labor director. Neither the 1951 Act nor the new Act provides for profit-sharing, which is generally rejected by the unions.

[1] Under the 1951 Act, the board of directors of 11 members has four who represent shareholders, four who represent labor, two more who represent the interest of labor and management but are not employed by either the company or the unions, plus one neutral member, chosen by an elaborate procedure which may go to the courts.

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There is as yet little evidence as to how co-management in the coal, iron and steel industries actually works. Elections to the boards of directors of the existing companies were concluded only recently, and some of the companies to be organized under Allied law are not yet functioning. In the firms in which co-management has been practised during the last five years, absenteeism has decreased, work has been speeded up, and board decisions have been unanimous. But these firms have had no owners, and management had authority only over production; planning and investment were done by the German Trustee Administration. To what degree the companies in the three industries will be independent in the future, or subordinated to some combine, or to government control, is still uncertain; the Schuman Plan will not work without such control. The unions favor the control of prices and the allocation of raw materials.

There has been an increase in the daily production of coal from an average of 392,490 metric tons in all of 1951 to 402,000 in the last quarter of 1951 and to 411,266 tons during the first quarter of 1952. *Deutsche Zeitung,* of Stuttgart, has attributed the increase partly to co-management, on the grounds that it has removed the workers' fear that increased efficiency will harm their interests, and partly to effects of a return of entrepreneurial responsibility. There has been no drop in man-hour production in these industries.

Observers in the Ruhr are doubtful whether the miners' and metal workers' unions, and the German Trade Union Federation, have sufficient trained and experienced personnel to fill the positions on the boards of directors. Moreover, trade unionists abroad tend to be skeptical about the value of the experiment. When Christian Fette, then President of the German Trade Union Federation, spoke enthusiastically about *Mitbestimmungsrecht* to the Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Milan in June 1951, the delegates remained cool. They feared the syndicalist tendencies of the German program, and doubted the wisdom of involving labor unions so deeply in the risks of enterprise and of burdening them with the responsibilities of management. A committee was set up to study the question. Privately some German Social Democrats expressed the same doubts. Officially, however, the S.P.D. has supported the program. It cannot afford to antagonize the unions, and has had no program of its own to substitute.

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German union leaders do not deny that it offers problems for them. After 1920 they feared for years that the works councils might lead the workers to think mainly of improving conditions in individual plants, and make them less concerned about class solidarity. The works councils, which have helped the trade unions supervise the execution of wage agreements and labor laws, seem never to have had this effect; but the unions have always favored centralization. In the inter-war years, Fritz Naphtali, the author of "Economic Democracy" (today a mem- of the Israeli Government), stressed the danger to economic planning not only of what was called "company egoism," but also of the organization of employer-labor boards by industries; he emphasized the need of national control.

After their rebirth in 1945, the trade unions came out for economic planning by the two "social partners"—employers and labor. Government hardly existed then. Socialization of key industries was so popular at the time that some of the *Laender* constitutions included it as an objective. In 1947 when the British offered co-management in some individual plants the unions had a large membership but were inactive since wages were controlled by the occupation Powers. Records had been destroyed and many of the old labor leaders were dead or abroad. The idea of entering the citadels of the former Ruhr tycoons appeared as a revolutionary step toward the socialization of the most important of all the key industries. South German labor leaders who had no *Vereinigte Stahlwerke* to enter, and had some contacts with American labor through the labor organizers whom the United States Army had included in Military Government, were much less enthusiastic about co-management. Today the Trade Union Federation holds that its own participation in co-management will eliminate the dangers of "company egoism."

II

Is co-management a new form of Socialism? Those who support the movement say that it is not, arguing that for labor to take a 50 percent share in management in a firm which is just returning to production is not "expropriation." Socialists say that it will not end the "anarchy of production" and must not "be allowed to reach a point where plant syndicalism becomes strong enough to hinder economic planning"—the essence of Socialism; they believe that the effect of co-management is very different from

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the effect of nationalization. The German Federation of Trade Unions continued to champion socialization of key industries after co-management was introduced in the most important steel firms. Current international Socialist theory holds that with the concentration of industry and banking that has taken place since the days of Marx, socialization of key industries and credit makes economic planning possible, and modern Socialist programs and practice have long been aligned with this change in theory. None of the German postwar socialization programs has gone beyond this. When the German Trade Union Federation demands co-management for all firms with at least 100 workers, it thinks of it as "the necessary supplement of political democracy" in the field of business, rather than as of an instrument of socialization. Under the stimulus of the depression of 1929 to 1934, the war, and the present defense program, powerful devices for the control of national economies have been developed without recourse to Socialism. If unions are vigilant labor can benefit greatly from these new practices, as the example of the United States demonstrates. It is to these devices that the German unions are gradually turning as Western thinking influences them more and more.

During 1951 the German Trade Union Federation increased its membership from 5,500,000 to approximately 6,000,000—that is, 39 percent of the labor force. This includes 47.2 percent of the men and 21.2 percent of the women. Of the employees in commerce, banking and insurance only 2.6 percent are in the Federation; the white collar workers in these trades have preferred membership in the separate *Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft* to membership in the industrial unions. The total also includes workers in gardening, forestry and agriculture where organization is traditionally low—now about 11 percent. Miners and leather workers are more than 90 percent organized; railroad, printing and paper workers are almost 80 percent within the trade unions. The metal workers, who compose the Federation's largest union, are more than 60 percent organized.

Since 1945 the unions have avoided the split into Free (Socialist), Christian and liberal unions which before 1933 embraced, respectively, 85 percent, 12 percent and 3 percent of the trade unionists. This does not mean that union members do not have political preferences; it is generally assumed than 10 percent of the membership of the Federation is Communist, that another 10

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percent would belong to Christian unions if such unions existed, while the others are Social Democrats. Perhaps 10 to 15 percent of those put down as Social Democrats really have no political affiliation. All the members of the Executive Board of the Federation are Social Democrats except the First Vice-President and the Women's Secretary, who are Christian Democrats; also 15 of the 16 presidents of the industrial unions and the nine chairmen of the regional federations are Social Democrats. The hold of S.P.D. on the union membership is due to the old attraction of Socialism for the workers. But the unions are eager to maintain their independence from political control. Last year, after the death of Hans Boeckler, the Federation's first President, Dr. Schumacher tried to have Walter Freitag, a member of the S.P.D. group in Bundestag and the president of the metal workers, chosen to replace him. But the election went to Christian Fette, the President of the printers' union, who is a member of the S.P.D., though he holds no party office. This result was reversed in October with the election of Walter Freitag.

Social Democrat union leaders think that the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which has headquarters in Holland, hopes to set up separate Christian unions in Germany, but their Christian Democrat colleagues in Germany seem eager to maintain unity in the German trade union movement. Whether the "Christian" group would resist pressure from the Roman Catholic Church is another question. Dr. Adenauer, who is head of political Catholism in Germany, could hardly desire such a split now. His own Party, which set out to unite Catholics and Protestants in German politics in 1945, is now rent by dissensions and it would be very difficult for the Catholics to carry many Protestants with them if they seceded from the unions. The Catholic attitude may alter if the Government parties decide to combine their votes in the coming Bundestag election. Herr Freitag must then show wisdom, courage and flexibility—in short, statesmanship—if he wants to avoid a split in the unions which might easily put the Government groups and the Social Democrats so far apart that German democracy would no longer work. The Communists are so weak that they cannot even threaten to split the Federation. All they can do is to induce union members to voice their grievances more noisily than they would do otherwise. Union leaders have freed the works councils from Communist domination.

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Though the German trade unions seek to keep free of control by political parties, they are not, of course, aloof from politics—an impossibility at a time when the scale of employment and the level of real wages is a function of government to an ever increasing degree. The unions have never found a satisfactory technique for political activity to replace the methods of their former affiliations. The American principle, "reward your friends and punish your enemies," does not work in a country where the approach to politics is so emotional and where party lines are so rigid. The unions have tried to lobby, to march in and out of government committees, and to publicize their program and to strike. They consider co-management in coal, iron and steel a great victory. But they have also suffered defeats before the setback this summer. Bonn has not yet passed the measure for holidays for workers introduced in the south by *Laender* legislation. And labor has suffered a reduction in representation in the joint labor-management boards which administer the sickness funds; from Bismarck's time, they have had a two-thirds vote on these boards, but now share a straight 50–50 representation with management. Unions also complain that the local employment agencies, which the unions formerly administered on equal terms with the employers, have now been bureaucratized.

The idea of co-determination, which seems to many Americans an impractical and doctrinaire notion, will perhaps become more understandable in the United States if it is seen—as German workers see it—as a much-needed method by which German labor can influence the processes of government. German workers not only seek places in the management of industry but also want to participate on terms of equality on the regional Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Crafts which have administrative functions. Labor's objective is the establishment by law of a national economic council where the two "social partners"—and they alone—shall have equal rights. The council would issue programs but not regulations, and its programs would not be binding on government. The employers who have fought co-management (though not the works councils) reject union membership in the Chambers of Commerce and of Crafts. They do not oppose a national economic council.

III

A new wage program is now being developed by the unions

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and the Mutual Security Agency. Instead of being tied to prices, which keeps real wages at the same level, wages would rise with the increase of productivity, thus bringing labor a higher standard of living as its efficiency rose. There has been a slight trend for wage increases to go beyond rises in prices during the last year and a half. Shortly before the currency reform in June 1948, a wage rise of 15 percent was allowed by the occupation authorities. For about nine months after the reform, union leaders refrained from making wage demands in order to allow industry and commerce to reorganize production and exports. Wage rises at that time were mainly due to the earlier authorization, and to increased hours. At the beginning of 1950, the index of prices was 155 and that of wages 142, using the year 1938 as a base, or 100. In June 1950, when the cost of living was dropping, wages continued to rise. By the end of that year the cost of living had again risen 10 percent, while wages rose 20 percent. Up to September 1951, the rise in wages continued to exceed the rise in prices.

The average monthly pay of a male wage-earner was slightly above DM320 ($80) for a 49-hour week at the end of 1951. In June 1952, top monthly wages were at DM480. Although this appears very low to American eyes, the tendency in Germany is the same as it is in the United States— wages of manual labor generally exceed or at least cover the rise in prices. The increase in wages of salaried employees and intellectuals (except technicians and some other limited groups in industry) lags behind the rise in prices. In Germany, wage increases have been gained through direct bargaining with the employers, without government arbitration.

Herr Vom Hoff, Secretary of Economic Affairs for the Federation, recently announced that the unions consented to the new wage policy. Necessary incentives to higher productivity were, he said, an increase in investments to eliminate the bottlenecks in mining, steel, electrical power and housing, and "a different climate in the plants and beyond."

To counter the general malfunctioning of the capital market a law was passed in January 1952 under which one billion Deutsche Marks are to be levied from industry. Union leaders, together with representatives of government and private enterprise, sit on the board administering the "aid." The law is only a preliminary measure, since approximately seven billion Deutsche Marks are needed. When the law on co-management in coal, iron and steel

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was discussed in 1951, some opponents of the measure contended that private capital, which so far has preferred investment in consumption industries, would no longer be freely available in these industries or in other heavy industries where labor would be seated on the boards of directors. Advocates of the measure replied that private capital will pursue profits, and that profits are in prospect in these industries now that the restrictions imposed on production, sales and prices have been lifted. Continued government aid to organize the market will probably be needed, however. By stating that higher wages are conditioned on investment in these industries, Hans Vom Hoff has indicated the willingness of the union to coöperate with private capital. At the same time he proclaimed that union goals are a higher standard of living for labor, secured by genuine co-management, and union participation in economic planning, beginning with the planning of investments.

IV

The present resentment of the unions against the Government will not affect the passage of the Contractual Agreement with the Allies. The unions have no seats in the Bundestag, and the Social Democratic "no" is an old story. When the unions say that they will fight the new law by democratic means, they are referring to next year's elections, not to the vote on the agreement itself.

In a press conference last January at which Christian Fette was present, Herr Vom Hoff stated that he favored Western preparations for defense against aggression. Protest telegrams poured into the Federation's headquarters in Düsseldorf. The Executive Board thereupon decided not to take a public stand on the question of German rearmament, fearing that if it did so the suppressed differences of opinion on this subject within the Social Democratic Party would come into the open in the union locals and tear them apart. Nonetheless, the unions did not want to follow Dr. Schumacher into the impasse into which he had led his party. The recent union congress sought to maintain this same balance by rejecting, as not within its competence, a motion to oppose the Contractual Agreement, while at the same time ostentatiously dropping Hans Vom Hoff from the Executive Board.

Dr. Schumacher was set on winning the next election and

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therefore opposed the Government at every point. His emphatic "no" to the Western contracts was the consequence of his domestic policy. His deputy, Carlo Schmid, reflected the opinions of many Germans when he said recently[2] that the German objectives in negotiation with the West are full German sovereignty, German participation in NATO and in Western Europe as an equal partner, settlement of the Saar issue on German terms, the end of French attempts to obtain German coal, and unity with the East Zone. Yet the Social Democratic Party, which has not abandoned Dr. Schumacher's line, cannot be said to have a real foreign policy unless it can offer an alternative to coöperation with the West. And it cannot offer any alternative since it is against German neutrality and against the unity of Germany under Russian auspices—which, it knows, it could not possibly survive.

The unions perceive that coöperation with the West is essential for the survival of German democracy, the maintenance of free trade unions and the achievement of a bearable standard of living for the German worker. They coöperate with the West in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and favor the O.E.E.C., the Schuman Plan and other such developments. Nevertheless, they do not follow Dr. Adenauer's policy without reservations. They are afraid that his present Government will not prevent the return of the old officers' caste when the new armed forces are organized, and they oppose what they consider to be his attempts to build Western Europe on a capitalist and conservative basis. Since High Commissioner McCloy gave such strong support to Dr. Adenauer, United States foreign policy is thought to share these preferences. The unions consider this policy shortsighted, insisting that labor is too strong to be circumvented and that European institutions can be organized only with labor's help. To frustrate the quest of labor for a higher standard of living will bring serious disturbances, they say, which will play into Communist hands.

[2] "Germany and Europe: The German Social Democratic Program," by Carlo Schmid, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1952.

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PORTUGAL'S STRATEGIC TERRITORIES

By Jose Shercliff

SINCE the ninth meeting of the Atlantic Pact nations in Lisbon in February last, Portugal, the little seaboard country that looks out across the Atlantic toward the Americas, has developed a community consciousness which is the mark of her absorption into the common defense of Western civilization.

Portugal is lacking in heavy industry and is not in a position to contribute to the common cause on a large scale with raw materials and troops. Fully mobilized, her Army numbers 700,000 men, now rapidly being equipped with modern American and British matériel. Her Air Force is small and in the event of war seems destined to be used more for scouting and Atlantic rescue work than for combat. Her Navy comprises about 60 vessels, counting training ships, hydrographic ships and patrol boats; but it does not include a cruiser, battleship or aircraft carrier. Experts say that the Portuguese Navy is at least ten units below desirable strength, and although sloops, destroyers and submarines now regularly exercise with the other Pact fleets off the Atlantic coast, no program has yet been set in motion to remedy this deficiency.

Portugal's neutrality during the last war, and the loan of her Azores bases to the Allies within the framework of the 600-year-old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, showed that her adjacent islands are of immense strategic value in warfare in the Atlantic. Last year the United States concluded an agreement with Portugal for the use of the full facilities of these bases in peace and war. The agreement also provided that the same facilities should be extended to Great Britain in the case of war, and that American officers should train Portuguese personnel at the Lajens air base.

With the threat to world peace coming from the East, all of Portugal's vast overseas Empire assumes importance. Her overseas possessions—East and West—cover some 2,170,276 square kilometers. Their coastlines, not including those of the adjacent islands, stretch along 5,534 kilometers of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans or of other Asiatic seaboard. They vary in size from the vast 1,246,700 square kilometer tract of Angola in Africa to tiny Macao, 16 kilometers square, on the coast of China.

The strategic significance of the Azores hardly needs emphasis. The Cape Verde Islands, which hold the key to the southern part of the Atlantic, are no less important as bases, lying as they do off the French West African coast, and on the air route to the South Americas. The large airport on Sal Island is already the nucleus of what may become a strategic wartime base.

Angola and Guinea, with 1,816 kilometers of coastline on the Atlantic, may be regarded as an integral part of Atlantic defense. They also offer a vital outlet to the inland territories of Africa. Angola is an important source of foodstuffs and raw materials, producing sugar, cotton, rice, coffee, maize, sisal and vegetable oils, among other crops, as well as asphalt, copper, commercial and other diamonds, mica and manganese. Although not a natural market for the United States, wartime needs and the tremendous develop-

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ment undertaken by Portugal since 1945 have raised America's trade with Angola from 396,000 escudos in 1930 to 139,316,000 escudos in 1951.

The E.C.A. has allocated $663,000 for a refrigerated storage plant to aid cattle-raising in Angola, and a Mutual Security Agency survey has recommended a further appropriation of $178,000, with an additional $42,000 in local currency, for technical assistance in engineering and agriculture. The research would be done in conjunction with Portuguese experts, on the lines of surveys already undertaken in various other territories. Private American capital has also gone into intensive prospecting for petroleum.

Angola is bounded on the north by French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo, on the east by the Congo and Northern Rhodesia, on the south by the mandated territory of South-West Africa. Its Atlantic coastline offers at least three splendid natural harbors—Luanda, Lobito and Mossâmedes. These ports are terminals of railway networks which provide vital outlets for the raw materials of the inland territories—from the Belgian Congo via the River Congo, and from the Rhodesias.

E.C.A. has also granted $1,037,000 for the development and equipment of airports in Angola, and the most important one, Luanda, is being prepared to handle the biggest four-engined planes. In order to prepare Angola for efficient help in time of war, however, more aid is needed. The Malange railway needs to be carried to a junction with the Belgian Congo line, so that there will be direct rail transit from the Belgian Congo to the Atlantic coast. The Mossâmedes Railway to Rhodesia also needs to be extended and the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Mossâmedes should be enlarged. A recommendation has been made by the Mutual Security Agency commission for improving Mossâmedes, and a scheme for developing Lobito is under study. It must be borne in mind, however, that such surveys—into which the United States has put $1,300,000—are a matter of long-term development, and their results cannot be seen for eight or ten years. It is, therefore, the policy of the Portuguese Government to concentrate on carrying out the plans already adopted, while awaiting the general reports.

II

In the east, Portugal has four blocks of overseas territory—Mozambique, the largest, with more than 771,000 square kilometers on the east coast of Africa; Timor, off the northern coast of Australia; the two small enclaves of Portuguese India on the Indian continent; and Macao, facing Hong Kong, on the Chinese coast.

Mozambique is a rich land, with excellent ports facing the Indian Ocean and, across the Mozambique Channel, the island of Madagascar. It is bounded on the north by Tanganyika, on the west by the British Protectorate of Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the province of Transvaal of the Union of South Africa, and the British Protectorate of Swaziland. To the south lies the South African province of Natal. Like Angola, it has both agricultural and mineral resources. Recent surveys made by the Mutual Security Agency technicians in conjunction with Portuguese experts have shown that the soil can be immensely improved with the help of irrigation

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schemes made possible by hydraulic power stations, whose financing has been recommended by the American mission. The colony's minerals include iron, coal, mica, graphite and beryllium, an important metal for hardening alloys used at high temperature in jet engines and now being exported to Great Britain. There is also uranium.

The interest of E.C.A. in Mozambique's potentialities resulted in a grant of $24,000 for agricultural machinery for the sugar industry, and another grant for electrical equipment for three large airports. Other Marshall Aid has gone into the reëquipment and reconstruction of installations at the important port of Beira, which the Portuguese Government purchased from British owners in 1948. The Beira Railway and port form the only outlet to the eastern coast for the Rhodesias at present. The E.C.A. has granted $950,000 and 4,250,000 florins for immediate use in the improvement of the port and purchase of rolling stock for the railway. Work already done had raised the international traffic turnover of the port to 1,292,335 tons in 1949 and 2,230,048 in 1951. The port of Lourenço Marques is also one of the important outlets for the inland territories, and in 1950 exported more than 2,000,000 tons of South African goods. If access to the Suez Canal were denied the Western Powers in another world war, as is possible in view of the situation in the Near East, and sea traffic had to be diverted around Africa, the Mozambique Channel would assume a new importance. The Mozambique ports of Beira, Lourenço Marques and Nacala would be invaluable bases for the protection of convoys, and for combating submarine warfare waged from southern Asia.

The chief political uncertainty in Mozambique stems from the growing strength of Islamism there. The population is predominantly Roman Catholic, but there also are some 800,000 native Moslems. The Archbishop of Lourenço Marques, Cardinal Dom Teodosio Clemente de Gouveia, recently called attention to the increasing number of natives who were embracing the Moslem faith, which is both a political and religious doctrine. He pointed out that both Indian and Arabian Moslem propagandists teach Swahili to the natives, this forming a common language all along the east coast of Africa. One of the factors feared by the Portuguese as disruptive is the return of large numbers of natives who have worked in the mines on territories under other sovereignties. These they suspect of contact with ideologies opposed to those of the Portuguese régime. There is, however, no color problem, in the customary sense, in Mozambique or other Portuguese colonies. In the Portuguese overseas territories the natives live and work side by side with the whites as Portuguese citizens, absorbing Western culture gradually and without being hurried toward an independence for which their government does not consider them yet to be fitted. Native education is largely in the hands of the Catholic Church. Four years ago, however, a decree was promulgated by which state schools were established in Angola and Mozambique to teach senior pupils the rudiments of hygiene, agriculture and administration, and to prepare them to undertake responsibility side by side with the whites. The decree stressed that the social evolution of the native populations should be "without violence or shock." In so far as possible the "jazz age" is being kept out of Portuguese Africa. No such racial situation as exists in the neighboring

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Union of South Africa, for instance, is conceivable in Mozambique, and there is little or no Communism.

Problems in Portuguese India and Macao are reflections of the geographical positions of these territories, contiguous to India and China. Portuguese India consists of Goa, the first colony conquered in India, in 1510, and several very small islands and adjacent enclaves, of which Diu and Damao are the best known. Together they occupy a total area of 3,983 square kilometers, and of this area Goa itself, with its capital city of Panjim on the Gulf of Cambay, accounts for all but a few hundred. Portuguese India has no airfield, but plans are under way to build and equip one capable of taking the largest modern transport planes, thus enabling travelers to Bombay, some 300 miles distant, to avoid a 24-hour train trip or 20-day journey by sea. Mormugão, the only port, is small but is in a strategic position on the Indian Ocean. Goa's garrison is 4,000 men, equipped with modern weapons, under white officers. Under Portuguese sovereignty every Goanese is a Portuguese citizen, and the small community, unified by its prevailing Roman Catholicism—it is the seat of the Patriarchate of the Indies, under a white Head of the Church—seems indeed a peaceful oasis in the vast and agitated continent of India (as it was described recently by the Portuguese Overseas Minister, Commander Sarmento Rodrigues). Although the balance of imports over exports is computed at about five to two, the little colony is prosperous. The production of manganese is nearing 100,000 tons a year, all of which is sought by Japan, along with Goa's output of iron. The colony is also now in a position to export rice to India. Though there is always a possibility of the spread of Communism across the frontier, Portuguese administrators do not feel that there is much likelihood that it can take root, partly because of the flourishing condition of the country and also because of the pride of the inhabitants in their Portuguese citizenship.

The repeated demand that Goa be integrated in the Republic of India is, of course, a serious matter to Portugal, even though the Indian Government has affirmed that it has no desire to enforce this wish by other than peaceful methods. That an economic blockade of Goa might be included under the head of "peaceful" persuasion is a contingency which Portugal does not overlook; but the policy of her government is to entertain as friendly relations as possible with India, and to "wait and see." Any direct attack by armed force against Portuguese India might set into motion the provision under the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance by which Britain promises to aid Portugal in case of any attack against her sovereignty, as well as the machinery of the United Nations.

III

The position of the little colony of Macao, on the edge of Communist China, is somewhat similar to that of Portuguese India, but much more precarious. Although Macao does not recognize the Communist Government of China, it depends upon Red China for its food supplies. An Overseas Ministry spokesman has described the Macao Government as a "diplomatic corps" striving to maintain the present peaceful relations with its turbulent neighbor. Yet Macao is under an anti-Communist régime, and the over-

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whelming might of Red China is an immediate threat to it. Indeed, a series of border clashes took place at the end of July 1952, with casualties. Whether or not it will be overrun probably depends simply upon whether Red China calculates that such aggression would accrue to its advantage.

Macao has retained its integrity through four centuries. It was to this colony that early Christians fled from persecution in the East. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign traders from Canton made their homes there, and Protestant missionaries studied and worked in peace in Macao while knocking on China's door with their message. When China was invaded by Japan in 1937, tens of thousands of refugees swept into neutral Macao from the stricken land; the hungry were fed, the wounded cared for, the orphans housed. During the last world war, Macao was the only Far Eastern territory that was not overrun by the Japanese, and it continued its traditional task of tending the needy; during the years from 1941 to 1945, the population was swollen from 200,000 to some 500,000.

From the military point of view, Macao has little value. Its only port cannot admit vessels of more than 2,000 tons, and its garrison is for policing purposes only. In case of conflict it would constitute an observation post as in the past: but the chances that Macao would retain freedom from Communist domination in any future world conflict do not seem great.

Finally, more than half of the island of Timor, 350 kilometers from the continent of Australia, is among Portugal's Far Eastern territories. The smaller part of the island, which was formerly under Dutch rule, has been under the sovereignty of Indonesia since December 1949. Overrun by the Japanese, who planned to use it as a jumping-off base for the conquest of Australia, Timor was a devastated and ruined land at the end of the war. The Portuguese Government immediately set to work to reclaim its area, and the work of reconstruction and development, carried on entirely without E.C.A. aid, has given the colony a new lease of life. The port of Dili has been equipped for the bunkering of naval units, and the airport of Bancau on the eastern side of the territory can already be used by four-engined planes. Other airports dotted over the area furnish landing fields for smaller planes. Timor's usefulness to Australia in the event of air attack is apparent.

Even so brief a survey as this of Portugal's Empire will have made plain the strategic value to the West of the defense rampart formed by these far-flung lines. A primary characteristic of the present world situation is that whatever promises to make Communist aggression unrewarding helps to maintain peace. Given peace, these territories can, in addition, prove an increasing source of welcome supplies of food and industrial material for the commerce of the world.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS. By F. S. C. NORTHROP. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 362 p. $5.00.

As in his earlier book, "The Meeting of East and West," Professor Northrop derives social relations from the theories which men create to understand nature. Despite this narrow (and in its exposition quite technical) basis for his interpretation of social phenomena, the author does present some extremely stimulating observations on international policy. The larger part of the book is devoted to the very urgent question of Asia's negative reaction to the American effort to organize police action against Communist aggression.

LIBERTY OR EQUALITY. By ERIK VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1952, 395 p. $6.00.

A learned Austrian Roman Catholic explores the conflict, as he sees it, between liberty and equality. As a monarchist and corporativist he is critical of the conformist tendencies of the democratic tradition. His argument is illustrated by a wealth of quotations, but in some instances, as in his genealogy of National Socialism, he is more dexterous than convincing.

DEMOCRACY AT BAY. By FELIX SOMARY. New York: Knopf, 1952, 171 p. $2.50.

Reflections on the contradiction between democratic principles and the necessary measures to be taken in the present world crisis. (The Swiss edition is "Krise und Zukunft der Demokratie." Zurich: Europa, 1952, 148 p. Sw. Fr. 7.)

A DECLARATION OF FAITH. By HERBERT AGAR. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 237 p. $3.00.

In answer to the question "What is the faith of the West?" Mr. Agar reaffirms his belief in the tradition of natural law.

EAST VERSUS WEST. By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL. London: Museum Press, 1952, 220 p. 12/6.

A British general, with long experience in tank warfare, discusses the strategy of the cold war, criticizes with some acerbity the shortcomings of the British War Office, and urges greater concentration on mobile armored forces.

U.N.O. AND WAR CRIMES. By VISCOUNT MAUGHAM. London: Murray, 1951, 143 p. 12/6.

The former Lord Chancellor undertakes to establish the principle that after any future war the only persons who can justly be tried and convicted are those proven guilty of violating "the laws and usages of war." He objects to the concept of "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity."

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IN THE NAZI ERA. By Sir Lewis Namier. London: Macmillan, 1952, 203 p. (New York: St. Martin's Press, $2.25.)

In this continuation of his work on prewar diplomacy, Sir Lewis Namier comments on the memoirs and apologia of the German diplomats and soldiers associated while completing the study, and a collaborator, Luciano Magrini, prepared it for on the year of the Munich crisis. Essentially a collection of review essays, the book displays the author's familiar penetration and astringency.

PEACE IN THEIR TIME. By Robert H. Ferrell. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952, 293 p. $4.00.

An able monograph on the curious origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Seeing the agreement to renounce war as the product of some very shrewd diplomacy and some very unsophisticated popular enthusiasm in the United States, the author treats the subject wittily but with rather intrusive irony.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1914. VOLUME I: EUROPEAN RELATIONS FROM THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN TO THE EVE OF THE SARAJEVO MURDER. By Luigi Albertini. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 612 p. $9.00.

The first of three volumes translating the most extensive history of the origins of the First World War since the works of Fay and Schmitt. Albertini died in 1941 with the Hitler régime, and considers the new information which has been published publication. The Italian edition, "Le Origini della Guerra del 1914" (Milan: Bocca), appeared in 1945. Despite its comparatively recent appearance most of the sources employed are the familiar diplomatic collections, and a good deal of important material has appeared since Albertini's death. It is valuable, however, for filling out the picture of Italian and Mediterranean diplomacy. The author was highly critical of the "old" diplomacy and of the irresponsibility of German policy, particularly as practised by Bülow.

THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND. Collected by Irving Dilliard. New York: Knopf, 1952, 262 p. $3.50.

A collection of non-legal addresses and papers over a period of 58 years by one of America's great judges.

IN ONE EAR. By Eric Sevareid. New York: Knopf, 1952, 258 p. $2.95.

A collection of Mr. Sevareid's brief and graceful radio commentaries on the events of the day.

THE RISE OF MODERN COMMUNISM. By Massimo Salvadori. New York: Holt, 1952, 118 p. $2.00.

A concise and able introduction.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

LAND FOR TOMORROW. By L. Dudley Stamp. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1952, 230 p. $4.00.

A British geographer, an authority on the subject, discusses the prospects of utilizing the world's undeveloped land resources. He concludes that the middle latitudes show the greatest promise and is not very optimistic about the potentialities of the Tropics.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CO-OPERATION, 1945–52. By Brian Tew. New York: Longmans, 1952, 180 p. $2.25. (London: Hutchinson, 8/6.)

About half this useful handbook describes the operation of the International

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Monetary Fund, the European Payments Union and the agreements that preceded it, and the sterling area. The rest of the space is largely given to an introductory treatment of international monetary problems.

THINKING AHEAD FOR BUSINESS. Edited by Edward C. Bursk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 215 p. $3.25.

Articles considering "the major political, economic and sociological forces throughout the world which promise to have such a profound effect on the future course of American business." The book is based on a conference sponsored by the Harvard Business School Association.

A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 81 p. $2.00.

Drawing on his experiences in the OPA, Professor Galbraith discusses in a stimulating and original fashion the nature and uses of price control. He makes clear distinctions between the purpose and methods of price control in the "disequilibrium system" of full mobilization and those suitable for partial mobilization.

DAS INTERNATIONALE FLÜCHTLINGSPROBLEM 1919–1950. By Paul Frings. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Frankfurter Hefte, 1951, 295 p.

A solid monograph, by a young German sociologist, on the international refugee question since the First World War. Much of the volume is devoted to national and international efforts to meet this unhappy problem.

The Second World War

GESCHICHTE DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGS. By Kurt von Tippelskirch. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1951, 731 p.

The most satisfactory military history of the Second World War to appear so far in Germany. The author, a former General Staff officer, gives a more balanced picture than Kurt Assmann's "Deutsche Schicksalsjahre" (noted here in April 1951), and avoids the latter's dubious political excursions.

LA SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE (1939–1945). By Guido Gigli. Bari: Laterza, 1951, 500 p. L. 2400.

An expansion of a study originally prepared as an appendix to the "Enciclopedia Italiana." Not a detailed account of the campaigns, it is principally concerned with the political and strategic concepts and errors of the belligerents. Well documented, but most of the sources are already familiar in the United States and Great Britain.

CINQUE ANNI DI GUERRA ITALIANA NELLA CONFLAGRAZIONE MONDIALE 1939–1945. By Rodolfo Corselli. Rome: Tipografia Regionale, 1951, 279 p. L. 1000.

A quick tour, à la Baedeker, through the Second World War.

SOLDAT UNTER SOLDATEN. By Dietrich von Choltitz. Zurich: Europa, 1951, 319 p.

War memoirs of a German field commander: from Rotterdam to Sevastopol to Normandy and finally to Paris.

GENERAL DIETL. Edited by Gerda-Luise Dietl and Colonel Kurt Herrmann. Munich (U. S. Zone): Münchner Buchverlag, 1951, 276 p.

A memorial biography, based on personal notebooks, war diaries, etc., of the "Hero of Narvik" and commander of German forces in Lapland, killed in 1944.

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THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WEST. By General Siegfried Westphal. London: Cassell, 1952, *222* p. 17/6.

The war in the West as seen by the Chief of Staff, successively, to Rommel in Africa, Kesselring in Italy, and Runstedt in France. The German edition, "Heer in Fesseln," was noted here in January 1951.

INFANTERIE IM OSTFELDZUG 1941/42. By Friedrich Hossbach. Osterode (British Zone): Giebel, 1951, *247* p.

A detailed and technical account of the infantry battles in the first seven months of the German campaign against Russia.

WEN SIE VERDERBEN WOLLEN. By Jürgen Thorwald. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1952, 605 p.

The author of two books on Nazi Germany's retreat and defeat in the East now writes of the confusing and contradictory factors which determined Germany's *Ostpolitik* during the war. The greater part of the book deals with the formation of military units made up of Soviet nationals; particular attention is given to the career of General Vlasov.

NORWAY—THE COMMANDOS—DIEPPE. By Christopher Buckley. London: H.M.S.O., 1951, *276* p. 10/6.

The first of a series of short but officially sponsored British histories of the smaller campaigns of the Second World War. This volume deals with the unsuccessful defense of Norway, the Commando raids, and the Dieppe affair.

PHANTOM WAS THERE. By R. J. T. Hills. London: Arnold, 1951, 344 p. 21/. (New York: Longmans, 1952, $5.00.)

The history of the British "GHQ Liaison Regiment," a mobile, independent unit for the gathering of tactical information. Although its activities extended to several theaters the author is not particularly successful in assessing the actual utility of such an organization.

ESCAPE OR DIE. By Paul Brickhill. New York: Norton, 1952, 248 p. $2.95.

Eight well-told stories of R.A.F. men who managed to escape their captors in various theaters.

THEY SAVED LONDON. By Bernard Newman. London: Laurie, 1952, 192 p. 12/6.

British operations against the V-1. A dramatic story told too dramatically.

LA LIBÉRATION DE LA FRANCE. By J. Joubert. Paris: Payot, 1951, 201 p. Fr. 540.

A brief summary of the events leading to the liberation of France, dealing mostly with the Free French and the Allies.

L'ASSAUT DE BREST. By Alix de Carbonnières and Antoine Coste. Brest: Le Bris, 1951, 168 p. Fr. 590.

The story of the siege of Brest in August and September 1944.

"CAMPO 25." By Alfonso del Guercio. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1951, *217* p. L. 600.

The history of the Italian prisoner of war camp in India which refused to recognize the Badoglio armistice in 1943 and persisted in staying at war with the Allies.

TEMPO D'ESILIO. By Paolo Bardessono. Ivrea: Bolognino, 1951, 233 p. L. 500.

The diary of an Italian prisoner of war in the Konigsberg camp from September 1943 to the summer of 1945.

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The United States

TURBULENT ERA. By Joseph C. Grew. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 2 v. $15.00.

This record of a 40-year career in the diplomatic service is based largely on Mr. Grew's diary and letters, edited by Walter Johnson, Professor of History at the University of Chicago. Valuable as a historical source, the sections of greatest current interest are Mr. Grew's review of the events leading to Pearl Harbor—he still believes the United States missed an opportunity for a peaceful settlement with Japan—and his work as Acting Secretary of State in 1945.

THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1929–1941. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 503 p. $5.00.

In this third volume of his memoirs (Volumes I and II noted here in July 1952) the former President is largely concerned with the Depression and the Election of 1932. The last quarter of the book deals with the Roosevelt Administration. Valuable as a document, and welcome as a corrective to extravagant Democratic charges of Republican responsibility for and mismanagement of the Depression, it is not at its best when dealing with the Democrats and the New Deal.

WILLKIE. By Joseph Barnes. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952, 405 p. $5.00.

A political biography by a newspaperman who accompanied Willkie on his world tour in 1942. Because of his remarkable development as a public figure and because he left behind comparatively little written documentation of his views, Willkie is a difficult subject to treat. Mr. Barnes, however, has done a commendable job in recreating the vividness, the "hoarse urgency" of the late presidential candidate.

LET'S GO INTO POLITICS. By Raymond E. Baldwin. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 179 p. $2.75.

An autobiographical guide to practical politics by the former Connecticut Governor and Senator.

WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST. Edited by Edmond D. Coblentz. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952, 309 p. $3.50.

An old colleague weaves a character sketch from the late publisher's letters and writings.

FROM MAJOR JORDAN'S DIARIES. By George Racey Jordan with Richard L. Stokes. New York: Harcourt, 1952, 284 p. $3.50.

The wartime liaison officer at the Great Falls staging base for Russian Lend-Lease supplies elaborates and revises his evidence concerning the Soviet espionage via Lend-Lease channels and American laxity regarding the shipping of strategic materials. More questions are raised than answered.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. By Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 244 p. $3.75.

Working from the premise that the weakest and most critical link in the process of making American foreign policy is the relation between the White House and Capitol Hill, the two authors examine the ambiguities of this relationship and set forth certain recommendations to overcome them. A useful contribution to an important problem.

ISOLATION AND ALLIANCES. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1952, 56 p. $1.50.

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Two lectures explaining to British audiences what the author considers fundamental changes in the premises of American foreign policy in the postwar years.

THE NEXT AMERICA. By Lyman Bryson. New York: Harper, 1952, 248 p. $3.50.

A discussion of the theme that the battle for democracy is between individuals and collectives, the mass organizations which increasingly dominate our society. Mr. Bryson, a professor of education, believes that the individual will have to seek his freedom in fields other than business and politics as now organized.

ECONOMY IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. By Paul H. Douglas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 277 p. $3.75.

Senator Douglas, formerly a professor of economics, here discusses with much practical insight the growth of federal expenditure, waste and nonessential spending, and proposals for budget-cutting.

ECONOMIC FORCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY. By George Soule. New York: Sloane, 1952, 568 p. $6.00.

In this survey of America's economic development, Mr. Soule devotes more than half his space to the twentieth century, which is just as well since he writes as an economist rather than a historian. His treatment of the recent, highly expansive growth of the American economy is, however, exceptionally full and well-informed.

AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE. By Robert Green McCloskey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 193 p. $3.25.

A study of the evolution of American conservative political thought in the persons of William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field and Andrew Carnegie.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE. By Robert M. Mac Iver. New York: Knopf, 1952, 86 p. $2.50.

Five lectures exploring the relationship which should obtain between public authority and private economic power.

FAIR TRIAL. By Richard B. Morris. New York: Knopf, 1952, 494 p. $5.00.

Fourteen criminal cases, from the trial of Anne Hutchinson in 1637 to that of Alger Hiss, all concerned with the question, did the accused receive a fair trial? A valuable analysis of the development of this important aspect of American legal procedure. Because of the current notoriety of the Hiss case its inclusion is something of a distraction in the development of the author's essentially historical theme.

FACES IN THE CROWD. By David Riesman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952, 751 p. $5.00.

Continuing the work begun in "The Lonely Crowd" (noted here July 1951) to develop a scheme for the understanding of "character, politics and society" in America, Professor Riesman here presents 20 portraits of individuals to illustrate some of the facets of the American character in its social and political setting. Although the book deals with individuals the aim is still that of arriving at certain generalizations about American society.

SOUTH OF FREEDOM. By Carl T. Rowan. New York: Knopf, 1952, 270 p. $3.50.

A Negro reporter on a Minneapolis paper reports a visit through the South, where he had grown up. Although he notes many changes brought about by the war and new industry, and observes signs of a better tomorrow, "today is a long day for the Negro."

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Western Europe

THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. By Drew Middleton. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, 313 p. $3.50.

The *New York Times* correspondent in Germany makes a tentative assessment of the progress made by the NATO powers toward the defense of Europe. An urgent expression of the need for a rapid build-up of strength.

MIDCENTURY JOURNEY. By William L. Shirer. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1952, 310 p. $3.50.

A chilly, late autumnal air pervades this reflective and personal journal of a trip in 1950 to Austria, France, Germany and Britain. Mr. Shirer finds little learned and much lost in Europe and in the United States during this last troubled decade.

ARROW IN THE BLUE. By Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 353 p. $5.00.

The first installment of an autobiography of one of the most articulate and intense anti-Communists of our time. The present volume covers his early years from 1905 to his decision in 1931 to enter the Communist Party.

EUROPA NOVA: TRADITION UND REVOLUTION. By Herbert Cysarz and Others. Vienna: Linde, 1951, 200 p. Schillings 35.

Four essays on the creation of a new Europe to carry on the heritage of the West.

WHITHER EUROPE—UNION OR PARTNERSHIP? By M. J. Bonn. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 207 p. $3.75.

An elderly German liberal cautions against overly hopeful expectations of any real European Union in the near future.

FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. By François Goguel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 198 p. $3.00.

While focussing on the elections of June 1951 and their aftermath, this able study by a young French political scientist provides a discerning analysis of the structure and development of French party politics since the war.

THE PARLIAMENT OF FRANCE. By D. W. S. Lidderdale. New York: Praeger, 1952, 296 p. $4.75.

A useful and interesting description of the rules and customs by which the Parliament of the Fourth French Republic is organized and by which it conducts its business.

VINGT ANS DE CAPITALISME D'ÉTAT. By André Armengaud and Others. Paris: Spid, 1951, 302 p. Fr. 450.

Eight critical essays on the advance of "state capitalism" into various sectors of the French economy in the last 20 years.

UN FRAC DE NESSUS. By J.-B. Barbier. Rome: Azienda Editoriale Italiana, 1951, 1400 p. L. 3350.

Interminable memoirs by a French diplomat, largely dealing with his grievances and petty adventures about the world in the years between 1915 and 1945. Anti-Third Republic, anti-American, and not very significant as a source.

ONE SKY TO SHARE. By Raymond Leopold Bruckberger. New York: Kenedy, 1952, 248 p. $3.00.

The journals of a French Dominican, who joined the French resistance during the war and subsequently came to America. Sensitive reflections on France

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struggling to free herself and the United States struggling to measure up to its responsibilities.

DE L'EMPIRE COLONIAL À L'UNION FRANÇAISE. By Noël Bernard. Paris: Flammarion, 1951, 215 p. Fr. 600.

An assistant director of the Pasteur Institute discusses the progress of France's overseas empire, largely in regard to the improvement of public health.

L'UNION FRANÇAISE. By Hubert Deschamps. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1952, 214 p.

A brief description of recent juridical, economic and social developments in France overseas.

RÉPONSE À PSYCHANALYSE DE L'ALSACE. By Hilarius Candidus. Strasbourg: Éditions La Fontaine, 1952, 200 p. Fr. 480.

A pseudonymous and vitriolic critique of Frédéric Hoffet's "Psychanalyse de l'Alsace" (noted here in July 1952).

L'ÉCONOMIE FRANÇAISE EN GRAPHIQUES. VOLUME I: 1949–1950. Paris: Publications Économiques et Sociales, 1951, 160 p. Fr. 500.

A collection of graphs on demography, employment, cost of living, industry, transportation, commerce and finance. Its usefulness to the average reader is limited by the absence of any commentary or guide to interpretation.

ANNE FRANK: THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL. New York: Doubleday, 1952, 285 p. $3.00.

The diary of an adolescent German-Jewish girl during two years in hiding in Holland during the Nazi occupation.

DIE SILBERNEN SPIEGEL. By Hermann Teske. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Vowinckel, 1952, 264 p.

This account of a German officer's experiences in the General Staff from the 1930's through the end of the war is a limited but useful contribution to the recent history of that body.

AUSSENHANDELS JAHRBUCH 1952. By Hans Karl Leistritz. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Wirtschaftsdienst Verlag und Druckerei, 1952, 504 p.

An encyclopedic collection of useful information, designed for exporters, but of more general value.

DRAMATISCHE TAGE IN HITLERS REICH. By Erwin Wickert. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1952, 400 p.

A journalistic reconstruction, based on postwar documentary publications, of four episodes: Hitler's coming to power, the Anschluss, the Sudeten crisis, and the Danzig crisis.

BERLIN BASTION. By Lowell Bennett. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Rudl, 1951, 263 p.

A detailed account, by an American correspondent, of the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948–1949.

NÜRNBERGER TAGEBUCHNOTIZEN. By Viktor Frh. von der Lippe. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Knapp, 1951, 547 p.

A chronicle of the Nuremberg trials of the principal war criminals from November 1945 to October 1946. The material is based on an account dictated daily by the author, who worked for the defense.

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EIN LEBEN FÜR DEN LIBERALISMUS. By Eugen Schiffer. Berlin: Herbig, 1951, 255 p.

Pleasant and relatively relaxed memoirs and portraits relating largely to the late Wilhelmian and early Weimar years, by a former Minister of the German Treasury.

ICH HABE ADOLF HITLER VERBRANNT. By Erich Kempka. Munich (U. S. Zone): Kyrburg, 1951, 151 p.

An account of Hitler's death by his chauffeur and transportation officer, who testified in the Nuremberg trials.

AUF DEM WEGE ZUM NEUEN STAAT. By Hermann Dietrich. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1951, 130 p.

A cabinet member of the Weimar era sketches the tasks awaiting the new Germany, with particular emphasis on the development of agriculture, decentralization of housing, and the extension of co-determination in industry.

VANGUARD OF NAZISM: THE FREE CORPS MOVEMENT IN POST-WAR GERMANY, 1918–1923. By Robert G. L. Waite. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 344 p. $6.00.

A history of the German Free Corps as an important part of the immediate background to National Socialism. Most of the individual episodes of the story are familiar but the book is valuable in tying them together to provide a general picture of this perversely heroic movement.

AMERIKA UND WIR, 1926–1951. By Ernst Jäckh. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1951, 207 p.

Articles on behalf of American-German understanding by a publicist and teacher who spent many years in the United States.

LA FINE DEL REGNO: GRANDEZZA E DECADENZA DI VITTORIO EMANUELE III. By Ugo d'Andrea. Turin: Società Editrice Torinese, 1951, 440 p. L. 2000.

A broadly conceived biography in which the life of Victor Emmanuel III is used to study the history of Italian constitutional monarchy from 1868 to 1946. While defending the late monarch, who in the author's view attempted to maintain the constitution, the book is much more than an apologia.

SICILIA REGIONE. By Paolo d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1951, 530 p. L. 1500.

A solid and valuable survey of Sicily. The author, a geopolitician at the University of Rome, is primarily concerned with Sicilian particularism, but he also treats the problem of the *latifondo* as well as the other leading economic and social difficulties of this island.

A HISTORY OF PORTUGAL. By Charles E. Nowell. New York: Van Nostrand, 1952, 259 p. $4.50.

Only the last chapter of this competent and much needed short history of Portugal deals with the twentieth century.

Eastern Europe

SOVIET OPPOSITION TO STALIN. By George Fischer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 230 p. $4.00.

Taking the Vlasov movement as a case study of Soviet opposition to Stalin, the author explores the larger problems of the nature and forms of such opposition. The

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conclusions, especially those dealing with American misconceptions concerning anti-Stalin opposition within the U.S.S.R., throw much light on the question of future United States policy in this matter.

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF STALIN. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper, 1952, 272 p. $3.50.

A brief portrait of the Soviet ruler, with some speculations on the political consequences of his death. The most satisfactory portions of the book relate to the 14 years when Mr. Fischer was himself a particularly well-placed observer in Russia.

STALIN. By Nikolaus Basseches. New York: Dutton, 1952, 384 p. $4.75.

A biography by an Austrian journalist who spent most of the inter-war years in Russia. Not always accurate, it suffers from the author's natural tendency to project into the 1940's and 1950's the situation as he knew it in the mid-1930's. (Swiss edition, "Stalin." Bern: Scherz, 1950, 356 p. Sw. Fr. 13.40.)

RUSSIA: ABSENT AND PRESENT. By Wladimir Weidlé. New York: Day, 1952, 152 p. $3.00.

An essay on the relationship of Russia's culture to that of Europe and on the Soviet threat to both.

MOSCOU NE CROIT PAS AUX LARMES. By Michel Koriakoff. Paris: Éditions du Monde Nouveau, 1951, 283 p. Fr. 400.

An officer attached to the Soviet Embassy in Paris renounced his post in 1946—a move he described in "Je me mets hors la loi" (1947). The present book is a series of essays in condemnation of the Soviet system.

UNA DELEGAZIONE ITALIANA IN RUSSIA. By Aldo Cucchi. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1951, 145 p. L. 450.

One of the two Italian Communist leaders who broke with the Party in 1951 tells of a journey to Russia in 1950.

MIRROR TO RUSSIA. By Marie Noële Kelly. London: Country Life, 1952, 248 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.50.)

A travel book by the wife of the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. from 1949 to 1951. The author refrains from political discussions but has much to say on Russian art and architecture. Some excellent photographs.

POSTMARKED MOSCOW. By Lydia Kirk. New York: Scribner, 1952, 278 p. $3.00.

The wife of the American Ambassador in Russia from 1949 to 1952 writes of her problems and experiences while running Spaso House.

A WORLD APART. By Gustav Herling. New York: Roy, 1951, 262 p. $3.50.

In his preface to this book by a Polish writer, Bertrand Russell remarks that it is "the most impressive and best written" of the books he has read on the experiences of victims in Soviet labor camps. This judgment seems well merited.

NIGHTMARE. By Jean Rounault. New York: Crowell, 1952, 267 p. $3.50.

A French journalist and citizen, who had been born in Transylvania, was deported to a labor camp in the Donets Basin when the Russians entered Rumania. The underlying grimness of all such experiences is present in his narrative, but the writing is somewhat quieter, with greater emphasis on the human foibles and corruptibility of his Soviet guardians.

ICH SPRECHE DIE WAHRHEIT! By Assi Hahn. Esslingen (U. S. Zone): Bechtle, 1951, 251 p.

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The experiences of a German prisoner of war in Russia from 1943 to 1950. Some information on the Antifa movement and the "Nationalkomittee."

DAS LAND DER STUMMEN MILLIONEN. By Klaus Ackermann. Tübingen (French Zone): Katzmann, 1951, 232 p.

A report on Russia by a former German prisoner of war. Emphasis on labor conditions and agriculture.

DER NATIONALE KAMPF DER KRIMTÜRKEN. By Edige Kirimal. Emsdetten (British Zone): Lechte, 1952, 374 p.

An extensively documented history of the national struggle of the Crimean Turks from 1883 to their deportation in 1946. The major part of the book deals with the years 1917–1918.

HISTOIRE DE GÉORGIE. By Alexandre Manvelichvili. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions de la Toison d'Or, 1951, 476 p. Fr. 1500.

Only the last 40 pages of this general history of the Georgian people deal with twentieth century developments.

RUSSISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE VON DEN ANFÄNGEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART EINSCHLIESSLICH DES RECHTS DER SOWJETUNION. By Lothar Schultz. Lahr (French Zone): Schauenburg, 1951, 340 p.

A concise handbook of the development of Russian and Soviet law.

CONQUEST BY TERROR. By Leland Stowe. New York: Random House, 1952, 300 p. $3.50.

Mr. Stowe, with long experience as a foreign correspondent, went to much effort to accumulate the information here presented on developments in Eastern Europe since the Soviets took over. His findings are grim. The transformation of the area into a very important source of Soviet strength, while not a surprising outcome, is not generally realized because of the cessation of current news from the area.

HISTORY OF LATVIA. By Arnolds Spekke. Stockholm: Goppers, 1951, 436 p. Kr. 45.

This second general history of Latvia to appear in English recently is a more scholarly work than that of A. Bilmanis, "A History of Latvia" (noted here in July 1952). The author was formerly professor and vice-president at the University of Latvia. Originally written in Italian in 1940–43, then translated into Latvian, and finally into English by a group of Latvians in Sweden, it is not particularly readable.

UNDERGROUND: THE STORY OF A PEOPLE. By Joseph Tenenbaum. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 532 p. $4.50.

A popular but substantial presentation of Polish Jewry during the war years, concentrating on the tragic events of Warsaw but also dealing with Jewish groups in other cities and in the partisan movements.

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN HUNGARY, 1947–9. By George Kemény. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, 146 p. $2.50.

A former Under-Secretary for Finance in the Hungarian coalition government gives a first-hand and critical account of the Three Year Plan of 1947–49.

DANUBIO CONTROCORRENTE. By Arrigo Jacchia. Rome: Macchia, 1951, 234 p. L. 800.

A journalist reports *con amore* on a visit to the Hungarian People's Republic.

THE EAGLE AND THE ROOTS. By Louis Adamic. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 531 p. $5.00.

The Jugoslav-born author, who died in 1951, spent seven months in Jugoslavia

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in 1949. This highly subjective book, the product of the visit, is too partial to the present régime to serve as an objective picture, but it contains some useful information, especially concerning the personalities of the Partisan leaders.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

NEW FABIAN ESSAYS. Edited by R. H. S. Crossman. New York: Praeger, 1952, 215 p. $4.00.

An effort, by a group of Labor Party intellectuals, to rethink Socialist theory in the light of mid-twentieth century problems. While the essay lacks the challenge and driving force of the original Fabian essays, the mood of self-examination is certainly appropriate to the present condition of British Socialism. Of particular interest is Denis Healey's essay on the problem of foreign policy—a subject comfortably neglected by the earlier generation of Fabians.

BEATRICE WEBB'S DIARIES, 1912–1924. Edited by Margaret I. Cole. New York: Longmans, 1952, 272 p. $5.00.

Earlier portions of Mrs. Webb's diaries provided much of the material for her two autobiographical works, "My Apprenticeship" and "Our Partnership." The present volume carries her life through the cataclysmic 12 years which saw the death of Edwardian England and the rise of the Labor Party. An important source.

DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY. By R. Bassett. London: Longmans (for the London School of Economics and Political Science), 1952, 654 p. 42/.

Taking the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931–33 as a case study, Mr. Bassett is primarily concerned with the movement of British public opinion on foreign policy. In developing the subject he challenges the techniques and inconsistencies of the critics of Sir John Simon. As in the United States, "criticism became more widespread and more extreme the farther critics were removed in point of time from the action or inaction complained of."

ROGER KEYES. By Cecil Aspinall-Oglander. London: Hogarth, 1951, 478 p. 25/.

An affectionate and admiring biography of the British admiral who was the organizer of the raid on Zeebrugge in the First World War and Director of Combined Operations in the Second.

THE TRAITORS. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Scribner, 1952, 222 p. $3.50.

An able British journalist deals with atomic espionage and the parts played by Allan Nunn May, Bruno Pontecorvo and Klaus Fuchs. Most of the information will be familiar to those who have followed the subject, but the author's interpretation of the relation of such individuals to society is worth reading.

CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN STEEL. By P. W. S. Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner. New York: Kelley, 1951, 374 p. $5.00.

United Steel Companies, Ltd., which produces over one-eighth of the British output of ingot steel, is used to illustrate capital development in the manufacturing industry.

BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION. By Ben W. Lewis. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1952, 313 p. $3.00.

An American professor of economics examines, somewhat tentatively but with sympathy, the activities of the Labor Government in the areas of economic planning and nationalization.

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LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN. By W. Friedmann. London: Stevens, 1951, 322 p. 37/6. (Toronto: Carswell, $7.12.)

A case study, based largely on British and Commonwealth experience, of the effect of recent social changes, especially the trend to the welfare state, upon the law.

CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH. By Heather J. Harvey. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 411 p. $5.00.

A useful compilation, successor to G. E. H. Palmer's handbook, presenting the principal facts, largely from official sources, about the machinery of consultation and coöperation in the new Commonwealth.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SINCE 1815. By C. H. Currey. Sydney: Angus, 1950–51, 2 v. 27/. (New York: Anglobooks, 1952, $6.25.)

A broad, historical survey of that "unique association" which defies simple classification. The first volume deals with the United Kingdom, the independent members of the Commonwealth, and the Republic of Ireland; the second with the non-self-governing territories of the Crown.

A SHORT HISTORY OF IRELAND. By J. C. Beckett. New York: Longmans, 1952, 208 p. $2.25. (London: Hutchinson, 8/6.)

A useful short history, but very general.

CANADA: THE GOLDEN HINGE. By Leslie Roberts. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 288 p. $3.50.

Primarily an informal review of Canada's economic resources and development.

INFLATION AND EXPANSION: ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY. By D. B. Copland. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1951, 130 p. 14/6.

A collection of articles on Australia's postwar economic problems by a leading economist of that dominion.

The Middle East

ISRAEL. By Harry Sacher. London: Weidenfeld, 1952, 332 p. 25/. (New York: British Book Centre, $5.50.)

The principal interest of this book is the extensive record of the military aspects of the struggle in Palestine from the guerrilla fighting before the end of the British Mandate to the Jewish-Arab war.

L'ÉTAT D'ISRAËL DEVANT LE MONDE. By N. List. Paris: Documentation Permanente, 1951, 223 p. Fr. 390.

A survey of the achievements of the new state. The author sees in the economic program of Israel the antidote to the problems arising from colonialism.

BLOOD, OIL AND SAND. By Ray Brock. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1952, 256 p. $3.50.

Anecdotal and flailing reportage on the Middle East.

LET'S TALK TURKEY. By Willie Snow Ethridge. New York: Vanguard Press, 1952, 252 p. $3.00.

The wife of the publisher of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* chats about a summer's stay in Turkey.

DAS ANDERE IRAN. By Edmund Jaroljmek. Munich (U. S. Zone): Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1951, 254 p.

A somewhat dated description based on the author's prewar experience in Iran.

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JOURNEY TO PERSIA. By Robert Payne. New York: Dutton, 1952, 256 p. $3.75.

A sensitive travel book, more concerned with ancient Persia than the present.

South and Southeast Asia

BEYOND THE HIGH HIMALAYAS. By William O. Douglas. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 352 p. $5.00.

Justice Douglas continues his travels in Central Asia, this time a trip in 1951 to the Himalayas. Though a travel book, and a pleasant one, it is also intended to help Americans see Asia somewhat less dimly and remotely.

SOUTHWARDS FROM CHINA. By Woodrow Wyatt. London: Hodder, 1952, 200 p. 10/6.

A Labor M.P. who has toured South-East Asia surveys developments since 1945. Special pleading on behalf of Labor policy but also some useful observations.

INDIA AND THE PASSING OF EMPIRE. By Sir George Dunbar. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 225 p. $4.75.

A rapid and informed survey of Indian history. The period between the First World War and the coming of Indian independence in 1947, when the narrative ends, is somewhat sketchy.

A QUEST FOR GANDHI. By Reginald Reynolds. New York: Doubleday, 1952, 215 p. $3.75.

A report on India and the spread of Gandhi's influence by an English pacifist who worked with Gandhi in 1929 and returned to visit India in 1949.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CEYLON (1931–1946). By I. D. S. Weerawardana. Colombo: Ceylon Economic Research Association, 1951, 207 p. Rs. 8.

A dissertation on the operation of the Donoughmore Constitution. The author questions the importance of this instrument as a preparation for dominion status.

THE SHOALS OF CAPRICORN. By F. D. Ommanney. New York: Harcourt, 1952, 322 p. $4.00.

A British naturalist's account of a cruise in the Indian Ocean. Informative chapters on Mauritius and the Seychelles.

GOLDEN EARTH. By Norman Lewis. New York: Scribner, 1952, 270 p. $4.50.

Well-written account of travels in Burma in 1951.

SOMEWHERE IN NEW GUINEA. By Frank Clune. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 356 p. $4.50.

Travels through Papua and Mandated New Guinea in 1940.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE AMERICAN RECORD IN THE FAR EAST, 1945–1951. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Macmillan (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 208 p. $3.00.

The Professor of Missions and Oriental History at Yale has written a remarkably detached appraisal of this controversial subject. Critical of aspects of American policy, he is fully aware of the complexity of the problem and the difficulties of the choices confronting the United States. A work for the general reader.

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JOURNEY TO THE FAR PACIFIC. By Thomas E. Dewey. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 335 p. $4.00.

In 1951 Governor Dewey made a whirlwind tour of the West Pacific from Japan and Korea to Indonesia. In this book he presents a running narrative of the trip, with accompanying reflections on the state of Asia. While the book is critical of American Far Eastern policy it is neither polemical nor dogmatic. Of particular interest are the reports on Indo-China and Formosa.

THE MIND OF EAST ASIA. By Lily Abegg. New York: Thames, 1952, 344 p. $4.50.

The author's many years in Japan and China have enabled her to describe with considerable insight some of the distinctive qualities of East Asian thought. The use of Jungian psychology to explain this thought is less successful.

REVOLUTION IN CHINA. By Charles Patrick Fitzgerald. New York: Praeger, 1952, 289 p. $4.50.

An eminent student of Chinese history, now on the faculty of the Australian National University, reports on and interprets the victory of the Chinese Communists. In his view, the present régime has good chances for survival because it embodies, in a manner democracy could not, certain deep-rooted concepts of Chinese society. His interpretation of the American rôle in recent events is questionable.

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES OF CHINA. By T. H. Shen. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 407 p. $5.00.

A useful compilation of available information on the basic agricultural resources and the state of farming in China, by the former Deputy Director of the National Agricultural Research Bureau of China. Statistics cover the period up to 1948.

REPORT FROM FORMOSA. By H. Maclear Bate. New York: Dutton, 1952, 290 p. $3.50.

A British diplomatic correspondent, who was born in China, has succeeded in writing an informative and balanced book about this hotly disputed subject. Though sympathetic to the Nationalists and critical of Britain's China policy, it is neither a eulogy nor a polemic. If the answer to the Formosan riddle is not given, the salient facts of the problem are well presented.

FORMOSA UNDER CHINESE NATIONALIST RULE. By Fred W. Riggs. New York: Macmillan (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 195 p. $2.75.

A concise and balanced report on Chinese Nationalist rule in Formosa since 1945, with emphasis on internal development. It is based in large part upon Chinese Nationalist sources.

HONGKONG. By Christopher Rand. New York: Knopf, 1952, 244 p. $3.00.

Personal but skillful reportage on Hong Kong, Macao and Lantao.

THE KOREA STORY. By John C. Caldwell in Collaboration with Lesley Frost. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 180 p. $3.00.

Personal experiences of a public information specialist in Korea up to the outbreak of the war. Very critical of American policy.

BATTLE REPORT: THE WAR IN KOREA. By Captain Walter Karig and Others. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 520 p. $6.00.

Navy and Marine Corps actions in the Korean war through the end of 1950.

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RETOUR DE CORÉE. By Serge Bromberger and Others. Paris: Julliard, 1951, 274 p. Fr. 500.

Four French correspondents combine their reports on the Korean War.

NEW JAPAN: SIX YEARS OF DEMOCRATIZATION. By N. Ito. Tokyo: Japan Peace Study Group, 1951, 239 p. (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, $2.50.)

A rather flat description of changes in the political, economic and social life of Japan under the occupation. Very little expression of any Japanese point of view.

DAUGHTER OF THE PACIFIC. By Yoko Matsuoka. New York: Harper, 1952, 245 p. $3.00.

An unpretentious but illuminating autobiography of the daughter of a samurai family, educated in Korea and the United States.

Latin America and the West Indies

COSTA RICA. By Stacy May and Others. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1952, 374 p. $3.00.

The report of a group of economic investigators sent to Costa Rica in 1950 by the Twentieth Century Fund. Emphasis is upon the state of economic development and on appropriate measures for improvement through the Point Four program.

PUBLIC FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GUATEMALA. By John H. Adler and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 282 p. $5.00.

A scholarly analysis of the impact of government fiscal operations on the Guatemalan economy and on the rate of economic development. The study was made at the invitation of the Banco de Guatemala, which provided many of the statistics.

CONTRIBUTION À L'HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE ET CONTEMPORAINE. By Georges J. Benjamin. Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'État, 1951, 314 p.

A mélange of articles and essays by a Haitian journalist, a large part of which is devoted to diplomatic relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

POR LA AMISTAD INTERNACIONAL. By Cosme de la Torriente. Havana: Academia de la Historia de Cuba, 1951, 455 p.

Some ten years of articles and addresses by the Cuban statesman.

LIBRO HOMENAJE AL CORONEL COSME DE LA TORRIENTE EN RECONOCIMIENTO DE SUS GRANDES SERVICIOS A CUBA. Havana: Ucar, 1951, 514 p.

Letters and articles in honor of Dr. Torriente, arranged to show the steps in his long career of public service.

LES ANTILLES FRANÇAISES. By Jean Pouquet. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1952, 128 p. Fr. 150.

A compact description of France's Caribbean "départements."

BRAZIL. By J. A. Camacho. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, 116 p. $2.50.

A former organizer of B.B.C. programs for Latin America discusses current economic and social problems and experiments in Brazil.

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BLOODY PRECEDENT. By Fleur Cowles. New York: Random House, 1952, 270 p. $3.00.

A somewhat strained effort to draw a parallel between the nineteenth century Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas and Juan Domingo Perón. Contains some able first-hand reporting on the present régime.

Africa

L'ÉQUIPEMENT DES TERRITOIRES FRANÇAIS D'OUTRE-MER. Paris: Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, 1951, 152 p. Fr. 700.

A handsomely illustrated review of the social and economic developments in France's overseas territories—principally in Africa and Madagascar—since the creation of FIDES, the investment fund set up for this purpose after the war.

THE SUDAN QUESTION. By Mekki Abbas. New York: Praeger, 1952, 201 p. $4.25.

An informed and valuable study of the dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The author, a Sudanese Moslem, former editor and member of the Advisory Council for the northern Sudan, is now a director of the board controlling the Gezira irrigation scheme.

THE CHOICE BEFORE SOUTH AFRICA. By E. S. Sachs. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 220 p. $5.75.

A militant South African trade unionist inveighs heatedly and somewhat recklessly against the Nationalist Government.

CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIA. By David Abner Talbot. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 267 p. $4.50.

The application of chamber-of-commerce prose to a description of Haile Selassie's kingdom produces startling results. The author is editor of the *Ethiopian Herald.*

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE LAWS OF ETHIOPIA. By Nathan Marein. Rotterdam: Royal Netherlands Printing and Lithographing Co., 1951, 288 p.

A survey of the laws of Ethiopia, designed for the use of lawyers and judges, by the Advocate General and General Advisor to the government.

ÄTHIOPIENS ENGEL SIND SCHWARZ. By Belo Skarnicel. Vienna: Ullstein, 1951, 282 p. Schillings 75.50.

Travels through Ethiopia and the Sudan.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Agriculture

Foreign agricultural outlook charts 1952. Washington, 1951. 99 p.

Cartels

The International petroleum cartel. Staff report to the Federal Trade Commission, submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly, Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 22, 1952. Washington, 1952. 378 p. $1.50.

Eastern Europe

Forced labor in the Soviet Union. Washington, 1952. 69 p. (Dept. of State. European and British Commonwealth Series 37.) 45¢.

Economic treaties and agreements of the Soviet bloc in eastern Europe, 1945–1951. Washington, Library of Congress, for National Committee for a Free Europe, 1952. 135 p.

Economic Conditions

Economic survey 1951. Stockholm, Svenska Handelsbanken, 1952. 59 p.

Economic survey of Denmark 1952. Copenhagen, Ministry of Finance, 1952. 47 p.

Overseas economic surveys. London, 1952.

Guatemala. 18 p. 1s. Peru. 90 p. 3s. 6d. Portuguese East Africa (Moçambique). 83 p. 3s. 6d. Egypt. 138 p. 4s. 6d.

European Federation

Council of Europe. Publications. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1951–52.

1. Concise handbook of the Council of Europe. 49 p. 30¢. *2.* The Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan. 40 p. 30¢. *3.* The European Convention on Human Rights. 65 p. 50¢. *4.* Low tariff club. 118 p. 75¢. *5.* Documentation on the European Coal and Steel Community. 25 p.

Traité instituant la Communauté Européenne de Défense et documents annexes. Paris, Documentation Française, 1952. 78 p.

Financial Policy and Exchange

The Internal financial situation in member and associated countries. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1952. 55 p.

Inflation and anti-inflationary policies of American States (Point 1 of the Agenda of the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.) Washington, Pan American Union, 1951. 142 p. (ESSE-Doc. 7/51-E (Rev. 1).)

Kapital-Og betalingsbalancen over for udlandet 1950. Foreign assets and liabilities and balance of payments 1950. Copenhagen, Bianco Lunos, 1952. 80 p. Kr. 2.00.

International tax agreements. Vol. III. World guide to international tax agreements, 1843–1951. New York, 1951. 359 p. (1951. XVI. 5.) $4.00.

Germany

Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland. Bonn, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1952.

1. "Bolschewistische Parteilichkeit" als Leitmotiv der sowjetzonalen Kulturpolitik, by Gerhard Möbus. 32 p. *2.* Einkommenstruktur und Lebenshaltung in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone. 80 p. *3.* Das Gesundheitswesen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, by Wilhelm Weiss. 130 p. *4.* Raiffeisens Ende in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, by K. von der Neide. 55 p. *5.* Das Versicherungswesen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone. 48 p. *6.* Zur Lage der bildenden Kunst in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, by Lothar Balluseck. 112 p.

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CONVENTION sur les relations entre les trois puissances et la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et conventions attachées. Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1952. 181 p.

THE WEST German Federal Government, by Elmer Plischke. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1952. 182 p.

BERLIN: development of its government and administration, by Elmer Plischke. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1952. 257 p.

LABOR problems in West Germany, by J. F. J. Gillen. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1952. 119 p.

GREENLAND

GREENLAND. Ringkjobing, Rasmussens, 1951. 166 p.

ITALY

I DOCUMENTI diplomatici Italiani. First Series, 1861–1870, Volume I; Eighth Series, 1935–1939, Volume XII. Rome, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1952.

JAPAN

JAPAN in the world of today. Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952. 15 p.

JAPAN; her security and mission. Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952. 15 p.

KOREA

PRISONER of war situation in Korea. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, House, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 9, 1952. Washington, 1952. 27 p.

REQUESTING the Secretary of Defense to furnish to the House of Representatives full and complete information with respect to insurgency in prisoner-of-war camps in Korea and Communist-inspired disturbances of the peace in Japan. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, House, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. Res. 661, Je. 10, 1952. Washington, 1952. 13 p. (H. Rept. 2128.)

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, House, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. Res. 662, Je. 10, 1952. Washington, 1952. 13 p. (H. Rept. 2129.)

REPORT of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China. Prague, World Council of Peace, 1952. 61 p.

GENERAL RIDGWAY. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., May 21, 1952. Washington, 1952. 34 p.

STATEMENT of General Hudelson on Korea. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 9, 1952. Washington, 1952. 3 p.

LABOR

THE INTERNATIONAL Labour Code 1951. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952. 2 v.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 36th Session, 1953. Reports IV (1), V (1), VI (1). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952.

TEXTILE wages; an international study. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952. 126 p. (Studies and reports. New Series 31.) 75¢.

ANNUAL report of the Trade Unions Registry for the year 1951, by J. B. Prentis. Kuala Lumpur, 1952. 42 p.

LATIN AMERICA

STANDARDS for the exercise of the authority of the Council with respect to specialized conferences. Approved by the Council of the Organization of American States. Washington, Pan American Union, 1952. 9 p. (Conferences and Organizations Series 18.) 10¢.

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